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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an attempt to resurrect the strategic and philosophical thinking of 
Henry Kissinger in order to unlock the Iranian-American impasse. Encounters between 
the two countries have been in a state of deadlock since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
though its genesis dates back, at least, to the American-sponsored coup d’état of 1953. 
Within the American foreign policy establishment, no one looms larger than Dr. 
Kissinger: his contributions intersect the two worlds of academic diplomatic history and 
statecraft at the highest levels of international relations. He was the chief diplomat at a 
momentous period. Kissinger―through his writings and public policy―emphasizes 
balance of power​, ​raison d’état, and international pluralism​. As a result, these are the 
scaffolds of this study. 
 Using these concepts (in addition to others), I bring forth new policy possibilities 
for the United States and Iran to adopt, centered around the general and mutual position 
of ​détente​. It is my contention that such recommendations could help mollify the deep 
and mutual antagonism that undergirds the current stalemate. 
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 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context and Subject of Study 
The political impasse between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
is one of the greatest foreign policy conundrums of the last half century. The souring of 
relations dates back, at least, to the 1953 coup d'etat, when the U.S. supplanted the 
democratically elected leader Mohammad Mosaddegh of Iran for a pro-American puppet 
regime headed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Twenty-six years later in 1979, the Iranian 
Islamic revolution, led by Ruhollah Khomeini, used built up bitter civil sentiment around 
western imperialism and the Shah to catalyze the forthcoming revolution. Since then, 
anti-Americanism has been an official dictum of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. In 
return, the United States has continually casted the Islamic Republic of Iran as a rogue 
state for the past thirty-nine years.  
The recent ratification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 
2015 is a noteworthy disruption to U.S. Iranian relations. The deal, however, does not 
mark a fundamental alteration. Tehran and Washington both remain apprehensive. If the 
nuclear deal underscored an easement of relations, it should be viewed as temporary; the 
deal does not guarantee the suspension of Iranian nuclear ambitious into perpetuity, nor 
has it curtailed American-Iranian enmity. While Iran’s nuclear ambitions are curbed for 
the coming ten to fifteen years, hostilities and tension between the two nations can be 
identified in nearly all major conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa: Yemen, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. These proxy military conflicts are compounded by the 
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 political rhetoric of President Donald Trump and his administration’s lack of a coherent 
Middle East strategy, let alone a general foreign policy. Moreover, President Trump has 
repeatedly expressed his distaste for the JCPOA and his intentions to remove the United 
States from the framework.  In Iran, the regime is stuck in limbo; the ideas it propagates 
oscillate between those that favor an isolationist stance in the name of independence and 
those willing to consider international engagement as a mechanism to domestic 
prosperity. The former is supported by principlists, who seek to preserve the initial 
character of the revolution, while the latter, taking a pragmatic approach, want the 
revolutionary spirit to evolve in order to meet contemporary demands and conditions.  
Given these conditions, I argue that the United States and the larger international 
community should not settle for the JCPOA as the premier arbitrator of Iranian-U.S. 
relations, let alone Iranian relations with the wider international community; the nuclear 
deal is not a foreign policy, only the product of one. While it is undeniable that relations 
between the two countries ​should​ be better, are the current socio-political conditions 
propitious for enhanced relations? Hence, one must ask oneself this: what is practically 
possible to improve relations, rather than what is ideally desirable?  
Iranian-U.S. relations can be viewed within a larger narrative of the international 
order. At the end of World War II, the United States assumed a role of influence and 
stature that was unprecedented. As the the most powerful nation to emerge out of the 
WWII era, it had the means to dictate an international order ideal for ‘liberal democracy’ 
and a liberal economic order. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United 
States’ vision for world order proved durable and favorable. The U.S. has remained the 
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 preeminent guardian of the international order. Its hegemonic position, however, is in 
jeopardy.  
Hegemony ― in the Gramscian conception ― is defined as a balanced mix of 
domination and consent. In the context of this paper, hegemony can be contextualized 
and understood by perceiving the United States as the dominator and most other nations 
as the consenters. A country must possess preeminent power to be hegemonic, but that is 
not the sole condition.n  To be hegemonic, a nation must receive acceptance from other 1
nations to be dominant. Assent is bestowed under the conditions of mutual exchange and 
compromise. In other words, nations grant legitimacy upon the United States when their 
demands and needs are fulfilled to a certain extent. If permission is absent and the U.S. 
resorts to pure coercion, dictatorship is all that remains, not a hegemonic balance between 
the ruler and the ruled. Similarly, if permission is absent and the U.S. falls into 
isolationism, removing itself as the great power on the world stage, hegemony fades. 
In this paper, I propose that the United States of America is losing the support 
necessary to remain hegemonic. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Turkey are all examples of major 
nations who are challenging the hegemony of the United States by diplomatic, economic, 
1 ​The U.S.’s supremacy and its eligibility for hegemony flows from its economic, 
political, military, and cultural power. At $19.5 trillion, the United States generates 24% 
of global GDP and it is a beacon of innovation. With 177 diplomatic missions around the 
planet, America has impressive political reach and influence. The second largest military 
on earth, but the most powerful, belongs to the United States, with over 800 bases located 
across the world and a military presence in 160 countries. A final example of American 
prominence is how deeply American culture - in the form of cinema, music, publishing 
and art -permeates throughout the globe. Despite these forms of power, the U.S. is not 
automatically a hegemon. 
 
 
7 
 and militaristic means. These Nations are uncomfortable or unsatisfied with American 
preeminence; they feel, perhaps, that the U.S. is sliding too far towards pure coercion or 
they find themselves in enhanced positions of power. In fact, with the inevitable rise of 
India and China, and maybe Brazil and Russia, simply due to their sheere magnitude and 
resources, the United States’ power is decreasing in relative terms. The world is slowly 
entering an era that will be defined by multiple centers of power―not just by the 
unipolarity of the United States. 
Regardless, they have determined that their desiderata are not being adequately 
fulfilled. This is occurring because of their internal calculations (i.e. they feel 
emboldened by their growth in power), the behavior of the United States in the 
international arena (i.e. they feel threatened or insecure), or some combination of the two. 
Hence, the U.S. is at a pivotal junction: will it resort to a winner-takes-all game of pure 
coercion to achieve a desired outcome, will it utilize mutual-exchange and compromise, 
or will it retreat into isolationism? Pursuing the second option has the potential to 
reinvigorate hegemony, where, arguably, a more stable world is maintained. In addition, 
if the second option does not resuscitate American hegemony, it will help the United 
States transition to the impending era of global multipolarity. The other two options lead 
to paths of uncertainty and insecurity. The affairs between Iran and the United States is 
one of the fronts where the future of American hegemony will be decided.   
In the case of Iran, I argue coercion is not productive, and, therefore, the time for 
creative diplomacy has come. Such a change could reinvigorate American hegemony and 
open new opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is arguably the chief 
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 country in the Middle East  and the U.S. is the unquestionable regional hegemon in the 2
Western Hemisphere.  As such, it is in the interest of the United States and Iran, in the 3
long run, to amend relations. To make this happen, the U.S. needs to retrieve the 
intellectual and strategic thinking of its distinguished foreign policy makers. In this 
context, no one looms larger than Henry Kissinger. The following paper will evaluate the 
prospect of critically adapting the strategic, intellectual, and diplomatic thinking of Henry 
Kissinger to transform the current deadlock.  
Henry Kissinger is a unique statesman, unparalleled, perhaps, by all other 
Secretaries of State and National Security Advisers. He is a thinker of exceptional 
capacity, with personal and intellectual roots in Europe and its international affairs and 
philosophical traditions. His greatest achievement was his diplomatic imagination to 
rethink relations with the People's Republic of China, which ultimately helped usher the 
P.R.C. onto the world stage and the triangular balance of power that followed in its wake. 
Moreover, he tactfully maneuvered the isolationist sentiment in the United States during 
the 1970s―catalyzed by the Vietnam War―so as to preserve America’s place in the 
international order. We are in a similar political environment today, as conveyed by the 
2  Its supremacy is derived from its combined economic, military, political, and religious 
might. Iran has the second largest GDP in the Middle East at $425 billion. It has one of 
the most powerful armies in the region, only slightly behind those of Turkey, Egypt, and 
Israel, and it has a population of 80.26 million people. Moreover, it has had, and most 
likely still does have, nuclear ambitions. Last, the Islamic Republic of Iran has immense 
religious and political influence in the region, which is largely derived from its position 
as the preeminent Shia majority nation. 
3 Here, the concept of hegemony follows the definition that John Mearsheimer bestows 
upon the term in his book ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​: ​military and economic 
dominance over a connected and manageable landmass. ​According to Mearsheimer, the 
United States is the only nation to have ever achieved regional hegemony. 
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 Trumpian slogan “America First.” Finally, his policy of detenté ushered in the lowest 
levels of hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States since the beginning of 
the Cold War. These three constructions―triangular balance of power, a global United 
States of America, and detenté― hold relevance to the United States’ conundrum with 
Iran.  
1.2 Central Questions 
To be clear: this paper explores the potential of Kissinger’s thinking to the 
prospect of overcoming the deadlock between Iran and the United States, and ultimately 
as an avenue for enhancing American legitimacy on the world stage. With that said, three 
central questions arise: 
1. What was Kissinger’s approach to international affairs? 
2. What are the main sources of the Iran-U.S. impasse?  
3. Could Kissinger’s intellectual and strategic legacy be useful in the thawing of 
U.S.-Iran relations? 
Well researched and thought out answers to these questions are important for the United 
States, Iran, and the rest of the world for a number of tangible reasons beyond the 
theoretical discussion of hegemony and its conjunctural implications. The palpable 
importance of the topic is explored in the following section.  
1.3 Importance 
Sour relations between the U.S. and Iran impedes enhanced security and stability 
in the Middle East. Iran and the United States often engage in proxy warfare by backing 
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 Shia and Sunni militias, respectively. The result is stark sectarian conflict. If the U.S. and 
Iran overcome their points of contention, security in the region would improve. Stability 
in the Middle East is one of the United States’, let alone the entire international 
community’s, greatests interests abroad. Peace, however, will not be achieved without the 
cooperation of Iran. 
Second, amelioration of the status quo will have economic consequences. For 
example, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Europe on Iran restrict trade and 
development. When the Iran Nuclear Deal was implemented in 2015, it cleared the way 
for Boeing to win a trade agreement with Iran Air worth $16.6 billion.  If the all 4
sanctions were lifted, similar agreements of greater magnitude would transpire.  
Third, transcending the current stalemate would allow for improved relations with 
the Global North and the Islamic World. Currently, there is a mentality that the Muslim 
world and the Western world are at odds with each other ― a narrative brought into 
precision by Samuel Huntington’s ​The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order​. Reconstructing relations with Iran would deal a great symbolic blow to 
Huntington’s thesis and deflate the rhetoric of extremist groups such as the Islamic State. 
The sweetening of relations would be a victory for cosmopolitan and multicultural 
projects across the world.  
Fourth, Iranian people are a proud people with deep civilizational roots. They 
have been a defined group since the ancient world. Consequently, they have been able to 
adapt and evolve. Historically, the Iranian people have not been defined by isolation. On 
4 Erdbrink 2016.  
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 the contrary, they have been associated with cosmopolitanism, vibrancy, and innovation. 
Their current withdrawn mentality contradicts their history. Thus, they too need to 
re-enter the international arena with greater confidence in pursuit of their legitimate 
national interests. 
More specifically, 50% of the Iranian population is under the age of 24 years. The 
country’s large youthful population will be looking for opportunity in the coming 
decades; opening up to U.S. and the rest of the world will provide numerous possibilities 
to meet the ambitions of the Iranian people. 
On a personal note, this thesis is of significance to me. I first became captivated 
by Iran in 2012, as a sophomore in high school, when I read the ​All the Shah’s Men​ and 
Rest: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future ​by Stephen Kinzer. Since then, I haven’t had 
the opportunity to pursue my interest as an academic subject. I want to rekindle my 
studies of this important nation. Second, state to state relations has not been part of my 
main academic experience at Macalester. International Studies transcends international 
borders, diplomacy, and trade, but this does mean inter-state and world politics are 
irrelevant. Before I attend graduate school, I want to dabble into the field of international 
politics. Third, I have recently completed a paper on the life and thinking of Henry 
Kissinger. In that assignment, I discussed the main contours of his life, his greatest 
achievements and failures, and the lessons one can learn from his tenure as an 
international leader.  
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 1.4 Sources and Methodology 
I use three types of literature to inform this paper: biographies, Kissinger’s 
writings, and secondary sources. I will briefly describe the nature of each type of source 
below, but I will not list the exact titles. For a full bibliography, see the end of the 
document. 
First, I have read a range of biographies that approach Kissinger’s life from 
different angles. Each biographer brings a certain set of assumptions and a bias for 
information and narratives that support their agenda. Kissinger is a controversial and 
complex individual, so it was important to read a variety of narratives that attempt to 
capture the essence of his life and his strategic thinking.  
Second, I rely on Kissinger’s writings in order to discern the nature his strategic 
and diplomatic thinking. I incorporate writings from different periods in his life. 
Diplomacy ​and​ World Order​ are the texts that I most heavily rely upon. The lessons and 
concepts extracted from his writings constitute the foundation on which I formulate the 
policy prescriptions to overcome the impasse. 
Third, I have read a wide scope of secondary sources. These sources are the heart 
of the literature review. Relevant books cover concepts such as the state, leadership, 
realism and idealism, and diplomacy. Moreover, pertinent secondary sources are ones 
that will provide for a robust, historical understanding of U.S.-Iran relations. Finally, 
recent events and current events vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, and takes at their 
interpretation, are sourced primarily from ​Foreign Affairs​. 
 
13 
 The methodology of the thesis is to integrate the life and philosophy of Henry 
Kissinger with history, international political theory, and current events (as they pertain 
to the U.S. & Iran). Through such integration, I conclude whether there is any prospect of 
overcoming the impasse between the U.S. and Iran through Kissinger’s thinking and 
writing. 
The thesis has two main parts: (1) a critical biography of Kissinger; (2) a case 
study of U.S.-Iran relations. The former is composed of historical context, the contours of 
the life of Kissinger, and the assets and liabilities of his leadership style and his 
philosophy of diplomacy and international relations. The latter is composed of a 
historical survey of Iran-U.S. relations since WWII, the current state of affairs, and the 
application of Kissinger’s thinking to the standoff in relations. 
1.5 Organizational Structure 
The thesis is composed of five chapters: (1) Introduction; (2) Literature Review; 
(3) Kissinger: Life, Policy, and Thinking; (4) U.S.-Iran Encounters: Discourse and 
Foreign Policy; (5) Prospects for Reconciliation and Balance of Power.  
In the literature review, five concepts are explained at length: the ​state​, 
leadership​, ​international​ ​relations​, ​balance​ ​of​ ​power​, and ​diplomacy​. These five 
concepts, in aggregate, form the foundation of the topic at hand. The United States of 
America and the Islamic Republic of Iran are states. When they interact, they do it 
through the apparatus of the state.  As such, it will be necessary to comprehend the nature 
of the state and the state system. International relations is the study of how states conduct 
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 and formulate relations, as well as coordinate multi and bilateral ventures and 
agreements. This paper is centered around the condition and prospect of Iranian-U.S. 
relations; therefore, it is necessary to explicitly define international relations and the 
schools of thought that make up the discipline. Diplomacy is one of the systemic tools 
and a real-life articulation of international relations. The paper's main purpose is to 
evaluate the merit of Kissinger’s approach to diplomacy ― in order to do this, a 
conceptual cognizance of diplomacy will be helpful. Last, leadership is the means by 
which great transformations occur within organized society. Considering that this paper 
seeks to find a plausible path to transformation through diplomacy, strong leadership is 
obligatory to the process. Therefore, leadership will be explored as a concept.  
The third chapter explores the life and philosophy of Henry Kissinger. His life 
will be excavated for its failures and accomplishments and his philosophy of international 
affairs will be critiqued for its limitations and value. These isolated discernments will be 
synthesized with the findings of chapter 4, creating a framework fit for discerning the 
usefulness of Kissinger’s strategic thinking, with regard to the impasse.  
Chapter four focuses on four tasks. First, it conducts a brief survey of Iran and 
depicts the relations between the U.S. and Iran from the end of WWII to today. Second, it 
describes the Iranian approach to world politics and how it conceives of the United 
States. Third, it demonstrates how the Islamic Republic of Iran is depicted in American 
discourses. Finally, it evaluates the state of the current affairs between the two nations. 
The goal of this chapter is to isolate the historic sources of the impasse and to determine 
the causes of tension. 
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 In the fifth chapter, I juxtapose the strategic thinking of Henry Kissinger and his 
foreign policy directives with the historical development of American-Iranian relations, 
the current state of affairs between the two countries, and the contemporary power 
dynamics of the Middle East. Ultimately, after making the case for ​detenté​, I lay out the 
specific policy prescriptions I derive from Kissinger’s thinking that would allow for 
detenté​ and a new balance of power to transpire and solidify.  
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CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION 
 
2.1 The State 
The modern state is the institution through which humans organize society and 
shape their political and social relations. Social organization and the pursuit of 
technological advancement are the two historic breakthroughs that set humans apart from 
other primates.  Hence, as our approach to social organization, the state is a fascinating 5
subject of study. Why and how the state developed is a question that has captivated 
scholarly attention since the beginning of the academy. Such a task, however, is outside 
the scope of this piece of work. What is attempted are answers to the questions of: what is 
the state and what are its defining features? What were its main stages of development 
leading up to its contemporary rendition? These questions are be explored below. 
2.1.1 Power and the State 
Scholars of politics disagree on the nature of the state; that is, what its chief 
purpose is, or what it should be, as the overarching architecture of organizational life. 
Yet, there is general consensus that power is fundamentally connected to the state and 
without it, the state would not exist.  
Gianfranco Poggi―a sociologists specializing in modern and ‘classical’ political 
institutions― wrote a book titled ​The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects​. 
5 ​Stavrianos 2015, p.17.  
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 Within his book, Poggi masterfully dissects the state: he expounds on its components, 
development, controversies, and its modern-liberal-democratic form. His tracing follows 
the Western European tradition of the state. Hence, one critique is the lack of thought 
given to state development beyond the region of Western Europe. Nevertheless, his book 
is of high value to anyone seeking a conceptualization of the state. This section relies 
heavily on his volume.  
Poggi’s ​The State ​begins with a discussion of social power. Like most scholars, he 
perceives social power to be the backbone of the state. He states, “...in all societies, some 
people clearly and consistently appear more capable than others of pursuing their own 
objectives; and if these are incompatible with those envisaged by others, the former 
manage somehow to ignore or override the latter’s preferences. Indeed, they are often 
able to mobilise, in pursuit of their own ends, the others’ energies, even against their will. 
This, when all is said and done, is what social power is all about.”  For Poggi, then, 6
power is the ability to make others do what you want.  
Poggi suggests this definition, perhaps, is too generic. Consequently, he offers a 
tripartite division of social power. For this, he turns to the words of the Italian political 
philosopher Bobbio:  
We may classify the various forms of power by reference to the facilities             
the active subject employs in order to lay boundaries around the conduct            
of the passive subject … we can then distinguish three main classes of             
power: economic, ideological, and political. Economic power avails itself         
of the possession of certain goods, rare or held to be rare, in order to lead                
those not possessing them to adopt a certain conduct, which generally           
consists in carrying out a certain form of labour … Ideological power is             
based upon the fact that ideas of a certain nature, formulated … by persons              
6 Poggi 1990, p.3. 
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 endowed with a certain authority, put abroad in a certain manner, may also             
exert an influence upon the conduct of associated individuals … political           
power, finally, is grounded in the possession of facilities (weapons of all            
kind and degrees of potency) by means of which physical violence may be             
exerted. It is coercive power in the strict sense of the term.   7
 
Therefore, all power is generated from the procurement of scarce resources (capital, 
social influence, and weaponry). What distinguishes political power from normative and 
economic power is its paramountcy and ultimacy.  These unique traits are derived from 8
political power’s unique ability to generate coercion on a large scale. By extension, 
political power is emphatically attached to facilities by which violence may be deployed. 
The ability to exhibit the provisions to coercion is what allows one, or an entity, to make 
others do what they or it wants ― to have power over them. 
The language used thus far might confuse the reader into thinking that all 
commands are carried out by the constant presence of coercion. This not the case. 
Legitimacy ― the willful conformity to authority ― is what allows for “stabilised 
political power relationships”  that do not heavily rely on the pervasive use of violence. 9
Today, political power is legitimate when it is regulated by principles that are codified 
into a body of laws. Variations in law and its application are what allows for a variety of 
political experiences.  
7 Ibid., p.4. 
8 Paramountcy of political power ― political power safeguards its claimed territory from 
external aggression, thereby allowing economic and normative power to assert their 
authority over a population. Ultimacy of political power ― political power is the last 
resort in dictating what is an appropriate formulation of interpersonal relations; that is, 
physical force is the ultimate facility when normative and economic sources of power fail 
to sufficiently order relations internal to the claimed territory. Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p.7. 
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 What is the relationship between the state and political power? The state is ​an 
entity by which political power can be institutionalized. Hence, the state is not ​the​ only 
body in which political power is located. It is, however, the most predominant form. 
Throughout the centuries, the state has widened in scope and scale, thereby stretching 
political power and its institutional manifestations into realms previously unimaginable 
― this is one of the key components of the modern state. Before a discussion on the 
development of the state takes place, its main components and modern features will be 
exposed.  
2.1.2 Components of the State  
For this paper, the relevant components of the state that Poggi highlights are 
eightfold: the state is (1) an organization; (2) demarcated; (3) a monopoly on violence; 
(4) sovereign; (5) a territory; (6) centralized; (7) a coordination of parts; (8) a member of 
the state system. 
One, the state is an ​organization​. As such, the state is the instrument ― or 
organization ― by which political power is invested. In principle, the state is ​one 
organization. Yet, Poggi suggests that it is “implausible” to render the modern state as 
one​ organization “in view of the enormous expansion and internal diversification of 
contemporary states.”  Poggi attempts to reconcile the aforementioned discrepancy by 10
insisting that while the state has expanded and come to consist of separate organs, its 
oneness is maintained through common purpose and a set of political interests.  
10 Ibid., p.19-20. 
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 Second, for an organization to be a state, it must be ​demarcated​ from all other 
organizations. Its central point of divergence ― “at a maximum” ― is that it “performs 
all​ and ​only​ political activities.”  It is helpful here to conceive of religion, enterprise, and 11
civil society as spheres that are separate from the state, but still develop and maintain 
organizations to pursue their own interests. Social and economic organizations can 
influence the political process; however, they do not possess the prerogative of coercion 
that allows the state to execute collective, political activities. 
Third, coercion is the sole privilege of the state (i.e. monopoly on violence). This 
component does not need much explanation, as it has been addressed intermittently 
throughout. Though, it should be said that while a state exercises control over a 
population typically through coercion, there is “ultimacy” attached to state compulsion. 
That is, “the state specialises in last-resort control” after the possibility of pain and 
imprisonment does not deter illegal action or after economic and normative organizations 
fail to control the population by their own means.  ‘Other organizations’ include 12
religious and education organizations, as well as labor obligations. In other words, 
violence is used as a last resort.  
Fourth, an organisation is a state when it is sovereign. In short, this means that the 
state is outside the control of any other organization or state and, thus, the state at hand is 
the only power exhibiting control or influence over the population. Not only does it claim 
such entitlements, but it is also willing to prove its sovereignty, if necessary, by the 
method of war. It is subject and bound to no outside rules. In fact, sovereignty, in part,  is 
11  Ibid., p.20. 
12  Ibid., p. 21. 
 
21 
 the ability to make rules and enforce them, irrespective of other states in the state system. 
Finally, sovereignty implies that a state is free to conduct an independent foreign policy 
that is line with its national interests. 
Fifth, the components discussed thus far ― particularly the notion of sovereignty 
― have an implicit assumption: the state is the one and only state within a definitive 
territory​. This does not mean a state needs to be the only state in the state system, as this 
would constitute a universal empire. Nevertheless, it does insinuate the need to be the 
only organization holding claim to sovereignty within a explicit territory. Borders 
demarcate a state and within these borders, the state “exercises jurisdiction and law 
enforcement...and… it is committed to protecting against encroachment from any other 
political power.”  Furthermore, Poggi evokes the thinking of an Italian jurist to convey 13
the relationship between the state and territory: “the state does not ​have​ a territory, it ​is​ a 
territory.”  Without a defined and internationally recognized territory, an organization 14
cannot be a state. States can exist ​de facto​, however, if it controls a territory but is not 
recognized by the international community. 
Sixth, to be a state, political power and political activities must originate or refer 
to the organ of the state that ultimately legitimizes activities carried out by bodies beyond 
the epicenter of power. For example, the office of the presidency and the legislative 
branch bestows the privilege to the Department of Homeland Security to use force and 
the Department is ultimately accountable to the Presidency and Congress. That is, 
members of the population “cannot exercise power, except in the capacity of agents of 
13  Ibid., p.23. 
14  Ibid., p.23. 
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 the state itself, or by influencing the activities of such agents.”  Hence, the use of force is 15
perceived as plausibly legitimate or excusable only when violence is authorized by the 
state. While the state might very well consist of many specialized and distinguishable 
organs, the power to make decisions at the collective level or the use of coercion is not a 
prerogative of all agents or organs of the state, but only the elite who have such 
entitlement assured by the institutional dictates of the centralized state. In short, a state is 
an organization where power is ​centralized​. An important caveat, however: it can be 
distributed and checked.  
The seventh component of the state is what Poggi titles “formal coordination of 
the parts.”  As the state developed from its initial form to the modern state of today, the 16
organs of the state grew in size and in number. In order to remain a centralized and 
unitary organization, the organs of the state and their faculties need be integrated and 
coordinated through some interconnecting mechanism, such as hierarchy and 
bureaucracy. The organs of the state do not exist as independent power hubs, but rather as 
entities that enhance and support the centralized state.  17
The eighth condition of a state ― membership in the state system ― is not 
inherent in a state’s own singular existence, but, rather, brought about by the presence of 
many states. The state system is comprised of all sovereign states ― the fact that there is 
not a singular, unitary state, gives rise to inter-state relations. Though these states lie next 
to one another and are similar in nature, “these units do not consider themselves, and do 
15  Ibid., p.22. 
16  Ibid., p.23. 
17  Ibid. 
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 not conduct themselves in relation to one another, as organs of that wider entity, as they 
would if the latter had established and empowered them and were in a position 
authoritatively to regulate their conduct.”  The regulation of inter-state conflict would 18
demand a world government with the authority to arbitrate disputes. The existence of any 
such government would result in the decline of the state ― according to the definition 
laid out here ― because requirements, such as sovereignty, would not hold. These 
conditions are the impetus behind international diplomacy. While no one state has direct 
power to make decisions on the behalf of another, diplomacy, war, coercion, and 
sanctions can be used as tools of persuasion and compromise.  
The account of the state detailed so far applies, according to Poggi, “[to] the 
advent of the modern era, [so] then in later stages of that era states acquired features not 
comprised within that definition.”  Nationhood, democratic legitimation, citizenship, 19
law, and bureaucracy are the ‘features’ Poggi emphasizes. In the following paragraphs, 
these “features” are regarded as contemporary-modern features, or simply contemporary, 
in order to distinguish them from the eight components of the modern state that were 
summarized above ― these components are simply referred to as modern components. 
Accordingly, what is expounded upon below characterizes and differentiates the modern 
state from the contemporary-modern state. 
Nationhood is a defining feature of the contemporary state. Nationhood is 
succinctly conceptualized as the sense of mutual belonging amongst people of many 
walks of life. As states grew in size, their borders increasingly encompassed a 
18  Ibid., p.24. 
19  Ibid., p.26. 
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 heterogeneous population, making it difficult to generate a sense of nation along ethnic 
lines. Still, a few states do possess a relatively homogenous population, such as Japan. As 
a result, one can detect two types of nationhood ― one generated along ethnic lines and 
one on civil lines, or a combination of the two. Poggi explains the possibilities of civic 
nationhood: “[nationhood] came to encompass, beside an ethnic bond, also a religious 
one, or a linguistic commonality, or one grounded on the sharing of institutional legacies, 
or something as vague as historical experience or a sense of destiny.”  Nevertheless, 20
nationhood can be perceived, on one hand, as a tool of the state to legitimize their rule 
over a population ― a means of consolidating and establishing power. On the other hand, 
nationhood can be seen as a tool of the civilian population. The argument goes that a 
unified populace along civil or ethnic lines will have the organizational capacity to 
penetrate the state and shape its policy to reflect the interests of the people. Nationalism 
and self determination, in the wake of decolonization, rearranged the state system’s 
borders, which helps to explain its importance to the contemporary state.  
The title of citizen bonds a person to a land and its nation. In theory, citizenship 
implies a level of equality amongst all citizens, in terms of state entitlements and 
obligations. When one is a citizen of a state, it is typically their prerogative to participate 
in the formation of a state’s agenda, which usually transpires through the electoral 
system. Yet, this is typically not the extent of involvement a citizen is entitled to ― one 
can expand their participation by running for public office. In the case of a theocracy or 
monarchy, citizenship might make you eligible for civil service, but the position will be 
20  Ibid., p.26. 
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 bestowed upon you by a theocrat or monarch, not by the will of the majority. It should be 
noted that citizenship began as a privilege granted to male elites ― typically those with 
economic power. In the global north, women were granted citizenship only in the 20th 
century. Still, there are states that deny certain demographics citizenship and, thus, its 
entitlements. 
The expansion of citizenship is the product of a wider phenomenon that is unique 
to the contemporary-modern state: democratization. Yet, this process did not occur 
universally, within all states (i.e. not all nation-states are democracies). Democratization 
represents a change in the state’s purpose: while political power is vested in the state, the 
constituency chooses the leaders to execute the prerogatives of the state, according to 
which candidate they believe will keep their interests in mind. Thus, the state exists to 
serve the people, not to serve itself. Furthermore, democratization gave impetus to the 
state as a provider of services and public goods. In exchange, the people abide by the law 
of the state and respect its authority. It should be noted that the way democratization has 
been described above does not, ironically, necessitate a state to be democratic, 
considering there are states, today, who provide services and public goods to its 
population, despite a democratic deficiency.  
The relationship between state and law has evolved over the course of the modern 
era. For long, the state has been the enforcer of law, but it has not always been the 
architect. Historically, religion, tradition, and economic interests have played a heavy 
hand in the production of law, codified or oral. The advent of sovereignty catalyzed the 
politicization of law and constitutionalism made law-making a deliberative affair instead 
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 an absolute affair. Accordingly, the state's developed legislative bodies that possessed the 
right to create law.  
A pattern of increased scale and scope is found in the previous paragraphs. 
Today’s state is different from earlier renditions because of the general increase in its 
primary activities. Initially, the purpose of the state was confined to the incubation of 
political power, but, over time, the state occupied itself with broader concerns. What 
emerged was the bureaucratic state. Bureaucracy alleviated the tension between a state’s 
unitary makeup and its multi-part composition; bureaucracy is the thread that weaves all 
the components of a state into a uniform entity. The bureaucratic model connects the 
epicenter of political power to the organs of the state that carry out a diverse set of social 
activities. In other words, bureaucracy allows the state to take on a larger set of activities 
while harboring the ultimate control of these activities under the supreme seats of power, 
such as parliament or the executive branch.  
2.2 International Relations 
International relations is the study of inter-state behavior. Theorists are 
determined to layout ways that describe and, ultimately, predict how states interact with 
one another. In today’s world, states are no longer the sole actor in international affairs― 
intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and religious and terrorist 
organizations also hold noteworthy influence. Despite the complexity added by non-state 
actors, the traditional schools of international theory ― realism and idealism ― hold the 
state as the main actor in the international arena.  
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 International relations theory, similar to all social science theory, is not predicated 
on any scientific facts. Its fluid, contradictory, and often conditional. Hence, it should be 
understood in relation to its particular context. No one theory should be held as a general 
theory. Paul Wilkinson has a useful way of wording this predicament: “[the main schools 
of thought] constitute ways of perceiving international relations, metaphors or models 
which appeal to their adherents because that is the way they prefer to view the world.”  21
Essentially, which theory appeals to one is often contingent on their lived experience and 
how their lived experience is emulated on the international stage. With that in mind, let's 
take a look at some of the most influential theories of international relations that help one 
make sense of an interconnected, interdependent, and unpredictable world.  
 
2.2.1 Realism 
Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are generally seen as the forefathers of 
the modern realist school of thought. Machiavelli and Hobbes ― articulated in their ​The 
Prince​ (1532) and ​The Leviathan​ (1651), respectively ― hold a worldview predicated on 
human beings motivated, naturally and unconditionally, by their own self-interests. The 
most precarious and enriching self-interest humans pursue is political power, which is 
entrenched within the state. Whether one wants to penetrate the state or maintain their 
rule over the state, the prince must accept coercion and violence as paramount to their 
ends. Though Machiavelli and Hobbes thoughts are targeted at capturing and retaining 
the state, the emphasis they place on power positioned them as the forefathers of realism, 
21 Wilkinson, 2007, p.2. 
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 which holds power as paramount to any inter-state analysis. While they wrote in the era 
before the establishment of the nation-state, their deep respect for power influenced 
international relations theorists in later ages as the world became an increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent.  
 Realism is predicated on a matter-of-fact analysis. In the international realm there 
is not a overarching state who projects power over the entire globe, nor is there a grand 
arbitror, or global government, to settle disputes and insecurities between states. 
Therefore, the international system is defined by disorder and constant power struggle ― 
a state known as ​anarchy​. The accumulation of power is the best guarantee against 
encroachment and survival ― similar to how Machiavelli and Hobbes conceived power 
as paramount to human interests and a ruler’s perpetuation. Accordingly, military power 
is necessary for defence, expansion, and the pursuit of a state’s ​raison d'etat ​(national 
interest). Military power is conditional on wealth and population, so industry and a large 
healthy population are seen as priorities for existent and rising powers. Eliminating 
conflict and war are viewed as futile efforts. As long as an anarchist system persists, 
realists stress the imperativeness of alliance-building, the state as the key political actor, 
balance of power, and an objection to empowering international organizations and 
entrusting agreements with collective security measures.  
Despite these underlying commonalities, realism is not a unified theory. It has 
evolved over time and has taken on many transformations and adaptations. Twentieth 
century realist discourse was dominated by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Walt, who are 
regarded as classical realists and structural realists, respectively. For Morgenthau, it is 
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 human nature that explains the behavior of a state; human beings possess a “will to 
power” that is insatiable.  States are led by humans, so the state system manifests in a 22
manner that evokes the behavior of humans and their appetite for power. Morgenthau 
suggests that states will always be on the offensive, seeking opportunities to dominate 
and extract resources that will enhance their relative power. He argues that the 
international system is better served by a multipolar balance of regional and global 
powers; his opinions stemmed from the perceived danger of the US/USSR rivalry.  
Kenneth Walt, on the other hand, argues that the power struggle that defines the 
international system is not predicated on human nature, but on the international system’s 
innate disposition towards anarchy. States, therefore, assume an attitude of survival, 
meaning they pursue power because it is the best insurance policy against defeat. In other 
words, states seek survival, not necessarily the domination of other states. In fact, he 
makes the case that most states behave defensively, in hopes of maintaining the balance 
of power that created stability. For Walt, balancing is a strong counter to offensive 
behavior, yet, contrary to Morgenthau, he claims bipolarity creates enhanced stability 
over a multipolar system.  
A noteworthy addition to defensive realism was developed by Robert Jervis, 
George Quester, and Stephen Van Evera. They argue that war is more likely to transpire 
when states can easily conquer each other. Thus, when defensive measures are more 
attractive and accessible than offense ones, peace should become prevalent and 
cooperation should flourish. The key is to get states to develop and value defensive 
22 Walt 1998, p.31. 
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 weaponry over offensive weaponry ― allowing for a healthy, but tilted, balance between 
offensive and defensive measures.  
John Mearsheimer's theory of “offensive realism” ushered realism into the post 
Cold War era. Mearsheimer’s theory is laid out in his book ​The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics​. He argues that states pursue power because it is the requisite for survival within 
an archaic international system. Offensive realism is a structural theory of international 
relations and, thus, it is similar to defensive realism. However the former differentiates 
itself from latter over the question of how much power states want to accumulate.  23
Defensive realism holds that states wish to maintain the current balance of power rather 
than to chase more. Offensive realism, however, “believes that status quo powers are 
rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful 
incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and 
take advantage of those situations when benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate 
goal is to be the hegemon in the system.”  Offensive realism shares a commonality with 24
classical realism: great powers unremittingly work toward enhancing their relative power 
to other contending states. Yet, there is an underlying difference. Classical realists 
understand state behavior as an extension of humanity’s innate drive to dominate, 
whereas offensive realists predicate state behavior on the fact that more power increases a 
state’s odds of survival in an archaic system. Hence, offensive realism implies the 
following: power struggle is not inevitable, but is guaranteed under a system 
characterized by anarchy. If anarchy could be suppressed, the nature of the system would 
23 Mearsheimer 2014, p.21. 
24 Ibid., p.21. 
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 change. Nevertheless,​ ​Mearsheimer’s theory is creating a lot of noise because it predicts 
China will not rise to great power status peacefully; he predicts a confrontation between it 
and the United States is inevitable.   25
 
2.2.1 Idealism 
The liberal school of international relations can be viewed as a set of reactions to 
the pessimistic nature of realist thought. Though there is a broad range of liberal theories, 
they have in common the belief that certain measures, institutions, and organizations can 
be adopted that will help prevent destructive power struggles and the wars that come with 
them. Liberal theories find their origin in the time of enlightenment when the intellectuals 
of Europe were constructing and advocating ideas that they thought would make the 
world a better place to live if they were institutionalized within the state.  Proponents of 26
this school of thought ― such as E.H. Carr and Woodrow Wilson ― tend to be optimistic 
towards the possibility of making the world a safer and more peaceful place. Just as 
liberals of the enlightenment were labeled utopian for their belief that a democratic 
government would lead to internal harmony and national prosperity, liberals of 
international relations are often pegged as idealistic and naive. Yet, they hold firm in their 
belief that global cooperation and mutual exchange, as well as economic interdependence 
and the spread of democracy, will alleviate the international system of its anarchic state.  
25 Ibid., p.395. 
26 Ibid., p.15. 
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 Liberal theories are supportive of three prospective institutions that could lead to 
international stability: economic interdependence, democratization, and international 
institutions. Supporters of economic interdependence see inter-state, economic 
contingency as a force for stability. That is, if a state’s economy and its growth are reliant 
on other states ― and vice-versa ― then states will be less likely to engage in conflict. 
War would disrupt economic prosperity. Considering economic wealth is an input to 
military power, states are reluctant to undermine their economic well being with 
attritional warfare against states whose wellbeing is closely connected to theirs. 
The second theory ― democratic peace ― upholds democracy as a means of 
suppressing inter-state power struggle. Advocates of this theory presume democratic 
states do not go to war with one another, but they stop short of considering democracies 
less warlike than their counterparts. The inherent values of democracy ― liberty, 
freedom, and free speech ―  prevent like minded states from going to war with one 
another, thereby escaping the aggressive and offensive tendencies that dictatorial, 
authoritarian, or monarchical states exhibit when they face each other or democratic 
states in the international arena. The democratic peace theory’s inaugural incarnation was 
expressed and pursued by Woodrow Wilson, hence the term ‘Wilsonian idealism.’ 
Last, there is a subgroup of the liberal paradigm that argues the establishment and 
the perpetual enhancement of international institutions will eventually overcome the 
historic trap of international warfare. That is, international institutions will encourage 
cooperation among states. These institutions and their organizational manifestations ― 
the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, NATO, and the EU ― did not render 
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 sovereignty meaningless, but, rather, stand as a set of important organizations with the 
influence to shape what is considered acceptable state behavior. Currently, these norms of 
conduct are not foisted upon states; they are negotiated and based on compromise and 
mutual exchange.  Hence, these institutions lay out prescriptions, not proscriptions to 
member states. Proponents of international institutions believe international law poses as 
a strong incentive for states to prioritize collective security over the narrow mindedness 
and fallibility of​ raison d'etat​. 
 
2.2.2 Marxism and Deconstructivism 
Within the field of international relations, there is a third, less conventional field             
of thought: radicalism. The most well-known of these theories ― Marxism ― challenges             
the assumptions underpinning the state system by pinpointing the capitalist system as the             
catalyst of international conflict. Its suggests a socialist plan of transformation that            
would, in theory, bring an end to state power struggle and the exploitation of the working                
class. Stephen M. Walt explains, orthodox marxist theory holds that “capitalist states            
battle each other as a consequence of the incessant struggle for profits and battled              
socialist states because they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.”             27
Subsequently, it was argued, and still is argued, that capitalist states exploit            
underdeveloped states at the expense of the latter's well being; furthermore, these            
exploited states become dependent on the capitalist state's extractive behavior. This           
theory is known as neo-Marxist dependency theory. Yet, Walt states, “both of these             
27 Walt 1998, p.32. 
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 theories were largely discredited before the Cold War even ended.” Academics point to             28
history to dislodge these theories as viable explanations for international conflict. First,            
examples of cooperation between capitalist nations are abundant, suggesting capitalism          
does not naturally lead to conflict. Second, it was shown that energetic participation in              
the world economy is a better path to prosperity than isolated, socialist development and              
underdeveloped nations were not without example of successful negotiation with          
multinational corporations in the global north. Nevertheless, there is some truth to be             
found in neo-Marxist theory ― particularly its argument of imperialism augmenting           
underdevelopment ― but it hard to argue for its viability as a theory that explains               
inter-state conflict.  
As Marxism capitulated as a reasonable theory for international conflict, its           
legacy and insight is held tight by a group of academics who were well versed in literary                 
criticism and social theory. Their school of thought became known as deconstructivism.            
It should be noted that these theorists did not offer holistic alternatives to the mainstream               
theories of realism and idealism, just critiques to these theories. Their “approach was             
openly skeptical of the effort to devise general or universal theories such as realism or               
idealism.” As a result, deconstructivism does not offer a unified theory of international             29
relations. 
 
28 Ibid., p.34. 
29 Ibid. 
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 2.2.3 International Relations in the 21st Century 
The end of the Cold War marks a new era for the discipline of international 
relations. Gone are the days of the bipolar and ideological delineation of geopolitics. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union it is not uncommon for Americans, including 
academics, to be to be optimistic for the future of international politics. According to 
their logic, a U.S. victory ended the era of great power politics and it renders obsolete the 
concept of balance of power. We now live in an era of international cooperation and 
mutual exchange. Some go as far as to say the new order will remain into perpetuity, as 
invoked by Fukuyama's phrase “the end of history.” The realist school of thought is seen 
as outdated. However, September 11th, 2001 and its aftermath diminishes the credibility 
of the aforementioned word view. Accordingly, the aforementioned is no longer widely 
held.  
What is undisputed is international relations has indeed adapted to a time period 
with a whole new set of questions and concerns. Walt suggests a general alteration of the 
discipline as it embraced a new age: “non-American voices are more prominent, a wider 
range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate, and new issues such as ethnic 
conflict, the environment, and the future of the state have been on the agenda of scholars 
everywhere.”  In terms of how individual countries will alter the current order, China is 30
paramount. In fact, China’s growth might very well be the defining feature of the 21st 
century ― its consequences will be felt all across the world. Of equal importance will be 
America’s reaction to China’s enhancement, as the former’s economic and military 
30 Ibid., p.35. 
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 preponderance declines in relative and, perhaps, absolute terms. Also of substance for the 
21st century will be climate change, the outcome of the Middle East, and the war on 
terror. Russia, Japan, India and the European project’s growing preponderance and 
strength will also play a role. These issues and the policies of the aforementioned 
countries will transcend borders and playout in distant regions of the world, such as 
Africa and South America. The schools of international relations produce useful insight 
regarding these matters. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the value of these 
schools of thought to each issue mentioned above. Yet, as the reader reflects on these 
issues, Walt provides useful advice that can perhaps serve as an immediate substitute: 
“The ‘complete diplomat’ of the future should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on 
the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, 
and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change.”  With that said, one 31
should keep these schools of thought in mind as the paper approaches the section of 
contextualizing U.S.-Iranian relations and Iran’s prospective role in the 21st century.  
 
2.3 Diplomacy 
While international relations is best understood as the study of how and why 
states interact with each other, diplomacy is the real-life practice and manifestation of 
inter-state interaction. As organizations, states do not naturally engage with one another 
― state engagement is ultimately the product of a humans interacting with humans on 
behalf of a state. Diplomacy, thus, brings to fruition international relations as an 
31 Ibid., p.44. 
 
37 
 academic discipline. One cannot be a practitioner of international relations, but one can 
be a practitioner of diplomacy: a diplomat.  
In today’s world, states are not the only player in international relations; 
multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, terrorist and crime 
organizations, and religious organizations all play a role in shaping international society 
and its future. For this reason, there is a growing trend to treat international relations as 
obsolete and replace it with the term world politics, as it is inclusive of non-state actors. 
This development has impacted the conceptualization of diplomacy. It is increasingly 
seen as a tool that is of use to individuals beyond that of just statesman. These trends are 
part of a larger debate on globalization and the state. Some argue that globalization is 
rendering the state obsolete, while others deny the erosion of sovereignty.​ ​Nevertheless, 
before prospects of the future can be more thoroughly explored, we must make sense of 
where we are now by looking at the history of modern diplomacy. Its history is closely 
aligned with the development of the state.  
 
2.3.1 Peace of Westphalia, Sovereignty, and Modern Diplomacy  
Diplomacy has been an integral component of organizational life for centuries. 
The formation of settled populations into urban centers gave impetus to confrontation and 
disagreement between neighboring settlements. Diplomacy, in its rudimentary form, was 
used in the transitionary times of warfare to peace and vice-versa. Over the centuries as 
empires rose and fell, diplomacy was a frequent practice that allowed for empires to 
maintain relations across their multi-ethnic population ― though this manifestation of 
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 diplomacy was technically internal ― and support relations with other empires. As 
humans and their institutions progressed and technology advanced, the nature of 
diplomacy evolved. Diplomacy became a perpetual, proactive and daily practice, no 
longer confined to transitional periods between peace and war or in times of 
disagreement. It is no longer a reactionary tool. Today, there are different conceptions of 
diplomacy and, thus, different, definitions. Yet, it is hard to deny that diplomacy has 
shaped the world in which we live.  
  For the purpose of brevity, a relatively in depth exploration of diplomacy will be 
limited to the tradition that finds its roots in the build up to the Peace of Westphalia and 
its solidification in the subsequent hundred years; this tradition is still, to some extent, 
practiced to this day. The year of 1648 is the typical date used to designate the advent of 
modern diplomacy, as it generally marks the birth of the nation-state. More importantly, 
it was at this time that states formed a common agreement on the principle of 
Sovereignty, which is a defining feature of the state system. These developments were 
not abrupt; hence, modern diplomacy was established in piecemeal throughout the 
preceding centuries. As the nature and the structure of the state evolved, diplomacy had 
to adapt to fulfill the needs of the time and place. Also, the states of Europe did not 
progress along identical timelines, so it is impossible to date these developments as they 
occurred at different times across Europe, according to the historical, intellectual and 
political status of each, respective state.  
In the Classical and Medieval periods, the principle of Sovereignty was a loose set 
of ideas. Sovereignty didn’t find formal articulation until Jean Bodin (1530-1596) laid 
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 out the concept in detail. It would take another 50-100 years before sovereignty was 
widely accepted. Medieval monarchs did not enjoy sovereignty because the feudal-state 
necessitated the sharing of power with his ​trustis​ in order to maintain authority. The 
Church also had a role in maintaining the monarch's supremacy. Eventually, a few 
monarchs were able to escape the power limitations of feudalism and extend their reach 
over larger and larger swaths of territory ― the states of England and France are 
examples. These monarchs no longer needed to delegate power to the ​trustis ​to maintain 
authority over a territory. Monarchs became ​the​ central authority, dependent only on its 
own faculties. While the feudal aristocrats were disposed, the power of the church 
remained a hindrance for a group of monarchical states across Europe or it stood as an 
integral component of authority, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire. Hence, while 
some monarchical states operated free of papal authority, others were still contained by 
the papacy. 
Correspondingly, medieval Europe was characterized by an aspiration to 
universality ― to resurrect the traditions of the Roman Empire and attach it to the 
growing power of the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the feudal states of Northern Italy 
and Germany were under the auspices of the Holy Roman Emperor during the 17th 
century. France and England were independent states ― beacons of sovereignty ― 
though they remained devoted to the Catholic Church.​ ​For most of the medieval period, 
the Holy Roman Emperor lacked the ability to project his political power across his entire 
empire. Hence, its claims to universality was nothing but empty posturing. The Habsburg 
dynasty, however, resurrected the power of the Holy Roman Emperor through the 
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 acquisition of Spain; furthermore, Emperor Charles V revived the imperial authority to a 
threshold capable of expanding his empire into central Europe. Such an empire would 
have been so large and powerful that it would have been capable of asserting its authority 
over the entirety of the European continent, perhaps even England. Yet, it was the 
outbreak of the Reformation that prevented this outcome and it empowered princes to 
break with the universal dictates of Rome. Supporting the emperor was not longer seen as 
a religious duty. Despite the effort of the Counter-Reformation, which led to the 30 Years 
War, the Holy Roman Emperor could not withstand the military and philosophical might 
of its opponents. After the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy Roman Empire was divided 
into hundreds of sovereign states who were free to conduct their own foreign policy. 
Many of these states did not evolve into nation-states; they were subsumed by quarrels 
and military conflicts.  
The foundation of international society was now to be based on sovereignty. The 
order is referred to as Westphalian Sovereignty and is based on three principles: (1) a 
state is subject to no outside authority, so it is entitled to complete control over its 
designated territory and domestic affairs; (2) no state can interfere in the domestic 
policies of another state; (3) each state, no matter its resources or size, is treated equal in 
international law.  Accordingly, diplomacy had to adapt for a new age based on ​raison 32
d'etat​ and balance of power.  
The transition from empire to the westphalian state was the impetus for a new 
incarnation of diplomacy. In the time of empires, diplomacy was typically a reactive tool. 
32 Armstrong 2014, p.40. 
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 The international order that emerged out of the Peace of Westphalia not only used 
diplomacy as a response to crises, but also as a means to preemptively honor the principle 
of sovereignty and maintain a balance of power. Thus, diplomacy became a preemptive 
and daily affair. Organizations ― in the form of embassies and consulates ― and 
positions ― foreign ministers and their deputies ― were created to allow for states to 
engage in frequent dialogue.  
From the propositions of sovereignty arose three institutions that shape the 
composure of international society. Of the three, inter-state diplomacy is one; the other 
two are realized and associated with its practice: (1) a professional diplomatic service; (2) 
balance of power; (3) and treaties between states that have the status of law.  Treaties 33
and congresses ― the documents and assemblies that bring balance of power into 
practice ―  were brought into fruition by state representatives: diplomats. In the past, 
empire was the typical form of government; empires do not wish to operate within an 
international system and strike a balance of power that will allow for stability; empires 
aspire to be the international system.   34
 
2.4 Balance of Power and Raison d’etat 
The premier implications of sovereignty on diplomacy are expressed through the 
concepts of ​raison d'etat​ (national interest) and the balance of power. These principles 
arose out of the political environment of the 17th century described in the previous 
33 Ibid., p.42. 
34 Kissinger 1994, p.21. 
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 section. ​Raison d’etat​ was used as a rationale for acting out against the Church. Henry 
Kissinger describes the historical necessity of these concepts: 
With the concept of unity collapsing, the emerging states of Europe           
needed some principle to justify their heresy and to regulate their relations.            
They found it in the concepts of raison d’etat and the balance of power.              
Each depended on the other. ​Raison d’etat asserted that the wellbeing of            
the state justified whatever means were employed to further it; the           
national interest supplanted the medieval notion of a universal morality.          
The balance of power replaced the nostalgia for universal monarchy with           
the consolation that each state, in pursuing its own selfish interests, would            
somehow contribute to the safety and progress of all the others.  35
 
France and England were faced with the prospect of destruction if they let the Holy 
Roman Empire expand and consolidate its authority in central Europe. Thus, it was in 
their national interest ― their ​raison d’etat​ ― to challenge the empire and the papacy. 
Fortunately for France, the reformation provided rivalries to exploit in their favor. 
Consequently, France backed a number of protestant states that would amount to a 
coalition against the Holy Roman Empire. In other words, by supporting Protestant 
German princes and the Protestant King of Sweden, France was able form a balanced of 
power against the Holy Roman Empire’s ambition on the continent. For the time it was 
revolutionary maneuver: a Catholic nation-state was backing the protestant apostates in 
the name of national interest.  
The primary statesman who conducted France’s foreign policy was Cardinal de 
Richelieu; ironically, he was a prince of the Church. Kissinger describes the radicalness 
of his approach and his legacy on the modern state system: 
35 Ibid., p.58. 
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 Few statesmen can claim a greater impact on history. Richelieu          
was the father of the modern state system. He promulgated the concept of             
raison d’etat and practiced it relentlessly for the benefit of his own            
country. Under his auspices, ​raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept          
of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.           
Initially, he sought to prevent Habsburg domination of Europe, but          
ultimately left a legacy that for the next two centuries tempted his            
successors to establish French primacy in Europe. Out of the failure of            
these ambitions, a balance of power emerged, first as a fact of life, then as               
a system for organizing international relations.  36
 
Therefore, ​raison d’etat​ is adverse to restraining state behavior to a moral code. The 
Habsburg dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire was unable to adapt to the rules of ​raison 
d’etat​; that is, the emperor Ferdinand II would not pursue his universal empire through 
means that would not be in align with the doctrine of God and the Church. That is, he 
refused to engage in treaties with the Muslim Turks or the Protestant Swedes. Essentially, 
he was more concerned with obedience to God then the welfare of his empire.  For the 37
nation-state, ​raison d’etat​ proved more versatile and, thus, superior to actions regulated 
by strict moral law.  
The pursuit of ​raison d’etat​ leads to the objective of predominance or to the 
formation of equilibrium. The former often results in over extension and self destructive 
military adventures, as with France at the beginning of the 19tn century and Germany in 
the first and second World War.  When a dominant power arises, in pursuit of its 
perceived national interest, and it threatens the safety of its neighbors, they form a 
coalition to resist the aspirations of the aggressor. If in aggregate these nations are able to 
36 Ibid., p.58. 
37 Ibid., p.60. 
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 check the aggressor so as to prevent imperious action, a balance of power has emerged. 
The goal of balance of power is not to prevent conflict, but to limit conflict. 
For the first 150 years or so after the Peace of Westphalia, a balance of power 
arose ​de facto, ​not be design. The intentional and premeditated construction of a balance 
of power would not form until the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Ironically, after the Peace 
of Westphalia, France’s ​raison d’etat​ required it to expand in Europe. To the East, the 
German States were weak, numerous, and lacked unity. To the East lay the Netherlands, a 
relatively weak state. Hence, France was enticed by the prospect of expansion. England 
led the effort to create a coalition to check the aggression of France; it realized if France 
became the dominant power on the continent, its position would be at stake. A coalition 
was formed ― known as the Grand Alliance ― to balance against France; Louis XIV 
would rage constant warfare against the alliance for nearly a quarter of a century. While 
France remained the strongest country in Europe, it would not dominate the continent. In 
should be noted that the Grand Alliance was not established for the sake of balance of 
power theory, but because it was a necessity for the Netherlands and England if they 
wished to maintain independence; or, at least, that is how they calculated it.  An 38
intentional equilibrium ― in the name of the theory of balance of power ― would 
emerge in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars.  
The concepts of balance of power and ​raison d'eta​t are the heart of the European 
tradition of  diplomacy. These tenets arose throughout an era of political change, 
immense international conflict and conciliation; they were the products of the European 
38 Ibid., p.71. 
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 experience in the 17th-19th century. Yet, the tenets of modern diplomacy have been 
adopted and practiced by all states. The adaptation happened inorganically, initially 
through colonialism and then by decolonization’s subsequent waves of nationalism, when 
the nation-state was cemented as ​the​ unit of the international system and imperial empire 
declined. Accordingly, state’s typically conduct international affairs with their national 
interests as their prime concern (as opposed to a cooperative institution, such as the 
United Nations, or a region organization, such as the European Union). While balance of 
power is a proven tool of European diplomacy, it is not as widely embraced or 
intentionally invoked as national interests is within the international system. 
 
2.4.1 Alternative Tenets to Diplomacy  
The United States is the only nation to have offered alternative principles to help 
guide diplomacy, while, simultaneously, possessing the power to project those principles. 
In fact, the United States has a tradition of antipathy towards balance of power. Woodrow 
Wilson is the 20th century father of this odium, though it's prodromes are traced to the 
preceding century. For Wilson, a better world comes about not be adherence to principles 
of balance of power, but through the proliferation of institutions or crusades embedded 
with the principles of liberty and democracy. Hence, he advocated for a messianic 
American diplomacy and the construction of inter-state institutions. The American people 
were not prepared to leave their position of isolationism at the time of Wilson and they 
would not be for another 25 years, but Wilson did possess the political power to establish 
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 the the league of nations : the institutional incarnation of his conception of international 39
affairs and diplomacy. Balance of power animosity was the product of the American 
experience: industrialization and expansion conducted in relative isolation, with the 
protection of an ocean each side. Wilsonianism has a deep legacy in American 
diplomacy.  40
Despite the United State’s aversion to balance of power, the U.S. has participated 
in it ― as an offshore balancer ― and it has benefited from it. For the first 125 years of 
its existence, the Concert of Europe ― the first intentionally designed balance of power 
― helped prevent European interference in American affairs. When the Concert 
collapsed, it was France, Russia, and Britain that checked the aggression of the German 
Empire through military means. The United States went so far as to reinforce the ​de facto 
balance of power through the application of its military might at the end of WWI. It 
would be forced to do the same in WWII, after the league of nations failed to contain 
German expansion ― in fact, there is a strong argument that the Treaty of Versailles 
provoked Germany anger and expansionism. Hence, while the U.S. detests balance of 
power, it is a tool of necessity in the face of aggression. Pleas to liberty and freedom do 
not hold up well against empire and nazism. At its best, balance of power is design 
intentionally, primarily through diplomacy. At its worst, balance of power is maintained 
through military alliance and the application of military might.  
  
39 The League of Nations Treaty was never ratified by congress so the U.S. was never a 
member, though it did contribute to its formation.  
40 For more on this topic, see Perry Anderson’s ​American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers 
 
47 
 2.4.2 Homogeneity and Domestic Institutions and Sentiments  
Unlike the political architecture of a state, there is by and large uniformity in the 
structure of international affairs. In other words, states possess a variety of political ideas 
― democracy, constitutional monarchy, or theocracy, to name a few ― that produce 
unique political experiences. A state within the international system, however, is faced 
with the same system of organization ― or lack thereof, as conveyed by the concept 
anarchy ― that all other nations confront. In a sense, then, all states will have a similar 
encounter as they conduct diplomacy in the face of anarchy. International experience 
differs along the lines of power, not along the lines of structure. All nations are faced 
with the same structure, but not all nations have the power to dominate, reform, or 
revolutionize the structure. It is the job of diplomacy to maneuver a state through an 
archaic international system, all the while guarding the state's national interest 
  ​Accordingly, states do not drastically shape how they interacts with the 
state-system with regard to the structure of its domestic political institutions. All states 
face the hegemonic, Westphalian order of international politics, which restricts the degree 
of agency they enjoy to shape their behavior in the international arena. Unless if a state 
possess the power necessary to seriously challenge the hegemonic order and raise the 
prospect of a establishing a new tradition of international statecraft, all states are limited 
by the norms, structures, and institutions of the Westphalian order.  
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 Within this order, however, states are free to determine their own national 
interests;  it's the differences in national interests across states that create divergences in 41
state behavior. States, though, will adjust their level of involvement to the international 
system based on domestic sentiments. This is exemplified by Castlereagh's failure to 
convince England to commit to constant engagement on the European continent by the 
means of ​the Concert of Europe​. The House of Lords objected to England's participation; 
Castlereagh was not able to ignore the representative institution of Parliament. Hence, 
structural, long-term ventures are constrained by domestic opinions, particularly in 
democratic societies. Within absolutist forms of government, public opinion is typically 
peripheral or secondary to the decision making process. However, regardless of domestic 
sentiment, states face the Westphalian conception of statecraft and its modern, liberal 
democratic form. While nations defy the dictums of the order (e.g. North Korea & Iran), 
they fall short of seriously challenging the perpetuity of the order. In the 21st century, 
only a rising super power such as China or India would have the capacity to challenge the 
status quo, which, as shown above, finds its roots in the 17th century Europe and its 
contemporary guardian in the United States. 
 
2.5 Leadership 
Leadership is an integral component of organizational life. Its scope is wide: 
politics, economics, religion, and culture, each of which have their own subgroups. The 
41 If a state’s national interest challenges the hegemonic order of statecraft, the 
state-supporters of the status quo will push back against the counter-hegemonic thrust 
(e.g. the allies counter the Third Reich). 
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 scale of leadership varies too, with small scale, community leadership at one end and 
transnational leadership at the other end. The common thread between all leadership roles 
is social power. Accordingly, leaders have a greater range of assets than their peers, 
allowing them to stretch constraints on resources, institutions, and circumstances. This 
section will talk broadly of leadership, but it will favor political leadership and its 
requisite form of social power: political power.  
All great human achievements and endeavors have been headed by an individual 
or a small regime, who have the authority to make decisions at the collective level. 
Leadership centralizes decision making processes into the hands of a select few. At its 
best, leadership can help a project of transformation in terms of efficiency and efficacy. 
Yet, because leadership condenses power to an individual, poor and incompetent 
leadership can have disastrous consequences. In the realm of political leadership, 
institutions are implemented to ensure a leader does not have absolute power to make all 
decisions at the collective level ― a bulwark against inept or totalitarian leadership. 
Effective leadership begins with a clear understanding that its practice is found at the 
intersection of two dual, but antithetical concepts: agency and structure. 
 
2.5.1 Agency and Structure 
Agency is centered around freedom. It implies the ability to choose an action 
whereas freedom is the ability to follow through on a choice. In other words, freedom 
allows one to act in response to their own dictates (agency). Agency permits one to 
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 choose change ― individual or collective and on a range of scales ― and freedom allows 
one to drive it. Agency, however, is in constant tension with what is known as structure: 
constraints that limit the range of one’s actions; they stress the composition of one’s 
circumstances. Often, these restrictions lean towards the reproduction of past and current 
set up. Institutions are how the past reproduces in the present. Hence, structures manifest 
through political, economic, legal and social institutions (e.g. constitution, private 
property, criminal law, and familial norms, respectively). Ultimately, agency and 
structure pose a quandary: structure is the constraint to agency, yet it is agency that has 
the ability to break structure.  
As humans, we are intelligent, purposeful primates, who are capable of setting 
goals and manipulating our environment. We have the ability for inner subjectivity, 
which allows us to examine ourselves and our circumstances. If unsatisfied, we as 
humans can dare to use our agency to reform or transform our circumstances. If a human 
acts to alter a circumstance that people are faced with (e.g. lack of universal health care), 
they are elevating their agency to a collective level that might ultimately affect other 
people’s lives. In most circumstances, this person will need the support of others if they 
wish to take on the status quo. When this occurs, an individual is on the cusp of 
leadership. However the intention or desire to create change will not suffice ― an 
individual must have resources to pair their agency and vision with if they wish to see 
success. Resources give people the freedom to live out their agency.  
In the case of political leadership, faculties of violence, intellectual prowess and 
historical insight, and awe are some of resources that can help raise an individual into a 
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 leadership position. Academics and leaders are inconsistent on which of these inputs they 
regard as paramount. I will touch on a few ― these thinkers thoughts on the matter are 
largely representative of the demands of their time period, so they should not be ingested 
as perennial truths.  
 
2.5.2 Competencies, Resources, and Inputs 
In ​The Prince​, Niccoló Machiavelli lays out a series of pithy maxims on 
leadership, principalities, and human nature. For Machiavelli, adept leadership arises 
from the acknowledgement that power is paramount to all other faculties or traits that 
could constitute a Prince’s position and character. Machiavelli’s phrase, “what men do,” 
captures the human tendency to be self-invested and, above all, to do whatever we can to 
escape premature death and poverty. To guard against demise, the prince must perceive 
humane nature pragmatically and, thus, subjugate virtuous aims and morality to political 
realities. Machiavelli summarizes the logic of his realist posture: 
And many have imagined for themselves republics and principalities that          
no one has ever seen or known to be in reality. Because how one ought to                
live is so far removed from how one lives that he who lets go of what is                 
done for that which one ought to do sooner learns ruin than his own              
preservation: because a man who might want to make a show of goodness             
in all things necessarily comes to ruin among so many that are not good.  42
 
Hence, Machiavelli advises those aspiring to a role of leadership to be prepared to go 
against their ideals, as there will come a time when they must defy what they think 
42 Machiavelli 1532, p. 57. 
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 should be in order to confront what is (i.e. the reality of the matter). Political power and 
realism are the twin dictums that lead to political success for Machiavelli.  
It should be noted that Machiavelli lived and wrote in a time of transition. The 
feudal order of the middle ages was to be imminently replaced by an order with sovereign 
nation-states at its foundation. His words were written to help restore republican 
government, resemblant of the Roman Republic. Thirty-five years after his death, Europe 
was plagued by the Wars of Religion. His ideas influenced the realization of sovereign 
during the 100 years after the Peace of Westphalia. However, the relevance of 
Machiavelli's thoughts diminished as the state transitioned from absolutism to 
constitutional monarchy and eventually, to liberal democracy. As the nature of politics 
transformed to a representative era, Machiavelli's maxims lost some of their explanatory 
power.  
As the state became increasingly penetrable by citizens, political leadership took 
on a new, or at least an additional, form. While Machiavelli was concerned with rise and 
glory of the prince, others became concerned with citizens and their access to the state. In 
other words, in the years leading up to the French Revolution and in the proceeding 
one-hundred years, intellectuals built a philosophical tradition that claimed the state 
belonged to the people ― not to an absolute monarch. The practitioners of this tradition 
― the soldiers of an idealised world ― took on a role of political leadership that was 
largely unprecedented: leaders emerged who claimed to represent citizens and their desire 
to make a unified claim to the state.  
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 With the democratic age on the horizon, intellectuals wrote treatises on how to 
successfully penetrate the state. One such scholar was Ludwig Von Rochau, a liberal who 
coined the concept ​Realpolitik,​ in response to the European Revolutions of 1848. His 
book ― ​Foundations of Realpolitik​ ― explored a question of immense importance to this 
day: “how to achieve liberal enlightened goals… in a world that did not follow liberal 
enlightened rules.”  Foundations of Realpolitik was a response to a liberal idealism that 43
lacked efficacy.  
Rochau, like Machiavelli, understood power as the determining factor of politics. 
Hence, he advised his liberal compatriots to accept the fact that change could not be 
implemented without preponderance or without linking liberal ideals to the interests of 
those who held power. Given the condition of the German Empire at his time, Rochau 
advocated for the latter. He believed statesmen could be convinced to accept the ideas of 
constitutionalism if they were persuaded that repression was not in the interest of the 
state. That is, a constitution would give monarchs a potent method of harnessing and 
balancing the powerful societal forces of the age. John Bew,  a scholar of Realpolitik, 
explains Rochau’s thinking: “the conditions of modernity had changed the nature of 
statecraft … in previous historical eras, the state had often been able to flatten and subdue 
challenges to its authority through the use of violence, as Machiavelli had described in 
The Prince​.”  Technology and the rise of the bourgeoisie and the middle class had 44
changed the character of politics. Suppression through violence would no longer work as 
it had in the days of Machiavelli.  
43 Bew 2015, p.18. 
44 Ibid., p.37. 
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  Ultimately, Rochau detected that public opinion now mattered in politics. 
Consequently, he argued that the ​zeitgeist ​(the “spirit of the age”) is the most important 
factor in determining the direction of state’s politics. John Bew expounds on this point, 
using his own analysis and the words of Rochau: 
The Zeitgeist was the ‘consolidated opinion of the century as expressed in            
certain principles, opinions and habits of reason.’ An opinion transformed          
itself into the Zeitgeist to the extent that it stood the test of time. The               
Zeitgeist represented in all circumstances the most important influence on          
the overall directions of politics. For a state to act in defiance of the              
zeitgeist was completely self-defeating … To put it simply, liberalism and           
nationalism could not be put back into the box. With the help of a strong               
police force, it may be ‘possible to manipulate citizenry like puppets’ but            
the ideals they held on to could not be smothered forever.  45
 
With that said, Rochau advises one to possess a deep understanding of history and how 
the past continues to shape the present and constrain the prospects of the future. Hence, 
an aspiring leader learns that historical perception and a deep understanding of the spirit 
of the age are necessary complements to political power if one is to be a consummate 
political leader.  
In summary, I encourage the reader to perceive leadership at the intersection of 
agency and structure; or, in other words, at the intersection of choice and context. At this 
point of convergence, resources, ideas, and opportunity come together. Leadership can 
thus be defined as the possession of a set of critical competencies ― which include, but 
are not limited to the ability to tactfully use violence, read into historical and current 
narratives, formulate a set of ideas that inspire and resonate ― that help one drive a 
process of transformation.  
45 Ibid., p. 41.  
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 It should be noted that leaders come in two types: revolutionary leaders and tinker 
leaders. The former strives to invalidate the past by building something new ― the 
creation of a new set of institutions. They devote their time, resources, and position of 
power to building a new future. Revolutionary leadership is arduous to lead and very hard 
to execute.  Tinker leadership, on the other hand, takes a reformist approach. That is, the 
leader is intent on change, and no less intrinsically so than that of the revolutionary 
leader, but she is keen on driving change that does not shock the current structure, or the 
current institutions under which she operates. The change is not a deep transformation 
that redefines, in totality, the concept of structure as it pertains to a country, social group, 
etc. Essentially, tinker leaders do not advocate for the a total rejection of the past. 
Whether tinker or revolutionary leadership is appropriate depends on the circumstances, 
the trajectory of transformation, and one's political orientation. 
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 CHAPTER III: KISSINGER: LIFE, POLICY, AND THINKING 
 
Henry Kissinger is a statesman of unique makeup. He rose to the highest levels of 
the United States government despite his rather un-American approach to foreign affairs. 
Even though he spent the majority of his life in the United States, his tone and approach 
never resembled America’s traditional conception of diplomacy. As such, he is a radical 
and controversial figure in the American milieu.  
His approach to diplomacy is not the only component that sets him apart from his 
American predecessors and successors. Kissinger was an academic before he was a 
statesman ― an intellectual heavyweight. His command of history and his clear 
interpretation of its meaning sets him apart from other National Security Advisors and 
Secretaries of State. Kissinger studied diplomacy for years before becoming the Chief 
diplomat of the United States; this cannot be said, perhaps, for any other individual who 
has held the same positions that he has.  
All the while, his command of diplomatic history and his unprecedented approach 
in the American tradition did not earn him universal reverence by the American people at 
the time he exited government nor even now. In fact, his policies are a cause of 
bewilderment if not outright dismissal, though individuals, particularly on the realist end 
of the spectrum, do praise his tactics and achievements.  
A consensus on Kissinger's tenure and legacy is nowhere to be found. 
Biographies, exposés and hagiographies seek to reach a consensus but have failed to 
 
57 
 consolidate opinion. Perhaps a consensus will never be reached in our lifetime. In the 
coming decades and centuries, posterity will define the legacy of Kissinger as it hashes 
out a widely accepted narrative of history for his time period.  
Like most people who leave their mark on historical development, Kissinger is a 
controversial figure. Within Kissinger’s ten years of civil service, one can identify two 
types of Kissinger. There is the Kissinger who constructed detenté, the arm control 
treaties with Russia, shuttle diplomacy in the Middle, and the opening with China. Then 
there is also the Kissinger who toppled the democratically elected president in Chile, 
bombed Cambodia, prolonged the chaos in Vietnam, overlooked if not instigated 
genocide in Bangladesh, as well as play a heavy hand in the domestic affairs of East 
Timor, Kurdistan, Argentina, Uruguay, and Cyprus in order to fulfill his strategic 
doctrine.  
Nevertheless, it is easy to critique the decisions of a statesman in retrospect than it 
is to actually make the decisions in the moment with asymmetrical and incomplete 
information. Disaster averted is taken for granted while calamity is repeatedly expounded 
as self-interest and criminality. The statesman should never be let off the hook for his 
questionable actions, as that is what he signed up for ― he does not operate in a vacuum 
void of criticism. Still, the paper is hesitant to choose a label for Kissinger. 
Accordingly, I approach an overview of his life and policies in a rather balanced 
fashion. I do not attempt to say definitively whether Kissinger should be regarded as 
good or evil or worthy of reverence or scorn. What I do attempt to do is deduce his 
theory. achievements and shortcomings, as well as isolate his greatests assets and 
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 liabilities. The aforementioned is conducted in the first section of the Chapter, which 
provides a short biography and an overview of his time in office.  
The second section is devoted to the philosophical and strategic thinking of Henry 
Kissinger. It does not analyze Kissinger’s policy decisions in search of situations that 
resemble the current deadlock between the U.S. and Iran. Rather, it seeks to derive a 
framework ― somewhat theoretical and definitely conceptual ― of thinking that allows 
one to examine US-Iranian relations without having to resort to particular policy 
decisions that Kissinger enacted. His main foreign diplomatic convictions are isolated, 
but no policies are looked at in hope of finding one that is applicable by analogy. In fact, 
doing the aforementioned would be rather contradictory to Kissinger’s mode of thinking.  
Finally, within the following paragraphs, one might encounter contradictions, 
particularly between Kissinger in theory and in practice. These are intentional. Humans 
are not seamless and consistent, let alone the statesman. I do not attempt to reconcile the 
discrepancies in his actions and thought, just to lay them out as they are.  
 
3.1 Biography 
Henry Kissinger was born on May 27th, 1923 in ​Fürth, Germany. At this time,​ a 
new period of Jewish repression and oppression was underway. As a Jew in Nazi 
Germany, Kissinger’s liberties were restricted. Eventually, Henry’s mother ― Paula 
Kissinger ―  decided it to be best that her family leave Germany for the United States. 
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 The decision proved fateful. At least 13 of Kissinger’s close relatives were murdered in 
the holocaust.  
Yet, Kissinger minimizes the impact of the traumas he faced as a child on his life. 
He stated to a reporter once, “‘My life in Furth seem to have passed without leaving any 
lasting impressions’”  and on another occasion he is quoted as saying, “‘that part of my 46
childhood is not a key to anything.’”  Regardless of Kissinger’s demurrals, it hard to 47
believe his years in Nazi Germany had no impact on him. Kissinger’s mentor in the U.S. 
Army ― Fritz Kraemer ― affirms the impact of his childhood: 
For the formative years of his youth, he faced the horror of his world 
coming apart, of the father he loved being turned into a helpless mouse… 
it made him [Kissinger] seek order, and it led him to hunger for 
acceptance.  48
 
Hence, it seems that Kissinger’s childhood had, at least, a subconscious affect on his 
outlook and development. Considering a close friend noticed an impact, it is possible to 
connect a few notable characteristics that he displayed throughout his life to his 
upbringing. I have identified a few of noteworthiness.  
Kissinger’s childhood experiences instilled in him a deep distrust of people. 
Neighbors and friends of the Kissinger family, who they thought they could trust, turned 
their backs on them. When in office, he repeatedly acted on his unwarranted distrust of 
those around him. He often conducted his diplomacy in secrecy (i.e. Paris Peace Accords) 
and instituted a series of measures to spy and keep tabs on his colleagues (i.e. secret 
wiretaps). 
46 Isaacson,  p. 28. 
47 Ibid., p. 28.  
48 Ibid., p. 29. 
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 A second legacy of Kissinger’s upbring is insecurity. Growing up, Kissinger was 
exposed to forces that sought to convince him that he was worthless and inferior. These 
forces came to have an imprint and influenced the complex of Kissinger, leaving him at 
times socially fragile. Furthermore, Kissinger’s self-doubt is part of the reason why he 
would attach himself to a series of patrons with strong personalities. Colonel Fritz 
Kraemer, Professor William Elliot, and Nelson Rockefeller helped both to curb 
Kissinger’s insecurity and foster his intellectual arrogance.  
Furthermore, growing up as an outcast in his own country and being an refugee in 
a foreign country, Kissinger was concerned with being accepted. Throughout his career, 
Kissinger went out of his way to win the approval or persuade those who opposed his 
ideas and actions. One of Kissinger’s longtime friends ― Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, ― 
deemed his constant quest for social acceptance a manifestation of  “‘his refugee’s desire 
for approval.’”  49
One can postulate that another legacy of his childhood was the appeal of 
philosophical pessimism. The grievances he experienced as a child made him adverse to 
thinking grounded in Idyllic naiveté. He came to favor the status quo over idealistic 
notions of what could and should be. He opposed revolution. He had seen too vividly the 
repercussions of transformation and the ensuing disorder. 
At the age of 15, Kissinger arrived in New York City in 1938. Unlike his family 
and his immigrant friends, Kissinger was more directed, more ambitious, and more 
serious about assimilating and succeeding in America. He was looking for a way to 
49Ibid., p. 31.  
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 escape his tight-knit Jewish community when he received a draft notice on his 19th 
birthday; the year was 1943. 
Kissinger was made a citizen of the United States at Camp Croft in South 
Carolina. Over the course of the next three years, citizenship would transition from what 
might have felt like a gift bestowed upon him, to an honor that he earned. Kissinger 
conceded that the army “‘made [him] feel like an American.’”  In addition to 50
Americanization, the army helped Kissinger ground himself as a practical man and it 
exposed him to Fritz Kraemer, a Colonel and the individual who claims to have helped 
Kissinger find himself. The two bonded on conservations that linked theory with history. 
Impressed by Kissinger’s intellect, Kraemer became Kissinger’s patron. He help secure 
him the role of administering captured towns and helped him ease his way into the 
Counterintelligence Corps. In this position, Kissinger casted anger on his subordinates 
who showed anti-German sentiments. He found it impractical to perpetuate the same kind 
of hate that had given rise to Nazism. Hence, his realistic and practical orientation shined 
through from an early age. At the end of Kissinger’s tour in 1946, Kraemer convince 
Henry to go to Harvard. 
Henry Kissinger received his Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts, and PhD at 
Harvard. While an undergraduate student at Harvard, Kissinger attached himself to 
Professor William Elliott. He was similar to Kraemer in persona and he would act as 
Kissinger’s benefactor at Harvard. Under his guidance, Kissinger’s realist and 
conservative orientation evolved into a holistic and personal philosophy. His intellectual 
50Ibid., p. 40.  
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 development culminated into a B.A. thesis titled the ​Meaning of History: Reflections on 
Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant. 
After completing his undergraduate, Elliotte placed Kissinger at the head of a 
project that would remain in his hands for the next seventeen years: the Harvard 
International Seminar. The program invited young leaders from around the world to 
spend their summer at Harvard, where they would take classes in politics and humanities. 
Some treat the International Institute as significant to the rise of Henry Kissinger, as it 
helped him build a network of influential contacts.  When in office, Kissinger would 51
often make use of the contacts he developed at the Institute.  
Kissinger wrote his doctoral dissertation on a subject that would seem outdated in 
1955, when the Nuclear Age was commencing. His thesis was titled, ​A World Restored: 
Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22​. Nevertheless, Kissinger 
produced a piece of work that was more relevant to the Nuclear Age than one might 
deduce from the title. The thesis laid the foundation for his approach to diplomacy: 
balance of power by design and the pursuit of the national interest. The approach endured 
throughout his career. To this day, he has not rebuked his method. Once he successfully 
completed his PhD, Kissinger was reluctantly awarded a professorship in the Department 
of Governance.  
In 1955, Kissinger secured a job at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he 
would analyze the impact of nuclear weapons on foreign policy with a study group of 
specialist. The job proved consequential for direction of Kissinger’s ambition. The 
51Ibid., p. 73.  
 
63 
 exposure to the inner workings of the New York foreign policy scene caused Kissinger to 
realize that pursuing a career at Harvard would always leave him in on the fringes of 
power. More importantly, it helped him realize that he did not want to be a professor for 
the rest of this life. He yearned for power. 
Before Kissinger returned to Harvard to resume teaching, he met a man by the 
name of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller. Mr.Rockefeller was the grandson of Standard Oil 
scion John D. Rockefeller. He hired Kissinger as a part time consultant and aide. 
Rockefeller became Kissinger’s third patron and the one with the most influence and 
power. Their relationship was pivotal; it exposed him to realms of political power that he 
would have unlikely had access to without a personal connection.  
Between 1959 and 1968, Kissinger continued his professorial responsibilities at 
Harvard while also participating in the political scene in Washington D.C. His heart was 
truly in Washington. He worked as an advisor to Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson, 
while simultaneously working for Nelson Rockefeller. In 1967, Kissinger began his first 
encounter with secret diplomacy. He single handedly discovered a channel to engage in 
secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese while on a trip to Paris ― what became 
known as the Pennsylvania Negotiations. Kissinger’s willingness to provide Presidential 
Candidate Richard Nixon with back-channel insights about the Paris peace talks 
provoked Nixon to pay heed to Kissinger.  Thus,​ ​when Nixon won the Presidential 52
election of 1968, he offered Kissinger the position of National Security Advisor. 
52 The move was not as seamless as the paragraph gives off. Kissinger was quite deceitful in the 
process of switching his allegiance to Nixon after the defeat of Rockefeller in the Presidential 
primaries. For a full exposé of events, see Greg Grandin’s chapter “Ends and Means” in his book 
Kissinger’s Shadow.  
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 Kissinger accepted, enticed by Nixon’s desire to set up a strong National Security 
Council staff in the White House, in order to seize the role of developing foreign policy 
from the State Department.  Kissinger would remain in office from 1969 to 1977, where 53
he would assume the role of National Security Advisor and, eventually, Secretary of State 
under the Nixon and the Ford administration. 
 
3.1.1 Historical Context 
Henry Kissinger came into power at a time of international upheaval. Thus, the 
climate for international transformation was ripe. It is generally understood that placated 
environments inhibit direct and efficacious challenges to the status quo. Three main 
historical dynamics were at play at the time when Kissinger assumed the role of National 
Security Advisor in January 1969:  54
1. The Vietnam war was at an impasse: victory was not insight and 
withdrawal was difficult. More than 31,000 Americans had died in the 
War. The ill conceived war was inciting a wave of American Isolationism. 
The nation had to adjust to a new era of limits. It was the first time 
Americans had to face the fact that foreign policy has innate limits.  
53 The development and deepening of the national security state ― characterized 
by imperialism, warfare, and unaccountability ― is the overarching argument of 
Greg Grandin’s book ​Kissinger’s Shadow​. He asserts that Kissinger’s policy and 
style enabled “the ascendance of the neoconservative idealists who took 
America  into crippling wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Grandin argues that 
America’s perpetual state of warfare is a direct result of Kissinger’s mode of 
thinking and style of leadership.  
541-3:  Ibid., p. 158.  
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 2. America’s rejection of the PRC was becoming outdated. The PRC and the 
Soviet Union were becoming increasingly antagonistic towards one 
another, so the U.S. began to pivot away from viewing communism in 
monolithic terms. The division created the conditions for a new global 
balance of power.  
3. The nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. were due 
for reconsideration. The nuclear arms race became less meaningful as 
nuclear arsenals reached a point where incremental additions were 
inconsequential The time had arrived for both nations to avidly pursue 
arms control negotiations.  
In his approach to these historical currents,  Kissinger marked a break in how American 
foreign policy was conducted ―  a departure from typical Cold War strategy and a 
withdrawal from integrating Wilsonian idealism into foreign policy. He disfavored 
diplomacy based on what Americans like to believe are the traditions of their country’s 
foreign policy ― a respect for human rights, international law, democracy, and other 
idealist values.  He sought to redirect American foreign policy from a moral crusade 55
against Soviet-communism to an unsentimental de-escalation of relations through 
cooperation with Moscow and to open up of relations with Communist China.  
Unfortunately, theses successes did not transpire in isolation. At the time, 
Kissinger linked detenté and triangular diplomacy to what transpired in other corners of 
the world. The battlefields of the Cold War were located in what was then considered the 
55Ibid., p. 766.  
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 ‘Third World’ and today the Global South. He took a hawkish and often an imperial 
stance towards these countries that amount, in retrospect, to his greatest failures. 
Kissinger argues that what are often regarded as failures were the in-the-moment price 
for securing what in retrospect are considered his accomplishments. Regardless, he 
redefined the orientation of American foreign policy, even if it was just for his time 
being. Given the historical climate, I will now commence with a survey of Kissinger’s 
greatest achievements and failures.  
  
3.1.2 Accomplishments and Failures 
Determining the achievements and failures of a statesman is no easy task. What 
one individual might deem to be a foreign policy success, another might deem it to be a 
failure; it depends on one’s philosophical orientation. Hence, I have judged Kissinger’s 
foreign policy from the baseline of order. Which policies amounted to heightened levels 
of stability and which led to chaos? The essence of Kissingerism is the pursuit of stability 
― stability can be achieved without domestic or transnational justice. It should be noted, 
that Kissinger strove to create, first and foremost, international stability, not domestic 
stability. Yet, I judge his policies on international steadiness and their implication on 
domestic cohesion. A statesman should not only be judged on geopolitical ramifications, 
but also on the implications of his policies on the domestic stability of foreign nations.  
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 3.1.2.1 Accomplishments 
 
 Rapprochement with China 
The creation of strategic and diplomatic ties to the PRC was one the greatest 
foreign policy achievements since the Marshall Plan or the creation of Nato.  Kissinger 56
headed the endeavor. The opening up of China, in the words of Henry Kissinger, 
“transformed the structure of international politics.”  Rather than the binary power 57
struggle between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that had defined world order for about 25 
years, the new triangular system between  U.S., China, and the Soviet Union would give 
way for a new, more complex, balance of power.  The triangle presented the opportunity 
for creative diplomacy and the manipulation of delicate leverages.  
Henry Kissinger was initially skeptical of the idea of opening up to China. 
However, as the hostility between China and the Soviet Union started to heat up during 
1969 , Kissinger and Nixon started to pursue the idea. After two years of flirtation, 58
China invited a U.S. envoy to visit Beijing. Kissinger was tasked with charting the path 
of the new relationship. While Kissinger did not single handedly improve relations with 
China, he did indeed play a significant role in the transformation. He was the visionary of 
the Soviet-China-America triangle and he skillfully executed his visit , so as to lay the 59
56Ibid., p. 333.  
57Ibid. 
58Throughout 1969, the two countries frequently exchange of gunfire on border. 
59 ​On Friday, July 9, 1971, Kissinger and his party landed in Beijing. He was welcomed 
by Premier Zhou Enlai. Over the course of the visit, Kissinger and Zhou held talks for 17 
hours. The discussions were not formal. They discussed mutual interests, the state of their 
nations, and world affairs. The only practical piece of business Kissinger had to settle 
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 foundation for the gradual fruition of the triangular balance of power and Nixon’s 
Presidential Visit in February 1972 ― the first official American Presidential state visit 
in history. 
The spearheading diplomacy of Henry Kissinger helped promote world stability. 
First, the opening of relations with China made the Vietnam War seem like a historical 
holdover. The U.S. had just ameliorated relations with a communist country, so it made 
the ideological component of the Vietnam War seem outdated. The U.S. was ready to end 
the violence in Vietnam and it was not considering military conflict with China. 
Moreover, the reworked cooperation between the U.S. and China would contain Soviet 
aggression and make them more interested in Détente  (instead of looking to prolong 60
American anguish in Vietnam). Third, the renewed relations between the two nations 
made the need to stop the advancement of Chinese Communism in the region less 
pressing. The perceived spread of Chinese communism was one way the Vietnam war 
was initially justified, so the easing of the relations between the two countries decreased 
the likelihood of conflict. The world had become a more stable place through the new 
triangular fixture. Hence, the opening of relations with China was indeed one of 
Kissinger’s greatest achievements. 
 
  
 
was to convince Zhou and his counterparts to invite President Nixon for a summit in 
Beijing. The two reached an agreement, which was typed up into a formal document, 
stating the summits purpose: “to seek the normalization of relations.” 
60 Detente is defined as the easing of relations between the Soviet Union and US. 
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 Soviet Union Relations: Détente 
Détente was one of Kissinger’s signature foreign policy achievements. Détente is 
defined as the United States’ effort to ease the strained relations between it and the Soviet 
Union. It is not represented by one agreement or one meeting, but rather it was a general 
policy pursued in a series of fashions, such as summit meetings, arms control 
negotiations, and other bilateral agreements. The U.S. did not want to further militarize 
its relations with the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. wanted to pivot from a pattern of 
hostility and force, to a new pattern of diplomacy and negotiations. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis had shown the potential dangers of a nuclear attack. The scare was still fresh and 
alive at the time. A new policy was needed to detract from the nuclear option. Détente 
was the solution and Kissinger was the mastermind and executor. 
The backbone of the Nixon and Kissinger Détente policy were the arm control 
negotiations. These negotiations were held in a piecemeal fashion, over the course of the 
first few years of Nixon’s administration. Kissinger was largely at the head of the 
negotiations and at the head of fostering improved relations between the two countries. 
For example, Kissinger laid the groundwork for the acclaimed SALT I agreement of 1972 
while in Vienna for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the year 1970. Moreover, 
Kissinger, from 1969-1971, wonderfully molded his relationship with Anatoly Dobrynin, 
the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, so as to breed the formulation of a Moscow 
Summit in the year of 1972.  
The Moscow Summit is the hallmark of Détente. It took place in May 1972 and 
marked the first visit of a U.S. president to Moscow. The Strategic Arms Limitation 
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 Talks (SALT I) were the center achievement of the Summit. While the agreements had 
little effect on the world’s nuclear arsenals, the Summit represented a turn in Soviet-U.S. 
relations. Two countries with competing ideologies, who had been keeping the world on 
edge for a quarter of a century, were able to come together, cooperate, and form a new 
relationship based on realism, not ideological emotion.   61
Kissinger and his style of leadership deserves credit for the pursuit and 
implementation of Détente. Kissinger had usurped the traditional powers of the Secretary 
of State. That is, Kissinger was conducting Nixon’s foreign policy in every corner of the 
world except the Middle East, where Secretary of State William Rogers was largely in 
charge.  With the unorthodox power he had attained, Kissinger created a diplomatic 62
environment ripe for the easing of hostility through secret, back door diplomacy. 
Operating in the West Wing, he was able to avoid the bureaucracy of the state 
department. On a different note, Kissinger’s statecraft that lead to improved Chinese-U.S. 
relations helped to manipulate the Soviet Union into following the U.S. policy of Détente.
 The Soviets feared the combined Strength of the U.S. and China.The policy of Détente 63
did indeed ease tension between the two Cold War adversaries. Therefore, it deserves to 
be recognized as one of Kissinger’s finest successes.  
 
  
 
61Ibid., p. 437.  
62 This would change once Kissinger became Secretary of State and conducted what is 
now referred to as shuttle diplomacy throughout the Middle East.  
63Ibid., p. 353.  
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 Vietnam: Success or Failure? 
The Vietnam War is one of the greatest points of contention in American history. 
Nixon and his administration inherited a war that the majority of the American public 
found frivolous and an act of imperialism. Kissinger assumed the role of leading the 
effort to end the Vietnam war, mainly through a series of secret peace negotiations with 
the North Vietnam representative Le Duc Tho in Paris. The negotiations took place over 
fours years, but they never truly created peace. The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 
were the negotiations best attempt for peace. The accords created the pretense necessary 
to end direct U.S. military involvement, but the agreement only temporarily stopped the 
fighting between North and South Vietnam. The fighting between the two Vietnam 
factions would continue and not cease until the fall of Saigon in April 1975.  
One of Kissinger’s maxims of realpolitik was that military force and diplomacy 
must work together ― an emulation of Machiavelli's concept of ​Virtù (i.e. The 64
combination of virtue and vice)​. In the case of Vietnam, this maxim brought disdain to 
Kissinger’s name. The military might that he employed did not give him the upper hand 
at the negotiation table that he was looking for; instead, it created instability and domestic 
abomination. The consequences of the secret bombings of Cambodia, the invasion of 
Cambodia, and the Christmas Day bombing were too antithetical to stability that they 
overshadow the secretive diplomacy he conducted in Paris. 
  
 
64Ibid., p. 237.  
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 The Guardian of American Hegemony 
Nevertheless, Kissinger’s success in Vietnam is found not in his direct handling 
of the war, but in the way he reshaped American foreign policy in response to the 
isolationist sentiments at home.  He maneuvered and manipulated the complexities of 65
the Cold War, so as to preserve American influence in the post-Vietnam era, without 
relying solely on American military resolve.  
Since the onset of the cold war, American foreign policy was self-defined by the 
willingness to assure the wellbeing of liberty throughout the world. However, Americans 
were starting to consider the limits of American interventionism due to the Vietnam War. 
Henry Kissinger did not want to see America retreat into isolationism; at his core, 
Kissinger was an internationalist.  
In order to preserve America’s globalism, Kissinger pursued a triangular balance 
between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and he integrated Détente. In 
aggregate, these policies conveyed that the United States was redefining its role in the 
world. It was looking to create stability, cut back on intervention, and co-operate. 
However, the stalemate in Vietnam was impeding the commencement of the new era.  
It was clear that there was not a military victory in sight for the U.S. Nixon was 
not interested in maintaining an indefinite military presence, since his reelection counted 
on military withdrawal. In the eyes of Kissinger, however, troop removal would not only 
weaken the possibility of a diplomatic solution, but it would damage the United State’s 
legitimacy. Furthermore, it would compromise the success of Detenté and the opening up 
65Ibid., p. 239.  
 
73 
 of relations with China.  If the U.S. pulled out unconditionally, it would appear that the 
U.S. was retreating into isolation, giving in to domestic sentiments. Its legitimacy would 
be lost and, by extension, its hegemony.  Hence, Kissinger provided tension to Nixon’s 66
policy of Vietnamization ― a plan that reduced the number of U.S. troops in the country 
― in order to reach a diplomatic agreement before military removal was complete  
Kissinger managed to sign the Paris Accords before U.S. troops were completely 
pulled out of Vietnam. While the agreement did collapse, it provided the pretense that the 
time was right to remove all U.S. troops from Vietnam. Hence, U.S. credibility was not 
damaged to the extent that it would have been had it extracted all of its troops in absence 
of a peace agreement. The historic holdover was over and a new era had begun; the U.S. 
could now comfortably situate itself within the Triangular balance. Kissinger’s leadership 
deserves credit for reorienting the U.S. in the post-Vietnam era and preventing the nation 
from retreating into isolation. The U.S. remained hegemonic.  
It is worth noting that one might not consider this new course of path as a success. 
The United States’ position in the post-Vietnam era simply assured the continuance of 
American imperialism. It could have reverted to a more isolated position in world affairs 
and assumed the role of an offshore balancer, as it had in both the World Wars. Counter 
to that, world stability would not have necessarily improved with the implementation of 
American isolationism. The relations between China and the Soviet union were heating 
66 Hegemony is defined as the functioning balance between domination and consent. 
Hence a country needs to have power in order to be hegemonic, but the position also 
requires more than power. Nations give consent to U.S. domination when their needs are 
meet to a high degree. When needs are meet, legitimacy is bestowed upon the United 
States. If permission to rule is obsolete, than dictatorship is what remains. 
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 up and tensions in the Middle East were rising (i.e. Yom Kippur War of 1973). Kissinger 
believed a global America was integral to stability. The avoidance of isolationism 
deserves to be at least considered a success of Kissinger’s leadership. 
 
3.1.2.2 Failures 
While Kissinger achieved success as the leader of American diplomacy, he also 
pursued policies that were detrimental to stability, antithetical to human rights, and 
imperialist. His quest for international stability and the protection of American interests 
at times resulted in what some deem to be immoral calculations. Furthermore, he failed to 
consider ― or he chose to ignore ― the domestic consequences his policies would have 
on foreign nations. I have isolated three such policy scenarios that exhibit the 
aforementioned. The cases I outline are by no means exhaustive. 
 
Callousness: Invasion of Cambodia 
Kissinger’s moral callousness arises in his support for the invasion of Cambodia. 
His support for the invasion arose out of his concern that the internal upheaval of 
Cambodia would interfere with his containment of Vietnamization. After Norodom 
Sihanouk ― the King of Cambodia ― was deposed by his subordinate Lon Nol, 
Kissinger advised Nixon to back Nol, since he was avidly pro American. Sihanouk 
refrained from expressing allyship with foreign powers out of the fear that it would 
subvert the delicate balance of his country.  
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 Nol took a hardline stance against the North Vietnamese, demanding that they 
abandon their sanctuaries on the Cambodian side of the border. In response, the North 
launched an attack. Crippled, Nol pleaded for American military assistance. After much 
deliberation with his staff and academic friends, Kissinger was convinced that they only 
way Vietnamization could proceed unhindered and the only way American credibility 
could be preserved was through a military invasion composed of U.S. and South 
Vietnamese troops. The invasion, Kissinger thought, would prevent Cambodia from 
becoming a conduit for massive communist infiltration and resupply. The invasion lasted 
from May to July of 1970. 
The consequences of the invasion were devastating. The invasion only widened 
the war in Cambodia: it initiated the spread of North Vietnamese troops throughout half 
of Cambodia and it encouraged them to begin arming the local Khmer Rouge ―  a 
fanatical cambodian communist group. The American invasion would only last three 
months, but the war in Cambodia lasted until 1979 ― four years beyond the end of the 
Vietnam war. During this time, the Khmer Rouge committed a genocide that few 
countries have endured during the modern human history. More than 3 million people 
were killed.  
It is forcefully argued that Kissinger and Nixon created the conditions necessary 
for the growth of the Khmer Rouge and, thus, the execution of the group’s genocide.  67
Yes, the Khmer Rouge bear the brunt of the moral responsibility for their unspeakable 
actions; Kissinger never intended for the genocide to take place. Yet, a statesman of 
67Ibid., p. 273.  
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 Kissinger’s caliber should not only be judged by his intentions, but also by the outcomes 
of his policy. Kissinger was warned by his advisors and academic cohorts of the possible 
implications of the invasion. His outlook lacked sensitivity and moral responsibility for 
the civilian population.  
Kissinger and Nixon express no regret for their decision to invade; in fact, all they 
regret is that they did not go far enough.  Kissinger’s leadership style, perhaps, too 68
heavily prioritized his grand vision: ushering the United States into a redefined position 
for the post-Vietnam War era. The consequence of his primacy of realism and his disdain 
for moral deliberations in the case of Cambodia deserves to be listed as one of his 
greatest failures; his policy indirectly transpired into the greatest form of instability: 
genocide. 
 
Detest of Moral Considerations: The Bangladesh Genocide and The Indian-Pakistan 
War 
Kissinger’s dismissal of Pakistan’s genocidal, political crackdown and his 
backing of Pakistan in India-Pakistan War are additional displays of unfettered 
realpolitik. The Bangladesh Genocide and the Indian-Pakistan War are intimately 
connected. In both situations, Kissinger backed Pakistan, despite its brutality against east 
Pakistan. He did so because he perceived his global vision to be conditional on U.S. 
support for Pakistan, since Pakistan was providing the channel of communication with 
China. 
68Ibid. 
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 What became the Bangladesh Genocide was Yahya Khan’s ― the President of 
Pakistan ― solution to the political victory of the Awami League in East Pakistan that 
favored autonomy from West Pakistan. The Bangladesh Genocide, overtime, became a 
general repression of separatist sympathizers. The suppression began in March 1971; 
within a year, the death toll would amount to a half a million people. Despite the 
senseless killing, Kissinger condoned the killing in order to keep the secret back channel 
with China open.  According to Kissinger, Pakistan’s cooperation was integral to 69
creating a triangular relationship with China; hence, the strategic issues at hand 
outweighed immediate moral concerns. 
The India-Pakistan War was indirectly caused by the Bangladesh Genocide. Ten 
million refugees sought safety from the Genocide by fleeing across the border into India. 
The influx of refugees caused India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi, to call for the 
autonomy of East Pakistan. The environment was prime for conflict between the two 
neighboring nations. According to Kissinger’s geopolitical analysis, India was likely to 
use the Bangladesh Genocide as an excuse to annex part of its neighbor.  If India made 70
the first act of aggression, Kissinger predicted the Soviets would come to back India and 
that the Chinese would come to back Pakistan. Therefore, Kissinger did not want to 
alienate the U.S. from the situation and allow the Soviets to stand unchecked by 
American competition by casting harsh words of criticism upon Pakistan. Hence, his 
geopolitical analysis persuaded him, yet again, to disregard the state's act of genocide.  
69Ibid., p. 372.  
70Ibid., p. 373.  
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 In aggregate, the two conflicts convey two basic maxims of his leadership style: 
the priority of geopolitics over humanist concerns and the proclivity to see world 
dynamics solely through the lense of Soviet-American confrontation. While these two 
maxims might have resulted in international stability, the cases of Bangladesh and 
Cambodian Genocide convey how the maxims simultaneously contributed to intrastate 
instability and violence. One these grounds, his handling of the Bangladesh Genocide and 
the India-Pakistan war deserve to be labeled as leadership failures. The handling of these 
events represent a larger failure too: Kissinger’s inability to reconcile geopolitical 
strategy with the advocacy for a higher set of moral principles that transcend international 
border and set targets for the development of humankind. 
  
Imperial Kissinger: The Fall of Allende 
Kissinger’s support and intent to subvert the democratically elected Chilean 
President Salvador Allende stands as one of his most explicit acts of imperialism while in 
office. In the cases of Pakistan and Cambodia, Kissinger did not seek to control or sway a 
political outcome. In Chile, Kissinger meddled in national politics in order to achieve an 
outcome favorable to his desire to destroy the success and consequent expansion of 
socialist governments. 
Salvador Allende ― a democratic socialist ― was elected President of Chile on 
the 4th of September 1970; he won a narrow plurality of 36.2%. The CIA tried to ‘buy’ 
votes in the Chilean Congress in order to block Allende.  It was fruitless. Thereafter, 71
71Ibid., p. 290.  
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 Kissinger handled the orchestration of subversion efforts himself. Kissinger viewed Chile 
as linked to a web of trials of American geopolitical resolve. If Allende stayed in power, 
it would be an infiltration of the Western Hemispheres bulwark against socialism. Hence, 
to Kissinger, it was imperative that the U.S. depose the democratic socialist.  
Kissinger began to avidly pursue a more brutal form of sabotage: the promotion 
of a military coup. He instructed the CIA to approach Chilean military commanders about 
the possibility of a coup.  The climate was not right; the military was committed to 72
refraining from political involvement. Under the guidance of Kissinger, the U.S. reverted 
to economic measures (investment discouragement and credit blockage) and funneled 
money to anti-Allende activities. Moreover, Kissinger refused a policy of 
accommodation, even when faced with Allende’s amazing gesture of inviting a U.S. 
aircraft carrier to make a ceremonial stop at the port of Valparaiso. Kissinger demanded 
that the invitation be declined. Hence, he turned down an opportunity for improved 
relations. Kissinger favored meddling in Chile’s political system.  
The U.S. played a direct role in the coup that lead to the death of Allende. In the 
aftermath, Chile entered a period of violent dictatorship and social instability. Kissinger’s 
approach to the rise of Chilean socialism was not doubt imperialistic in nature: he sought 
to dominate Chile through political manipulation and degradation. Kissinger’s binary 
view of the east-west struggle caused him to treat a peripheral country as disposable in 
his quest to eradicate South America of what he deemed to be soviet influence. For 
Kissinger, imperialism was a valuable tool of diplomacy, not a liability. 
72Ibid., p. 290.  
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3.1.3 Assets and Liabilities 
As shown, Henry Kissinger’s policies resulted in success and failure. It is 
worthwhile to deduce lessons ― positive and negative ― from the policies he 
implemented. The following points will help guide the fifth chapter as I attempt to size up 
Kissinger’s assets without overlooking his shortcomings when formulating a policy to 
upend the deadlock between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
 
Intellectually Secure, yet Socially Insecure 
Henry Kissinger was intellectually brilliant and self assured. He had a mind 
capable of conceptualizing unobvious patterns and seeing connections between different 
events that others had a hard time deciphering. He could decrypt how an action in one 
corner of the world reverberate in a different corner of the world. Moreover, he was 
intellectually poised, so he often sought having his ideas and theories debated with aides 
and academics. Hence, the following lesson: ​be thoughtful, attuned to detail and 
interconnectedness, and so familiar with a idea or theory, that you can defend it to the 
point where you can disprove the opposing argument. 
Simultaneously, Henry Kissinger was socially insecure. His social uncertainty 
was connected to his habits of secrecy and deceit. For example, he unnecessarily tapped 
the phones of his colleagues, aides, and adversaries in order to have an upper hand in 
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 persuading the president to implement his geopolitical vision.  The tactic wasn’t even 73
particularly effective and it almost led to Kissinger’s resignation. Moreover, Kissinger’s 
social diffidence manifested in his constant quest for approval. He tried to seduce a broad 
spectrum of people in order to be liked and admired. He was socially thin skinned, but 
also charming. His social maneuverings resulted in a reputation of duplicity, which not 
only hurt him at times in the hierarchy of government, but also in his diplomacy. A lesson 
can be derived from his social insecurity: ​while social fragility is not innately a liability, 
one needs to contain and examine the impulse to act on it; if introspection is absent, 
one’s secretive actions could backfire and result in downfall.  
 
Master Geopolitical Architect, but Inconsiderate of Domestic Implications 
Henry Kissinger was attuned to global dynamics, history, and political nuance. 
Hence, he was adept to overarching geostrategic frameworks. Testaments to this are his 
creations of Detenté and Soviet-Chinese-American triangular relations. Both policies 
sought to intrench international stability. These geopolitical frameworks required 
patience, manipulation, and clairvoyance. The aforementioned qualities are ones 
imperative to a statesman of the highest caliber. 
While a geopolitical visionary, Kissinger too often overlooked and 
underemphasized the domestic implications of his policies on foreign countries. For 
example, his advocacy for the invasion of Cambodia indirectly created the conditions that 
73 The wire tappings were initially justified on the basis of deducing the source of the leak 
on the U.S.’s bombing of Cambodia. The practice, however, remained in place for nearly 
two years.  
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 allowed for the Cambodian Genocide. An important lesson is derived here: ​while 
visionary thinking is fundamental to leadership in the international realm, one should not 
downplay the consideration of domestic implications that could potentially amount to 
internal instability. 
 
Unfettered Realism 
Kissinger’s greatest successes were derived from his realpolitik disposition. He 
vehemently believed the prime responsibility of diplomacy was to establish international 
stability. He detested foreign policy guided on moral principles and considerations. 
Basing policy on ideals made a nation seem dangerously unpredictable. This philosophy 
led to a reorientation of the U.S.’s stance towards the Soviet Union and China. 
Kissinger's realistic strategy of containment and cooperation with Moscow allowed for 
the internal contradictions of the Soviet system to play out. In an age of idealistic 
diplomacy, it is imperative to reconsider the underlying value of Kissingerian realpolitik: 
it diminishes unpredictability by prioritizing stability through the balance of power. 
Simultaneously, Kissingerian realpolitik was often left unconstrained by morality. 
He failed to strike an appropriate balance between values-based idealism and realism. 
While it is imperative to deduce the reality of a situation, it also useful to conceptualize 
idealized outcomes. Stability and the support for values-based idealism are not inherently 
at odds. Kissinger, however, pushed a foreign policy that denied the use of American 
hegemony to advocate for ideals ― such as inclusive institutions, free media, 
sovereignty, and self-determination ― on the global stage. ​Hence, aspiring leaders must 
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 recognize the importance of striking a balance between realism and idealism; the pursuit 
of one at the denial of the other ignores the nuance and complexity of geopolitics in the 
contemporary world.  
 
3.1.4 Final Thoughts 
I have distilled two possibilities as to why Kissinger remains a pivotal and central 
figure in American Foreign Policy debates: (1) Kissingerian realpolitik was 
unprecedented in modern American foreign policy, yet it managed to enhance the 
stability of geopolitics ― though at a great cost; (2) Kissinger ignored or overlooked how 
detrimental American policy can be to the internal stability of the nations on the receiving 
end of his policies ― his decisions amount to crimes against humanity.  
To his enthusiasts, his legacy is that of a realistic strategist whose policies ushered 
in a newly defined role for the United States, a role defined by containment and 
cooperation, not by the unconditional protection of world liberty. To his critics, his 
legacy is that of a immoral tactician whose policies were imperial and callous; while he 
might have stabilized the international realm, Kissinger's policies destabilized entire 
nations. Of course, there are those who sit somewhere in between.  
The next section challenges the position that Kissinger was adverse to morality 
and ethics. An analysis of his theoretical thinking and philosophical disposition conveys 
that he was well attuned to conceptions of morality and ethics. His takeaways, however, 
are markedly different than American notions of moralism. While completing his B.A. 
and PhD at Harvard, Kissinger thought considerably about these topics. The section lays 
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 out a moral positioning that is perhaps hard for some to recognize from Kissinger in 
practice: the circumvention of war through a constructed and legitimate balance of 
power.  
 
3.2 Kissingerism: Strategic Thinking and Philosophical Disposition  
3.2.1 Kissinger on Order 
Henry Kissinger’s latest book is titled ​World Order​. It strives to articulate 
regional conceptions of order that have heavily influenced the evolution of the modern 
era. In aggregate, his geopolitical analysis amounts to an attempted framework on which 
to build World Order, but stops short of prescribing explicit piecemeal policy proposals. 
His experience with the complexity of the world leaves him with the state of mind that 
in-depth policy needs to formulated by today’s statesmen operating the power structures 
of government. On another note, Kissinger’s decision to write, what might very well be 
his last book, on the concept of world order conveys the state and direction of his 
thinking in the final years of his life. Hence, from this book, I attempt to distill the 
up-to-date state of Henry Kissinger’s strategic thinking.  
As a statesman rooted in the European tradition of diplomacy and philosophy, 
Kissinger devotes the first chapter of his book to an overview of the European experience 
and isolates from it what he finds to be the most likely path to World Order: a 
contemporary rendition of the European tradition of pluralistic international society. The 
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 task of world order requires a framework of thinking that transcends borders, yet gives 
credence to the role of the state in cultivating a universally accepted international order, 
and avoids universal prescriptions other than those agreed upon as the governing 
principles of inter-state relations. 
What, precisely, does the concept of order entail? How does it change with 
variant contexts, such as world, international, and regional order? Kissinger defines his 
overarching concept using a tertiary scale of differentiation: 
World order describes the concept held by a region of civilization about            
the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be             
applicable to the entire world. An international order is the practical           
application of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe ― large             
enough to affect the global balance of power. Regional orders involve the            
same principles applied to a defined geographic area.  74
 
Hence, the notion of World Order rests on a set of overarching principles on which the 
international system is predicated and a distribution of power that holds off conflict and 
preserves stability. For a world order to reach beyond conceptuality, it needs to be backed 
by power and accepted as legitimate. Today, for many, the liberal international order is 
supreme. However, when Kissinger references the quest for World Order, he implicitly 
rebukes the efficacy of the current liberal international order. In fact, there are some who 
claim it has collapsed entirely, such as the Historian Niall Ferguson. Finally, a regional 
order is not necessarily incompatible with an international order of a different mold, 
though it helps if there are clear points of similarity. This is exemplified by the European 
Union and its participation in the liberal international order. 
74 Kissinger 2014, ​World Order​ [Henceforth WO] p.9. 
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 In the quest for World Order, the multifacetedness and contradictory nature of the 
human experience will need to be reconciled. In the words of Kissinger: 
Can regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories          
of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system? Success in such            
an effort will require an approach that respects both the multifariousness           
of the human condition and the ingrained human quest for freedom. Order            
in this sense must be cultivated; it cannot be imposed...In our time, the             
quest for world order will require relating the perceptions of societies           
whose realities have largely been self-contained. The mystery to be          
overcome is one all peoples share ― how divergent historical experiences           
and values can be shaped into a common order.  75
 
Inevitable in this process is the capitulation of ideals and historical conceptions of justice 
and order. As countries rise in power, such as China and India, there perceptions of 
morality and order that “have [hitherto been] largely self contained” will be placed onto 
the crucible of diplomacy. If the resulting mixture of principles is rejected, diplomacy 
will fade and war will decide the outcome of the new status quo.  
However, if nations compromise on the principles that they hold as universal, 
what are they getting in exchange? They receive stability through a “set of commonly 
accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that 
enforces restrain where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating 
all others.”  This will not emerged naturally but, rather, through persistent cultivation 76
and compromise.  
Take, for example, the conflicting claims over proprietorship of the city of 
Jerusalem. Any future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal will necessitate a compromise over 
75 Ibid., WO p.8. 
76 Ibid., WO p.8. 
 
87 
 Jerusalem, as both parties claim the city to be their rightful capital. Each claim the city is 
rightfully theirs. Regardless of who should have it from a moral standpoint, the statesmen 
is forced to treat dictums of divinity as bargaining chips. A recent Atlantic article 
reporting on Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 
nicely frames the palestinian and jewish orthodox position ― or at least a rendition of the 
possible positions:  
When Jews all over the world pray, they face Israel. Those in Israel face              
Jerusalem, and those in Jerusalem face the Temple Mount, the site of            
Judaism’s two ancient sanctuaries, which once stood on the same patch of            
land now occupied by the Al-Aqsa mosque. “This is all because we            
believe this is our capital,” said Arieh King, a right-wing member of            
Jerusalem’s City Council. “For the Orthodox Jew like me, Jerusalem is not            
just a place to live. It’s a way that you live. It’s in a place close to where                  
everything important of our history happened … also in the future,           
[where] we believe the third Temple will be built.” 
 
Palestinians feel just as strongly about the city’s religious significance.          
“Jerusalem is part of our faith. It’s the first place where Muslims started             
praying,” said Ziad Abu Zayyad, a lawyer and former minister of the            
Palestinian Authority. Not only is Jerusalem a symbol of national identity;           
it’s the home of one of the most important sites in Islam. “Al-Aqsa is in               
the heart of every Muslim,” Zayyad said. “It’s a red line. It’s the third holy               
place,” after the Saudi Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina.  77
 
The task of statesmen is daunting, evidenced by the absence of a resolution on the 
palestinian-Israeli conflict for decades. How does one go about reconciling such 
divergent and seemingly incompatible aims? Another pertinent question: does world 
order depend on a resolution of the conflict? If yes, the order will have to be considered 
just by both and accurately assess the balance of power in the region. Moreover, 
77 Green 2017.  
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 statesmen must convince the people and state they ultimately represent that order is 
acceptable, otherwise it will not be sustainable.  
World order is a scheme for the statesmen. However, an order that is successful in 
the long-run  is contingent not only on the support of elite statesman, but also the citizens 
of the states invested in the system. Acceptance is based on the perception of a just 
system. As a result, World Order cannot be imposed. In the words of Henry Kissinger: 
Any system of world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as just ―              
not only by leaders, but also by citizens. It must reflect two truths: order              
without freedom, even if sustained by momentary exaltation, eventually         
creates its own counterpoise; yet freedom cannot be secured or sustained           
without a framework of order to keep the peace. Order and freedom,            
sometimes described as opposite poles on the spectrum of experience,          
should instead be understood as interdependent. Can today’s leaders rise          
above the urgency of day-to-day events to achieve this balance?  78
 
While often criticised for overlooking domestic sentiment during his tenure as Secretary 
of State and National Security Advisor, his words, here, do not convey negligence 
towards domestic institutions and sentiment. Rather, Kissinger defines the role of the 
statesman, in part, to bridging the gap between domestic maxims held as universal and 
those of other nations. Kissinger seems to believe reconciliation will arise out of what he 
calls “the ingrained human quest for freedom.”  He suggests in ​World Order​ to frame 79
order and freedom as interconnected and not as two opposite poles. While Kissinger 
offers no specific blueprint for striking an equilibrium, he contends that an order that 
incompasses the whole globe will have to have pluralism as its guiding and unabiding 
tenet. Pluralism is the best means to satisfying the “the ingrained human quest for 
78 Kissinger 2014, WO p.8. 
79 Kissinger 2014, WO p.8. 
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 freedom.”  In the context of states, no region is ripe with a traditional of pluralism as the 80
European experience. 
Henry Kissinger believes in the validity and prospect of the pluralistic 
international order that arose out of the European experience after the end of the Roman 
Empire. The order amounted to little other than diversity for centuries; it was defined by 
the makeup of many different polities, but lacked a commonly accepted set of rules that 
maintained relative peace between regional states. Hence, disorder and warfare was 
prevalent. The European experience is unique in that competing powers did not display 
examples of “political contests [that were] fought for control [over]...established 
framework[s] of order,”  unlike in China and Islam; “dynasties changed, but each new 81
ruling group portrayed itself as restoring a legitimate system that had fallen into despair. 
In Europe, no such evolution took hold.”  Though Europe is denoted as a general 82
geographical area, its political complexion was defined by a range of governance styles 
and identities. In addition, when one leader defeated another, the principles by which rule 
was established were typically different than that of their predecessor.  
When the Roman empire disintegrated, a new empire did not rise to take its place. 
The unity of the Roman empire was replaced with the Church. Yet, the relationship 
between Church and state was never synthesized, despite the fact that the two mutually 
80 Kissinger 2014, WO p.8. 
81 Kissinger 2014, WO p.11. 
82 Ibid., WO p.11.  
 
90 
 reinforced one another for centuries. Ever since, Europe has been composed of a 
multitude of polities, some of which were ironically titled empires.   83
Accordingly, order, under the European Experience, was conceived as not only an 
internal matter, but also contingent on the equilibrium among states. This differs 
drastically from the empire/imperial conception of order, where it is conceptualized as 
being contingent on the state of internal governance. As such, the farther the empire 
reached, so did the prospect of complete order. In other words, total order was feasible 
when an Empire had ​all​ people and ​all​ land under its domain.  
In Europe, Kissinger holds that it was the inability of anyone state to dominate the 
others that resulted in a plural regional order. He states: 
It is not that European monarchs were more immune to the glories            
of conquest than their counterparts in other civilizations or more          
committed to an ideal of diversity in the abstract. Rather, they lacked the             
strength to impose their will on each other decisively. In time pluralism            
took on the characteristics of a model of world order. Has Europe in our              
83 Kissinger admits a partial caveat, but attests it is not incoherent with his argument:               
“Aspirations to unity were briefly realized on Christmas Day 800, when Pope Leo III crowned               
Charlemagne… as Imperator Romanorum (Emperor of the Romans), and awarded him the            
theoretical title to the former eastern half of the erstwhile Roman Empire, at that point the lands                 
of Byzantium...But Charlemagne’s empire did not fulfil its aspirations...After Charlemagne’s          
death, his successors sought to reinforce his position by appeal to tradition, by naming his               
possessions the Holy Roman Empire. But debilitated by civil wars, less than a century after its                
founding, Charlemagne’s empire passed from the scene as a coherent political entity (though its              
name remained in use throughout a shifting series of territories until 1806)” (14). Furthermore,              
Kissinger recognizes “the rise of the sixteenth-century Habsburg prince Charles (1500-1558)” as            
the only period when “a full flowering of the medieval concept of world order was envisioned [a                 
concept based on universalism].” In fact, “a Chinese or Turkish visitor to Europe at the time                
might well have perceived a seemingly familiar political system: a continent presided over by a               
single dynasty imbued with a sense of divine mandate. If Charles had been able to consolidate                
his authority and manage an orderly succession in the vast Habsburg territorial conglomerate,             
Europe would have been shaped by a dominant central authority like the Chinese or the Islamic                
caliphate.” Ibid., WO p.16.  
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 time transcended this pluralistic tendency ― or do the internal struggles of            
the European Union affirm it?  84
 
The “model of world order” that Kissinger references has largely proliferated across the 
world. This model is based on national interest and balance of power. The means of 
proliferation were colonialism. Hence, the system’s spread out to be thought of as 
inorganic. If regions of the world were free to develop their own model of world order, it 
is possible that the foundational tenets would have been at odds with the pluralistic nature 
of the European experience. Henry Kissinger frames this development with less explicit 
language:  
The modern era announced itself when enterprising societies sought glory          
and wealth by expanding the oceans and whatever lay beyond them...sixty           
years later, the European powers sailed from a continent of competing           
sovereign authorities; each monarch sponsored naval exploration largely        
in the hope of achieving a commercial or strategic edge over his            
rivals...the age of three centuries of preponderant European influence in          
world affairs had been launched. International relations, once a regional          
enterprise, would henceforth be geographically global. With the center of          
gravity in Europe, in which the concept of world order was defined and its              
implementation determined...Their global competition for territorial      
control changed the nature of international order. Europe’s perspective         
expanded ― until successive colonial efforts by various European states          
covered most of the globe and concepts of world order merged with the             
operation of the balance of power in Europe.  85
 
It is unlikely that Kissinger disavows colonialism on practical grounds, and perhaps 
ethical ones as well. Though never stated explicitly by Kissinger, it is possible that he 
conceives colonialism as a means ― intentionally or not ― to subsume areas of the globe 
84  Ibid., WO p.12. 
85  Ibid., WO p.17. 
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 to the international organizational structure of the nation-state. Decolonization and the 
simultaneous tide of nationalism instituted the state as the unit of the international system 
― a unit averse to universal conceptions of order.  
What, precisely, is the Westphalian conception of order? At its base, it holds each 
nation as equal, regardless of its power or domestic system of government. As such, each 
state recognized by the international community is, in theory, granted the right to exist in 
its own right into perpetuity. The state’s guiding principle is its national interests. 
Accordingly,  
The Westphalian concept took multiplicity as its starting point and drew a            
variety of multiple societies, each accepted as a reality, into a common            
search for order. By the mid-twentieth century, the international system          
was in place on every continent; it remains the scaffoldings of           
international order such as it now exists.  86
  
The Westphalian order does not escape the fact that nation-states are possessed by power 
and perennially fearful of their neighbors, but it does help subdue universal inclinations 
or quests of force by prioritizing the cultivation of a balance of power. This balance 
provides a kind of insurance against hegemonic aspirations. Before the Westphalian 
model of order, balance of power was not sought after intentionally. It incidentally 
emerged when empires were incapable of establishing a comparative advantage in 
violence, resulting in military stagnation. For the Westphalian model to have legitimacy, 
nations need to exhibit a degree of reservation when contemplating or adopting conquest 
as the rock of national interest. It is the job of diplomacy to establish a suitable and 
efficacious balance of power where war is not a desirable means to a country’s aspired 
86  Ibid., WO p.27.  
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 ends. If a balance of power is legitimate, grievances are expressed and settled through 
diplomacy. The Westphalian concept attempts to adjudicate within the existing system.  
Kissinger distinguishes between a balance of power ​as a fact​ and balance of 
power ​as a system​. As a system, balance of power must be established and, eventually 
reestablished. As history attests through the rise of and fall of empires, power is never 
fixed. Hence, a balance of power of a certain configuration will not last into perpetuity. 
Typically, warfare readjusts a balance of power, but it is also the later that limits the 
former’s extent. A readjustment to balance of power is typically enacted by a challenge to 
the status quo. This happens in at least two ways according to Kissinger:  
The first is if a major country augments its strength to a point where it               
threatens to achieve hegemony. The second occurs when a         
heretofore-secondary state seeks to enter the ranks of the major powers           
and sets off a series of compensating adjustments by the other powers until             
a new equilibrium is established or a general conflagration takes place.           
The Westphalian system met both tests in the eighteenth century, first by            
thwarting the thrust for hegemony by France’s Louis XIV, then by           
adjusting the system to the insistence of Prussia’s Frederick the Great for            
Equal Status.  87
 
 Thus, a challenge to the system does not amount to an automatic adjustment and 
it is plausible to achieve great power status without challenging the status quo with force. 
While a state’s national interests might amount to a ​tour de force​ to upset the current 
balance of power, it is more common for a state’s national interests to be aligned with the 
preservation of the current balance of power. Secondary powers with little hope of 
augmenting substantial power to be a threat or a current major power falls into this box. 
87  Ibid., WO p.33. 
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 The appeal of balance of power is that it is practiced under the assumption that the 
international system would not tolerate hegemonic aspirations.  
Nonetheless, the concept of balance of power arose out of the historical 
conditions of Europe; for nearly three hundred years, it was the guiding principle of the 
international order. In past, balance of power transpired as a necessity ― one power was 
not able to augment enough power to overcome their foe. Under the European 
experience, balance of power became proactive, something that was sought after. 
Kissinger undoubtedly supports balance of power. He sees it as the most plausible path to 
a World order. Yet, he is hesitant, if not against, the assumption that it’ll automatically 
transpire on the world stage.  
On this note, Henry Kissinger likes to raise Kant’s idea of perpetual peace. To 
reach such a state, according to Kant, a voluntary federation of republics, united under 
the premise of goodwill and transparent domestic and international conduct, would 
cultivate world peace. Humans would “reason [their] way toward ‘a system of united 
power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security’ and ‘a perfect civil 
union of mankind.’”  While the state has become the unit of international system, each 88
society had its own set of unique historical circumstance that result in a diverse 
institutions and approaches to order that differentiate it from its peers. As such, is the 
world too complicated and diverse to rationally approach the conception of world order 
as something that can be invented by apt thinkers and instituted by statesman?  
88  Ibid., WO p.40. 
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 Kissinger seems to deny the viability of the rationalist tradition that arose out of 
the enlightenment as a means to international order. He seems to embrace a different 
approach, “requiring a kind of intuition and an almost esoteric element of statecraft.”  89
He claims such a modus operandi aligns with the organic view of political evolution. On 
these grounds, the ideas that emerged out of the enlightenment ― the very ideas that 
constitute the foundation of Western political tradition ― are not the requisite to world 
order. Each nation possess its own perception of legitimacy and national interests, so as 
to make “a perfect civil union of mankind” impossible. One cannot rationally reconcile 
contradictory ideals. World Order is the realistic substitute to Kant’s theoretical ideal of 
perpetual peace. Therefore, for Kissinger, World order is something that needs to be 
cultivated, but not solely through the rational tradition of statesmanship that holds 
federal, republic institutions as it guiding principle. In order to overcome varying 
cultures, histories, and ideas of morality, esoteric leadership, based on intuitive 
perceptions of reality, is keen. Any such conception of reality is not avoiding reality as 
much as it is creating it. The statesman, using his or her position to align divergent 
experiences, seeks to create conditions and principles for a common system of world 
order that is vindicated by all participants in the system. Conjecture is an essential 
component of the leadership style that Kissinger embodies and advocates.  
  
89  Ibid., WO p.41. 
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 3.2.2 Kissinger on Hegemony 
Kissinger’s denial of historical determinism is relevant to American hegemony. In 
his B.A. thesis, Kissinger incorporated Spengler heavily, but rejected the cyclical nature 
of his thinking ― that is, that civilizations inevitably rise and collapse. For spengler, 
culture is the period of becoming, while civilization is what has becomes once the 
impulses of culture become static. This cannot be escaped. Kissinger denied its 
inevitability, but recognized the validity of the signs emblematic of societal decay. 
Namely, it is when the “fact-men” take over a civilization that its position is put in 
jeopardy. At this point, the heyday of dreams, myths, and risking taking that inspired a 
society in its early days fade. The intellectuals, political leaders, logicians, and 
rationalists become overly concerned with questions of why rather than how. Greg 
Grandin explains this point nicely: 
Spengler wrote (referring to the rationalism of modern society, which          
strives for every more efficient ways of doing things), “is a time of             
decline.” The intuitive dimensions of widom get tossed aside, technocratic          
procedure overwhelms purpose, and information is mistaken for wisdom.         
“Vast bureaucratic mechanisms,” Kissinger said, develop “a momentum        
and a vested interests of their own. Western Culture was history’s highest            
expression of technical reason: it “views the whole world,” Kissinger          
wrote, “as a working hypothesis.”...At Harvard, the Vatican of American          
positivism, filled with the country’s high priests of social science,          
Kissinger looked around and asked: Would American leaders command or          
fall slave to their own technique? “Technical knowledge will be of no            
avail,” the twenty-six-year-old student-veteran warned, “to a soul that has          
lost its meaning.  90
 
90 Grandin 2015, p.20-1. 
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 A soul that lost its meaning is prone to soul searching. In the case of civilizations, they 
stumble outward, conducting conquests and implementing imperial projects to fill the 
soulless void. The wars that great civilizations get tangled in result in exhaustion and 
eventually demise. In the words of Kissinger: “‘Imperialism is the inevitable product’ of 
this final stage… ‘an outward thrust to hide the inner void.’”  Yet, decay is not 91
inevitable.  It is the job of the statesmen to spare a nation from this impending abyss. 92
According to this strain of thinking, American hegemony will not necessarily 
fade, but it does need be continuously cultivated in order to be sustained into the future. 
Positivism and its cause-and-effect analysis will not resurrect the United States’ position. 
An imaginary and innovative population and statesmen who rely on intuitive and 
instinctive conjecture are the means to a revival of American hegemony. Retreat into 
isolationism, similarly, will not sustain american preponderance.  
There is a Caveat to Kissinger’s thinking, as it regards to America in the post 
Cold War order. American will never be able to revive the economic, political, and 
91 Ibid., p. 21-22 
92 Greg Grandin makes an interesting note to this point. He possess the thought that if 
Kissinger realized war and imperialism help, if not cause, the process of a civilizations 
decay, then why did he wage and prolong war while in office. In other words, he claims 
Kissinger’s philosophical stance seems to be at odds with Kissinger in practice. Grandin 
writes: “Based on his reading of Spengler (and other philosopher-historians, such as 
Arnold Toynbee, who warned of the “suicidalness of militarism”), Kissinger might have 
come to the conclusion that the best way to avoid decline was to avoid war altogether, to 
put America’s greatest resources to building a sustainable society at home rather than 
squander them in adventures in places far and wide. But Kissinger took a different lesson 
from Spengler: it wasn’t war that was to be avoided but war fought without a clear 
political objective. He in fact advocated fighting wars far and wide ― or at least advocate 
for a willingness to fight wars far and wide ― as a way of preventing the loss of purpose 
and wisdom that Spengler identified as taking place during civilization’s final stage.” 
Ibid., p.22.  
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 military dominance it experienced at the end of WWII. Other nations are progressing and 
increasing their might vis-á-vis these metrics. The United States will remain absolutely 
relevant and improve its condition, but it will not make drastic relative gains. It will have 
to define its place in world where China, the EU, Russian, and India too are emblematic 
of preponderance in their regions of the world. To be sure, the United States remains the 
regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and will remain so for the foreseeable 
future. World hegemony is a far fetched dream, considering the rise of these growing 
civilizations.  
 
3.2.3 Kissinger on Diplomacy & Foreign Policy 
Kissinger’s magnum opus ― ​Diplomacy​ ― weighs the realist and idealist foreign 
policy perspectives. In the introduction and conclusion, he speaks generally, with no one 
diplomatic episode tracing the section. In the intermittent 29 chapters, Kissinger devotes 
each chapter to a theme he recounts and analyzes in detail, amongst them are those 
Kissinger personally partook in. Kissinger gives credence and appreciation to ideals, but, 
nevertheless, favors a diplomacy first and foremost guided by national interest.  
Take democracy for example and the american experience. Democracy and 
liberty are the cornerstone of the historical development of the United States. 
Accordingly, it is intimately connected to the nations foreign policy formulations. 
Kissinger holds the ideal of democracy has created “two contradictory attitudes toward 
foreign policy.” He writes,  
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 The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at             
home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that              
America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around            
the world.  93
 
Kissinger seems to generally favor the former. A national interest that prioritizes direct 
threats to the nation’s physical security is more sustainable than a national interest that 
emphasizes the defence and spread of democracy through threat and force. This does not 
mean American ideals are irrelevant, but it does means they should not constitute the 
linchpin of American foreign policy. Ultimately, a balance must be struck that favors the 
absence of sentimental notions in favor of the reproduction of the status quo (i.e. An 
international environment that allows America to perfect its democratic system).  
For Kissinger, contingency is the prerequisite of a solid foreign policy. He writes, 
“the essence of policy is its contingency; its success depends on the correctness of an 
estimate which is in part conjectural.”  Foreign policy based on conjecture is 94
diametrically opposed to foreign policy rooted in rationalization (i.e. if one does y, the 
numbers or facts concretely predict x). Kissinger thinks the world is too complicated and 
humans too irrational to depended on fixed policy informed by facts. For Kissinger, 
“profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant redefinition of goals.”  95
Hence, one must be creative in the implementation of foreign policy, resorting to 
conjecture based instinct, intuition, and history. Foreign policy is dynamic, not static.  
93 Kissinger 1994, Diplomacy [Henceforth D] p.18. 
94 Kissinger 1957, World Restored [Henceforth WR] p.326. 
95 Ibid., p.326. 
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 If one’s estimate is incorrect, they must adapt. Time and its pressure demands the 
statesman to act “on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making 
them.”  The decisions at hand must be made partly on conjecture and partly on one’s 96
understanding of what worked and failed in the past and why. In accordance with such 
thinking, the one who sits in front of a page typing cannot lay out a precise blueprint for 
what foreign policy should be, but they can outline a general, overarching framework that 
contains necessary voids, left to be filled by the conjectural thinking of the leaders of 
foreign policy. 
 
3.2.4 Kissinger on America’s Role in the 21st Century 
An international system free of an overarching ideological landscape, delineated 
along binary lines, is the fundamental difference between the contemporary international 
system and its Cold War predecessor. In the new order, states enjoy more flexibility as 
they execute their foreign policies and possess rather individualized national interests. 
The world is no longer dominated by two superpowers, but, rather, five or six major 
powers and an abundance of smaller ones; the system is now multipolar.  In a sense, 97
then, the world we live in bears resemblance to the European, pluralistic order of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In accordance, order will not emerge through a 98
balance of wills between the Soviet Union and the United States, but by the means of 
96 Kissinger 1994, D p.27. 
97 Since the end of WWII, nearly 100 nations have joined the international community. 
The five, maybe six superpowers of the 21st century are the United States, China, Russia, 
the EU, India, and maybe Brazil.  
98 Kissinger 1994, ​Diplomacy​ [Henceforth D] p.805. 
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 reconciling and balancing the national interests of a number of nations. The unique 
feature of the 21st century is that never before has the modern world experienced major 
centers of power distributed around the world.  
The United States has yet to determine how to transition from its experience in the 
20th century to the new power dynamics and realities it faces in the 21st century. Its 
attempts to adopt a position and strategy for the 21st century have largely failed.  Its 99
approach has been too heavy handed on the military end, particularly considering that its 
use of force has been applied to situations that do not directly jeopardize its national 
security. From the fall of the Soviet Union to the eventual backlash of the Iraq War, the 
United States attempted to police the world. With no immediate or direct threats after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, blunt calculations of national interest were ignored largely 
because they did not exist beyond the need to exercise restraint.  
Having entered an international landscape emblematic of the 19th and 18th 
century Europe, but on a global scale, the United States is fronted with a set of practices 
that were used successfully during these two-hundred years. These practices, however, 
have been questioned or dismissed since the establishment of the United States of 
America (i.e. national interest and balance of power). While still preponderant and 
capable of projecting power anywhere on the globe, other nations, too, are gaining the 
ability to exercise power far and wide ― markedly China. At this point in time, China 
has largely kept their military reach within the confines of their territory and their 
immediate peripheries. Economically, the United States is projected to be passed, in 
99 Mandelbaum 2016.  
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 terms of magnitude, by China, at the turn of the 5th decade of this century. This is 
remarkable considering that the U.S., at one point, possessed 35% of the world’s total 
economic output.  
Given the greater distribution of power throughout the world, Kissinger argues 
“America’s ability to employ [power] to shape the rest of the World has actually 
decreased.”  With power diminishing in relative terms, American foreign policy 100
conducted on the basis of Wilsonian Principles is becoming less viable and progressively 
dangerous. In 1994, Kissinger wrote, “As the twenty-first century approaches, vast global 
forces are at work that, over the course of time, will render the United States less 
exceptional.”  As the basis of Wilsonian foreign policy, the decline of American 101
exceptionalism in real terms needs to be accompanied by a change in mindset regarding 
America’s role in the world. American policy makers have not adequately adjusted to 
these new realities.  
Kissinger argues that with rise of multiple centers of power, balance of power 
becomes paramount over the spread and adaptation of American principles. 
Wilsonianism requires preponderance at a level where coercion leads to a desired 
outcome, or, at the very least, where its perception and its potential consequences result 
in the fruition of America’s strategic plan. However, America does not enjoy such power 
and, perhaps, it never did. When the U.S. conducts itself on the world stage as if the 
aforementioned is true, the U.S. gets bogged down in conflict and becomes overstretched. 
100 Kissinger 1994, D p. 809. 
101 Ibid, D p.809.  
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 It is a regional hegemon, not a global one. Thus, America should prioritize inter-state 
peace instead of the universal adaptation of its principles ― these are secondary.  
With the dictates of Wilsonianism becoming less practicable, this question arises: 
“on what principles ​ought​ America to base its foreign policy in the coming century.”  102
Kissinger provides no answers to this question, but he recommends the nation would “do 
well to consider the era before Woodrow Wilson and the ‘American century’ for clues 
about the decades to come.”  Kissinger believes clear and proper principles are 103
necessary in order to restrain the scope of the nation’s urge to police the world. 
Simultaneously, he insists on the cultivation of an equilibrium in order to protect against 
a great power’s capacity to insist and crusade on their respective principles, including the 
United States. Nearly a fifth of the way through the 21st century, the United States 
remains strongly committed to Wilsonian principles and often ignores the long term 
perils of resorting to force without direct threats to national security. With the rise of 
additional centers of power, the price of conducting a crusading foreign policy will rise, 
as it will irritate other major powers when it occurs in their backyard.  
This is not to say Wilsonian idealism is to be abandoned. It is to say that 
democratic crusades and state-making missions are to be reconsidered, as they come at 
the detriment of national security and the overall geopolitical balance. Support and 
preference for democratic governments is not at odds with the role Kissinger envisions 
for America in the 21st century; nor does he object to paying some price for the U.S.’s 
moral convictions. However, the difficulty of the matter is determining the amount of 
102 Ibid, D p.810. 
103 Ibid, D p.810. 
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 resources that can be devoted to moral convictions and to other American interests that 
do not amount to supporting and spreading democracy. The proliferation of democracy 
and human rights are to be embraced and advocated for, but their implementation through 
force is a questionable practice that ruins the standing and influence of the United States. 
In addition, these efforts largely fail.   104
America’s moral precepts are best served by posing as a beacon of freedom, 
democracy, and liberty. That is, using America’s soft power to ignite the values it holds 
dear ― letting them manifest throughout the world organically, not by imposition. The 
cultivation and establishment of inclusive institutions ― the very institutions that make 
America exceptional ― must emerge organically within the countries that have yet to 
implement them. America can assist, but it must do so free of coercion and military force. 
Otherwise, America takes on a rather imperial project as it pursues the creation of a world 
from its own unique, domestic mold.  
Defining America’s role in the world as such is not out of line with the historical 
experience of the American people. America’s exceptionalism has resulted in oscillations 
between two positions: “the notion that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize 
every dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself.”  The Cold War brought 105
America out of its historic shell, but today its in a position where its reach is too heavy. 
While America should retain the prospect of exercising its ability to reach far and wide, it 
should not be constantly put to use. Hence, what is needed is a set of criteria that can be 
used to select appropriate situations to deploy its massive resources. 
104 Mandelbaum 2016.  
105 Kissinger, D p.832-3.  
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 Power calculations and national security is a large component of the criteria that 
Kissinger advocates for. The United States should be keenly adverse to the establishment 
of a regional hegemon in any of the power centers of the world. That is, one power 
subduing, by force, the surrounding countries in the area. In such a scenario, a 
superpower would have the territory and resources necessary to threaten the United States 
in its rather isolated position if it desired. Yet, ​realpolitik​ will not suffice on its own. “To 
be true to itself,” Kissinger states, “America must try to forge the widest possible moral 
consensus around a global commitment to democracy. But it dare not neglect the analysis 
of the balance of power.”  106
The United States would do well to minimize its reliance on military power to 
execute its fidelity to its principles. Its economic and cultural power, if properly 
employed, will do a finer job, in the long run, in cultivating a world order with 
democracy and liberty as two of its hallmarks. As the only nation ever founded on the 
concept of liberty, the United States provides a heavy thrust of soft-power capable of 
permeating the ideals of the United States without any use of force or treasure. 
Accordingly, the United States should rely primarily on its soft-power to cultivate what 
Kissinger titles a “global commitment to democracy.” 
In addition to soft power, american Diplomacy and the balance of power that it 
can help cultivate should aim to build a series of overlapping economic and political 
structures that act as an alternative to direct and forceful impositions of American ideals 
and institutions. “The most creative solutions [to the new world order] will be to build 
106 Ibid, D p.834. 
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 overlapping structures,” Kissinger say, “some based on common political and economic 
principles as in the Western Hemisphere; some combining shared principles and security 
concerns as in the Atlantic area and Northeast Asia; others based largely on economic ties 
as in the relations with Southeast Asia.”  These structures, perhaps, will help realize, 107
world-wide, what America holds dear, but only through “ accumulation [in] partial 
successes.”  108
 
 
3.2.5 Kissinger On Iran 
Kissinger captures his published views on Iran and Iran-U.S. relations in his most 
recent book ​World Order​. Like most, he takes issue with Iran’s revolutionary language 
and, at times, practices. He does not attack outrightly Iran’s theocratic political structure, 
but he does take issue with the rhetoric and practices that undermine the pluralistic, 
westphalian order Kissinger so deeply values. He frames the implications of the Iranian 
revolution on the liberal international order as such:  
a theocratic wielding supreme spiritual and temporal power was, in a           
significant country, publicly embracing an alternative world order in         
opposition to the one being practiced by the world community. The           
Supreme leader of contemporary Iran was declaring that universal         
religious principles, not national interests or liberal internationalism,        
would dominate the new world he prophesied.  109
 
Despite the declarations of Khomeini and their revolutionary challenge, they have yet to 
transpire out of the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, while Iran labels 
107 Ibid, D p.835. 
108 Ibid, D p.836. 
109 Kissinger 2014, ​World Order​ [Henceforth WO] p.148. 
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 non-Islamic political institutions as “illegitimate” because they “do not base themselves 
on divine law,”  the state has not been able to ― our zealously strove to ―  cultivate 110
these institutions abroad, nor has it posed as a viable model of direct emulation for the 
wider region. Iran’s most noble and influential characteristic, perhaps, is its willingness 
to endure isolation in order to protest against the hierarchical world order governed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, the U.S. in the first 20 years of 
the post Cold War, and, currently, the U.S and Russia and maybe China.  
Iran’s revolutionary spirit has largely translated into support for militias, 
paramilitary groups, and militant Islamic groups that challenge Iran’s adversaries 
throughout the Middle East. This support has amounted to little other than instability and 
higher degrees of influence in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Islamic institutions 
have not arisen from Iranian support in the aforementioned countries, but support has 
heightened attritional conflict. This reality has led to Kissinger to the following 
assessment of the Iranian Republic since the revolution: “Yet thirty-five years of 
repetition had all but inured the world to the radicalism of these sentiments and the 
actions backing them. On its part, Iran combined its challenge to modernity with a 
millenial tradition of statecraft of exceptional subtlety.”  111
Furthermore, Kissinger suggests there is an inherent paradox in assuming the role 
of a revolutionary theocracy while also operating within the Westphalian system (albeit 
reluctantly). That is, by institutionalizing the tenets of the revolution into the apparatuses 
of the state, the Islamic Republic of Iran automatically loses a degree of its revolutionary 
110 Ibid, WO p.153. 
111 Ibid, WO p.148-9. 
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 zest. In fact, by proclaiming the title Republic, one is evoking westphalian principles that 
are at theoretical odds with the official dictums of the revolution. As a result, a “paradox 
took shape,” says Kissinger, “in the form of a dualistic challenge to the international 
order.”  He goes on to elaborate:  112
With Iran’s revolution, an Islamist movement dedicated to overthrowing         
the Westphalian system gained control over a modern state and asserted its            
“Westphalian” rights and privileges ― taking up its seat at the United            
Nations, conducting trade, and operating its diplomatic apparatus. Iran’s         
clerical regime thus placed itself at the intersection of two world orders,            
arrogating the formal protections of the Westphalian system even while          
repeatedly proclaiming that it did not believe in it, would not be bound by              
it, and intended ultimately to replace it. 
 
This leaves the international community in limbo ― what is the true posturing of Iran? Is 
reconciliation plausible considering the export of revolution is an explicit dictum of 
regime? Its leaders use language that is rather universal, resemblant of the age of empire 
when polities were determined to be the system rather than a participant within it. 
Similarly, the position of supreme leaders casts itself as the head of the Islamic 
Revolution and the leader of the Islamic Ummah and Oppressed People. 
Regardless, Kissinger believes that the current state of affairs between Iran and 
the U.S. and Iran and the international order is not necessarily permanent.  He points to 113
Iran’s flirtations with the Westphalian framework of international affairs as reason to 
believe that its reformist undertones of the general revolutionary-reformist dualism can 
be cultivated in a manner that successfully incorporates Iran into the international system 
as a devoted and active member. Furthermore, Kissinger pinpoints Iran’s “coherent 
112 Ibid, WO p.154. 
113 Ibid, WO p.158. 
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 experience of national greatness and the longest and subtlest strategic tradition”  among 114
the states in the Middle East as addition reason to believe that Iran is ripe with the 
historical DNA necessary to partake in the established, international framework.. Finally, 
he signals the cordial relations between the U.S. and Iran before the Islamic Revolution 
as additional evidence that the two countries can perhaps maintain cooperative relations. 
Kissinger goes as far as to state that “the United States and the Western 
democracies should be open to fostering cooperative relations with Iran.”  Hence, 115
Kissinger does not align himself with the rather militaristic approaches advocated by a 
number of neoconservative voices or the hawkish positions of Israel’s Likud party and 
Saudi Arabia’s monarchy. In other words, diplomacy is Kissinger's favorable course of 
action given the current situation. If and when the U.S. pursues actions symbolic of 
reconciliation, Kissinger provides instrumental advice on dealing with a significant 
power that holds a world view quite different than those of the Western democracies:  
What they must not do is base such policy on projecting their own             
domestic experience as inevitably or automatically relevant to other         
societies’, especially Iran’s. They must allow for the possibility that the           
unchanged rhetoric of a generation is based on conviction rather than           
posturing and will have had an impact on a significant number of the             
Iranian people. A change of tone is not necessarily a return to normalcy,             
especially where definitions of normalcy differ so fundamentally. It         
includes as well ― and more likely ― the possibility of a change in tactics               
to reach essentially unchanged goals. The United States should be open to            
a genuine reconciliations and make substantial efforts to facilitate it. Yet           
for such an effort to succeed, a clear sense of direction is essential,             
especially on the key issue of Iran’s nuclear program.   116
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 Accordingly, the statesman tasked with these issues must reconcile an Iranian worldview 
that holds the current hierarchical order as unjust with what the U.S. sees a front to the 
overall consensus on the way states should behave and act. In the pursuit of 
reconciliation, goals can remain unchanged, but tactics must change. Inevitably, each 
nation will have to partially compromise on its ideals in order to commence the beginning 
of a cooperative relationship.  
Regarding the nuclear question, Kissinger considers nuclear armed Iran 
unacceptable. He makes the argument that a nuclear Iran would have uncontrollable 
proliferation ramifications in the most tumultuous region in the world ― a region where 
nonstate actors can acquire and control large swaths of territory and conventional organs 
of the state. ​World Order​ was written and published in the midst of the fruition of the 
Nuclear Deal. With the deal having yet to fully manifest at the time of publication, 
Kissinger devotes a sizeable section of his chapter to the Nuclear Question. He foresaw 
the essence of the agreement; he states, “the quest for an agreement must contend with 
the prospect that Tehran will be at least exploring a strategy of relaxing tensions just 
enough to break the sanctions regime but retaining a substantial nuclear infrastructure and 
a maximum freedom of action to turn it into a weapons program later.”   117
Improving relations with Iran is contingent on timing. In other words, a 
transformation in relations is predicated on the state of domestic affairs and, thus, the 
physiological comfort of the regime, as well as how the regime perceives the relationship 
between external forces and the state’s geopolitical position. Moreover, the matter weighs 
117  Ibid, WO p.160. 
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 heavily on the strength of the reformist position over that of the hardlined establishment. 
If Iran feels secure domestically and externally, it will be rather difficult to get the regime 
to capitulate on the principles that are essentially directly in opposition to western 
dictums of international affairs. On the other hand, if the regime is insecure ― due to 
domestic sentiment, Sunni jihadism on its borders, or economic instability ― then it will 
be more willing to adjudicate its oscillation between “reform” and “revolution” and 
participation and confrontation in favor of the former positions, thereby appeasing the 
United States and allowing it to take a less confrontational stance. “Which option[s] Iran 
chooses will be determined by its own calculations,” Kissinger says, “not American 
preconceptions.”  118
As a participant and advocate of the international pluralistic order, America, in 
principle, should be prepared to overcome the deadlock with Iran on the basis of the 
Westphalian principles of nonintervention and to be willing to work alongside Iran in 
developing a regional order that rids the region of proxy warfare and manipulation. 
Kissinger rests the next step ― from principle to action ― on Iran acknowledging that it 
too needs to operate under the principles of nonintervention and the gradual rescindment 
of its support for non-state actors throughout the Middle East. The ultimate test for 
U.S.-Iran relations is whether Iran considers the chaos throughout the region as a threat or 
opportunity as it seeks to fulfill its millennial asspirations.  
Ultimately, a series of questions emerge that will determine the future of 
U.S.-Iran relations in the coming years and decades. If we assume a fundamental change 
118  Ibid, WO p.166. 
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 in the driving agenda of Iran, what brought about these changes in its national interests 
and how can the United States reform its policy in order to take advantage of the new 
conditions? Will the conflict be solved through a change in the attitude of the United 
States or a reform of its policy? And if the latter, what is the modification that should be 
sought? If the answers to these questions are favorable to a change in posture on both 
ends, though not necessarily a transformation of goals, then there is a chance that the 
spirit of the age is ripe for overcoming the nearly 40 year deadlocke. If not, the U.S. will 
continue to contain Iran through a combination of sanctions, rhetoric, and proxy warfare 
that will only prolong instability in the region. It would be an unwise to assume the 
Islamist forces and movements of era will fade anytime soon. The task before us is not 
only about reconciling U.S.-Iran relations, but about attempting to construct a pluralistic 
international order that is capable of accommodating a range of polities of unique, 
historical development.  
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 CHAPTER IV: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN ENCOUNTERS IN 
WORLD POLITICS AND DISCOURSE  
 
 
4.1 Iran: Country Overview 
Home to one of the world’s oldest civilizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
occupies a territory rich in history, tradition, culture, and identity. Contemporary Iran is 
located in Western Asia and shares a border with a number countries and bodies of water. 
To west lies Iraq and Turkey; to the northwest is Armenia and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan; directly to the north is the Caspian Sea; Turkmenistan is to the north east; to 
the east is Afghanistan and Pakistan; directly to the south is the Persian Gulf and the Gulf 
of Oman. Iran has an area of just under 1.7 million km; the second largest in the region. 
Tehran is the Capital and the largest city, and it is the economic and cultural hub of the 
state.  
Iran is home to over 81 million people, making it the 18th most populated country 
in the world and the 2nd most populated country in the Middle East. Over 60% of Iran’s 
population is under the age of 30, though it is aging. The nation is composed of 
predominantly Persians, though Azerbaijanis and Kurds make up sizeable minorities. 
Shia Islam is the principle religion. The majority of the population speaks Farsi.  
After Saudi Arabia, Iran possesses the second largest economy in the Middle East. 
Its GDP for 2016 was $412.2 billion and its main impetuses are oil, agriculture, and 
service sectors. The state has a large presence in the economy, particularly in the 
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 manufacturing and financial services sector. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps is quite active in the private sector, using revenues to fund adventures abroad. 
Despite the sanctions lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran remains 
subject to an international sanctions regime that limits the possibilities of economic 
growth.  
Iran is a theocratic republic. The unique political makeup of Iran is 
institutionalized in its 1979 Constitution. The Leader of the Revolution ― the Supreme 
Leader ― is the state’s ultimate authority. All major decisions demand his approval. He 
is not only the political leader of the nation, but also the religious leader and the 
commander-in-chief, thereby providing him with the sole power to declare war and 
peace. The Assembly of Experts elects the Supreme Leader. To date, the Assembly of 
Experts has never publicly challenged the decisions of the Supreme Leader. The 
Guardian Council vets and approves all presidential and parliamentary candidates, though 
the Supreme Leader selects all members of the council. The President is designated as the 
highest authority of the state, albeit his secondary stature to the Supreme Leader. The 
position is determined through a process of universal suffrage, though popular complaints 
of interference have occured. The legislature ― the Islamic Consultative Assembly ― 
drafts legislation, ratifies treaties, and approves the national budget. Though power is 
centralized at the hands of the supreme leader, there are multiple centers of power within 
the state.  The government of the Islamic State is by no means apolitical.  119
119 Council on Foreign Relations 2018. 
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 In effect, there are three domains of power: the Supreme Leader, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Presidency and its administration.  Though 120
power is concentrated in the hands of the supreme leader, not one center has a monopoly 
on power, making the others irrelevant. The IRGC is weakened by the fact that it has the 
lowest level of political function and empowerment. The presidency often butts heads 
with the IRGC, as the latter is heavily ingrained in economic, domestic and foreign 
policy. Furthermore, the IRGC is unique in that is not a component of the formal Iranian 
military, making it, technically, a paramilitary group. The supreme leader has the most 
sway over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. With a force of 125,000 soldiers, the 
IRGC is a substantial military force. Finally, the IRGC is the entity that oversees Iran’s 
extraterritorial and clandestine operations. Today, the group has a substantial presence in 
Iraq and Syria.  
The IRGC and the Presidency and the Ministries of government are rather 
dichotomous. In Tehran, the latter two are framed as the technocrats, while the former is 
conceived of as the guardian of the revolution. Both are committed to the tenets of the 
revolution, but each have their own means or ideas of how to faithfully fulfill their 
commitment to it.  In addition, each have their respective vision of reform. The 121
technocrats, in part, are weary of the components of the revolution that might precipitate 
international isolation; they do not see confinement as sustainable for the regime. The 
former, however, fear Western capital, ideas, and technologies will endanger not only the 
stability of the regime, but also jeopardize the spirit of the revolution.  
120 Vatanka, 2017. 
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 Iran is often referred to as a state sponsor of terrorism. This title has built up 
legitimacy throughout the years largely due to IRGC directed programs. Domestically, 
the IRGC is known to have led oppressive and violent campaigns targeting Kurdish and 
Baluchis disent throughout the 1980s, as well target figures of the Iranian civil reform 
movement. For example, in 1999, the IRGC  dismantled student protests and, in 2009, the 
paramilitary group crushed the Green Movement by arresting thousands of descendants. 
In both cases, civilian deaths occured.  
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps international workings have attracted the 
most attention. Attacks are not carried out directly by the IRGC, but by its proxies. The 
most infamous of attacks in American memory are the 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine 
compound in Lebanon, killing 283 personel, and the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing in 
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American service members. Ever since the U.S. implanted 
a large U.S. military force in the Middle East, Iranian munitions and Iranian-trained 
forces have repeatedly harmed American service members.  The Revolutionary Guard 122
conducted its first attack on American soil when it attempted to assassinate the Saudi 
Ambassador to the United States at a restaurant in Washington D.C. Eric Holder, the 
Attorney General at the time, claimed the plan was “‘directed and approved by elements 
of the Iranian government, and, specifically by the senior members of the Quds force.’”  123
With such a track record, figures in Washington argue heavily for placing the 
Revolutionary Guards on the U.S.’s Designated Foreign Terrorist List, while others hold 
that doing so would raise hostilities without providing any concrete benefits.  
122 Dubowitz 2017.  
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4.2 American and Iranian Encounters: 1953-Today 
The roots of American-Iranian hostility date back to the fateful 1953 Iranian coup 
d’état.  The American CIA, along with its British counterparts, orchestrated a covert 124
operation, known as Operation Ajax, to help organize the overthrow of the 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. At first, the coup failed, 
but was followed by a second attempt which succeeded. To this day, there is debate 
around why the United States felt the need to topple a democratically elected prime 
minister. Nevertheless, the immediate consequences are clear: the Shah would reassume 
power and maintain an oppressive state unitil the 1979 Iranian revolution. While in 
power, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was one of the closest allies of the United States. The 
U.S. provided the Shah will monetary aid and training for the secret police that would 
keep his regime in power. Ironically, the U.S. helped Iran establish its nuclear program 
and provided it with weapons grade enriched uranium in 1967. The United States 
engineering of the Coup of 1953 and its explicit support for the Shah throughout his 
twenty-six years in power made the Revolution of 1979 a reaction against not only the 
monarchical regime of Pahlavi, but also the United States influence in the country and the 
region.  
The Iranian revolution of 1979 shocked the world. It ousted the Shah and 
instituted the Islamic Republic of Iran with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the head of 
government. After the fall of the regime, when the United States temporarily allowed the 
124 Abrahamian, 2013. 
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 Shah to enter the United States for cancer treatment, the validity of the narrative that the 
Shah simply constituted an American puppet was solidified and it weaved a fierce and 
invigorated anti-americanism into the flames of the revolution. The act was perceived as 
an attempt to shield the Shah from facing his crimes under the new government. This, in 
addition to every other American act of subversion in the country instigated the storming 
of the American embassy by students loyal to Khomeini. The coup of 1953 had come to 
complicate America’s position in the region twenty-six years after it made the initial 
mistake. The deadlock in American-Iranian relations has remained in place ever since 
1979.  
American foreign policy towards Iran ― since the revolution ― has been aimed 
at subversion, aggression, containment, or some combination of the three. On the other 
hand, Iranian foreign policy, concerning the United States, has sought to challenge 
American aspirations in the region and the hierarchical order it champions. As a result, 
there is a deep level of distrust between the two nations that makes reconciliation 
extremely difficult. Simultaneously, both countries contain powerful domestic factions 
who outrightly deny engagement and, therefore, only consider subversive policy options 
as aligned with their respective national interests. It should be noted that though Iran and 
America remain suspicious of one another, they do engage in occasional and limited acts 
of cooperation.  
During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States provided military, intelligence, and 
logistical support to Iraq. There are reports that the U.S. also supplied information to Iran,
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  as America simply wanted the war to end in a stalemate, so as to preserve the balance 125
of power in the region. American support of Iraq, however, outweighed it assistance to 
Iran. Moreover, because Iran was bogged down in attritional warfare, it was not in a 
position to seriously challenge the United States, despite its desire to. Iran remained 
dormant for a few years after the war. Meanwhile, the belief that the United States 
disproportionately supported Iraq during the eight year war exasperated Iran’s perception 
of the United States as the “Great Satan.” 
The Iran-Contra Affair ― arranged in the mid 1980s ―  is an act of engagement 
intent on improving relations. Yet, the act violated a United States arms embargo. The 
Ronald Reagan administration hoped that by selling Iran armaments the U.S. might 
obtain Iran's influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon and, therefore, secure the release of 
American hostages being held in Lebanon. The affair received additional scrutiny when it 
was discovered that the proceeds of the weapons sale went to fund Contra rebels fighting 
the revolutionary government in Nicaragua. Ultimately, no hostages were released by 
Hezbollah, so the deal failed to enact meaningful change. 
In 1988, the United States launched a naval raid on Iranian waters, sinking two oil 
platforms, one frigate war boat, and one gunboat. The United States launched the attack 
in retaliation for Iranian mining in the Persian Gulf. In April 1988, the USS Samuel 
Roberts struck a mine while in the Persian Gulf. The naval raid, known as Operation 
Praying Mantis, was the U.S.’s response to the destruction of their boat. A few months 
later, on July 3rd, 1988, the U.S. Navy shot down an Iranian commercial plane on its way 
125 Woodward 2005, 507. 
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 to Dubai. It killed 290 civilians from six nations, most of whom were Iranian. Together, 
the acts aggravated anti-american sentiments within the regime and the country 
The bush administration’s refusal to follow through on its promise to match 
goodwill with goodwill added yet another instance of distrust to the track record of 
Iranian-American relations. The Bush administration approached President Rafsanjani 
with a proposal: use its influence and leverage over Hezbollah to secure the release of the 
remaining American hostages being held in Lebanon in exchange for a reciprocal gesture. 
The administration was considering easing sanctions, taking Iran off the terrorist list, 
compensating Iran for the shooting down of the Iranian airbus, and allowing the sale of 
badly needed airplanes. In the end, the Bush administration did not respond to 
Rafsanjani’s effort and ultimate success in securing the release of the hostages. 
Intelligence suggesting Iran was seeking Nuclear Weapons and planning terror attacks 
convinced Bush to reconsider. Rafsanjani was further irked when the United States 
excluded Iran from the Madrid and Oslo peace processes.  
Perhaps the fullest expressions of mutual respect and possible cooperation 
transpired under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was president from 1997 to 
2005. He put forward the idea of a “dialogue of civilizations” as a first step towards 
political rapprochement. He believed engagement would best be served through an initial 
apolitical encounter. Thus, a team of American wrestlers traveled to Iran to compete 
against their Iranian counterparts. The easement in relations did not continue, however, 
due to pushback from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions. 
Another gesture of easement occured in the days following the attacks of September 11th, 
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 when the President and the Supreme Leader condemned the attacks. There are reports 
that Iranian citizens gathered in front of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, in an expression of 
mourning and solidarity. Finally, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with the U.S. by providing it with intelligence and 
targets for its air force. American airpower backed the ground force of the Northern 
Alliance ― Iran’s main ally in Afghanistan ― which led the effort to take Kabul back 
from the Taliban. 
Collaboration, however, did not last. On January 29, 2002, President Bush 
presented the annual State of the Union Address, where he labeled Iran, along with North 
Korea and Iraq, as an “axis of evil.” President Khatami claims this rhetoric brought 
American-Iranian relations to, perhaps, their lowest point since 1979. In the aftermath 
and in anticipation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran, in a display of realpolitik, offered to 
provide the United States with the intelligence it held on Iraq; the gesture was enticing 
considering that the intelligence the U.S. received on Afghanistan proved reliable and 
consequential. In the end, the Bush Presidency ignored the offer, remaining firm in his 
position that Iran constituted a substantial threat to the United States and, therefore, 
would not cooperate with it. 
Over a year later, Iran sent the State Department a document titled the 
“Roadmap,” which suggested direct talks between Iran and America take place in order 
to improve relations ― everything was on the table. The mainstay of the document was 
that the U.S. would refrain from supporting regime change in Iran and it would abolish 
all sanctions in exchange for Hezbollah becoming an exclusively political and social 
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 organization and for Iran’s acceptance of the two state-state approach to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Iran favored because its content respected and acknowledged 
Iran as a regional power ― an absent feature of relations in the past. Moreover, the 
Supreme Leader agreed with large swaths of the paper’s prospective, making the 
“Roadmap” viable in the long run. In the end, Washington said no ― a decision made not 
by the President, but by the State Department. Washington’s rebuff was likely based on 
its intelligence suggesting Iran was pursuing nuclear capabilities. For the remainder of 
the Bush Presidency, diplomacy with Iran was left to the European states.  
When the Bush administration closed the diplomatic channel provided by the 
“Roadmap,” interactions were fraught and confrontational. The two sides exchanged 
accusations of the other’s wrongdoings. The U.S. has been accused of covert operations 
in Iran, including support for the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK) and 
Jundullah. Furthermore, the U.S. government was said to have supported the minority 
Ahwazi and Baluchi groups in hope of instigating dissidence. There were suspicions, too, 
that the U.S. Special Forces conducted cross-border operations for intelligence purposes 
from Iraq. In 2007, the U.S. raided an Iranian Consulate General in Erbil and arrested a 
number of staff members. Iran, on the other hand, has been accused by the United States 
of supporting Iraqi insurgency groups that killed American troops stationed in Iraq during 
the height of the Iraq War.  
The Obama administration ushered in a period of American-Iranian relations that 
differ quite substantially from Obama’s predecessors. The Obama presidency was the 
first to receive a congratulatory message from an Iranian president since 1979. In 
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 addition, Obama and Rouhani talked on the telephone on September 27th, 2013 ― it is 
often regarded as the highest political exchange between the two countries since the 
Islamic Revolution. The product of Obama’s reformed approach was the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ― the agreement that restrained Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions in exchange for the removal of the sanctions regime.  
 
 
4.3 Iranian-American Discourse in America 
America’s general, historical position towards Iran ― since the 1979 Revolution 
― can be accurately characterized as an oscillation between limited confrontation, 
antagonization, and subversion; indeed, there are brief moments of cooperation 
intertwined throughout the years. Hostilities between Iran and the United States were at 
their highest levels during the presidency of George W. Bush. Rhetoric during these eight 
years aimed to showcase Iran in a particular light. It is argued by authors such as John 
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam that American enmity 
towards Iran ― during the Bush Administration ― rose to unproductive levels due to the 
heavy influence of the neoconservative mindset and the Israeli Lobby.  These authors 
pinpoint the influence of the Israel Lobby and the neoconservative ideology on American 
foreign policy as a crucial reason ― if not the reason ― why the United States has 
historically and consistently opposed detenté or cooperation. Mearsheimer and Walt 
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 attest that America’s avoidance of engagement “has been harmful to the national interest 
[of the United States].”  126
Adib-Moghaddam builds an argument around the idea that one cannot separate 
facts “from a manufactured context.”  Indeed, facts are sometimes fabricated. He 127
contends that narratives around world politics are often socially engineered in order to 
push forward specific agendas or interests. For Adib-Moghaddam, the image of and 
narrative about Iran that permeates the American milieu are the ones “manufactured” by 
neoconservatives. The guiding interest and agenda for the neoconservatives is “to subvert 
the Iranian state and, by extension, to recode Iranian behavior in accordance with 
American and Israeli interests in West Asia and beyond.”  Neoconservatives, typically, 128
welcome aggression, rationalize war, and prioritize militaristic foreign policies. In order 
to use these means, they engineer narratives that legitimize and frame the aforementioned 
means as appropriate.  
Iran is considered a rogue nation by the hardliners in America’s foreign policy 
establishment; it is unpredictable, irrational, and defiant, as the narrative goes. While this 
version does, perhaps, hold some evidence of validity, it is pushed as irrefutable and 
reinforced with misinformation and fabrication. Invalid stories,  characterizations, and 129
simplifications foster a public and political sentiment where militarism or hostility is seen 
as suitable or even wise. In other words, national discourse is centered around the 
assumption that Iran is a rogue. Adib-Moghaddam refers to this step as “writing the 
126 Mearsheimer 2007, 305. 
127 Abid-Moghaddam 2008, 124. 
128 Ibid, 133. 
129 Ibid, 133. 
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 script, the speech, the terminology of a specific political discourse…(e.g. The ‘axis of 
evil’ invented by David Frum). The ‘writing’ is followed by two additional layers of 
scaffolding ― what he refers to as “decision-maker” and “strategic value.”  The former 130
are the individuals who take the script and elevate it to policy. Where as the script writers 
are tasked with setting discourse and therefore occupy media, think-tank, lobbyist, and 
advocacy positions, the decision-makers are “part of the day-to-day affairs of politics in 
Washington.”  They hold positions of power that elevate discourse to action. “Strategic 131
value” is the point where day-to-day is ingrained into “the long-term state interests;” 
therefore, it is stubborn, ingrained, and “not easily discarded or altered.”  It is at this 132
third level that discourse is elevated to an ontological position.  
For Adib-Moghaddam, the ontological positioning of Iran within the United 
States is completely distant from Iran’s own ontological content. Hence, “the facts” 
regarding Iran and its character within the foreign policy establishment of the United 
States deviates quite heavily from the ontological reality in Iran. War is, therefore, 
pushed as the only reasonable means to overcoming the Iranian threat and the only way 
to reconcile divergent ontological positions. It is such a discrepancy between “the facts” 
permeating the United States and the reality on the ground that made the invasion of Iraq 
feasible. Military action against Iran is cultivated under similar conditions and 
circumstances. Though the Bush presidency and the heyday of neoconservatism are 
behind us for now, the “strategic-value” of their discourse remains pervasive (e.g. 
130 Ibid, 141.  
131 Ibid, 142.  
132 Ibid. 
 
126 
 Trump's refusal to reinstate the Iran deal despite its effectiveness). The legacy of 
neoconservatism is its inscription of preemptive war into the composition of American 
foreign policy. Thus, we can understand Trump’s antagonism toward the Iran deal as a 
personal affinity for war as the suitable alternative for an already efficacious diplomatic 
solution to the global interest of nonproliferation ― the very interest the argument for 
war would claim to defend. Let us now take a look of how one might conceive of the 
ontological position(s) of the Iranian state vis-á-vis its approach to world politics.  
 
 
 
4.4 Iranian Foreign Policy Milieu 
Iran’s political, structural, and ideological disposition makes it arduous ― if not 
impossible ― to securely ingrain it within the general framework of the Westphalian, 
pluralistic international order. On one hand, Iran calculates its national interests based on 
the reality that power is the ultimate factor in the international realm. That is, despite its 
revolutionary character ― devotion to undermining the unequal scafeldoling of the 
international order, though not limited to this tasks ― international relations operates in a 
specific manner that the state is not able to escape. As a result, it behaves like any other 
state in the system: adopts policies that increase its relative power (e.g. supporting the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq). Simultaneously, Iran’s national interest is 
constructed in accordance with the guiding principles of the 1979 revolution ― 
anti-hierarchical world order and anti-imperialism ― and, therefore, takes on an idealist 
undertones. The main challenge to overcoming the current deadlocke between the United 
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 States and Iran, let alone the Western World, is how to incorporate Iran into the 
international system without violating Iran’s institutionalized precepts and historical 
memory (i.e. incorporation through regime change or other forms of coercion).  
The following section seeks to critically examine the Iranian milieu vis-á-vis 
world politics in hope of configuring a possible path forward. Coming from their own 
unique tradition, it is difficult for Americans and other foreign statesman to comprehend 
the convictions of the Iranian regime. As a result, the convictions of the United States and 
Iran often come to a ferocious grind that ultimately leads to political inertia between the 
two nations. If American statesmen can come to comprehend the Iranian complex, they 
will, perhaps, be in a better position to engage with the regime in a manner that does 
place irrationality at the forefront of  the policy decisions making process. 
Similar to the U.S., the Iranian government considers its founding principles as 
relevant and desirable to all people ― liberating. At its conception, the Iranian revolution 
was proclaimed to not solely belong to Iran, but to the entire world. “Islam [was] 
revealed for mankind and the Muslims,” the Ayatollah stated, “…An Islamic movement, 
therefore, cannot limit itself to any particular country, not even to the Islamic countries; it 
is the continuation of the revolution by the prophets.”  Accordingly, the Islamic 133
Revolution is central to how Iran imagines its purpose on the world stage. Because the 
revolution was just as much about challenging the hierarchical world order as it was 
about domestic and political discontents, the revolution extends beyond domestic policy 
into Iranian foreign policy.  
133 Adib-Moghaddam 2008, 32. 
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 When the revolutionary flare subsided and the new government consolidated 
power, dictums of the revolution were institutionalized into the state. Of these precepts, 
the challenge and denial of the international order, headed by the United States, is the 
most important in the context of the present argument. The new regime set out to fulfill a 
central component of the revolution: “[a] redefinition of the country’s identity and 
redirection of relations with the whole world; Iranians wanted to reinvent both 
themselves and the way they saw the outside world.”  However, Adib-Moghaddam 134
attests that the very action of institutionalizing revolutionary ideals “established Iran as a 
revisionist power in international affairs.”  That is, after toppling the Shah and 135
establishing the Islamic republic, the latter became the new status quo. What was once 
the counter-hegemonic force became the hegemonic force in Iran. By using the 
apparatuses of the state to fulfill the mandates of the revolution, the government 
automatically assumed a reformist approach to the fulfillment of its ideals. Throughout 
the 1980s, the Revolution became hegemonic in the domestic sense. Internationally, 
however, Iran remains a counter-hegemonic force, intent on subverting the regional and 
global status quo. Simultaneously, its disposition towards world politics takes on 
theocratic undertones, keen on spreading the Islamic mandates of its revolution. The two 
― anti-hierarchical world order and Islamic theocracy ― are not at odds, but in harmony.  
Central to “exporting” revolution abroad was the use of the notions ‘oppressed’ 
and ‘oppressors’ (Mostazafan and Mostakbarab in Farsi).  This language came short of 136
134 Ibid, 45-6. 
135 Ibid, 54.  
136 Ibid, 56.  
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 explicit religious connotation, which mattered in the context of the Palestinian liberation 
movements, but not in the context of Latin America during the 1980s. Oppressed and 
oppressor fit into a larger anti-imperialist narrative, thereby linking what was happening 
in the Iranian Revolution with the liberation movements occurring all over the world.  137
Accordingly, the constitution is ripe with notions that promote the triumph of the 
oppressed over the oppressors. The constitutions holds that Iran “provides the necessary 
basis for ensuring the continuation of the revolution at home and abroad.” This is an 
example of the institutionalization of revolutionary precepts. 
Upending the international status quo, support for liberation movements, and 
export of revolution were not to be pursued through “aggressive intervention in the 
internal affairs of other nations” and not by the means of force according to Khomeini.  138
He aspired to export the precepts of the revolution, but was weary of force as the means. 
Hence, on the one hand, Khomeini framed the task as such:  
We have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam              
and the suppression of the rule of the world conquerors we wish to cause              
the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and communism wither         
throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the            
systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the            
Islamic order of the Prophet in the world of arrogance.   139
 
Despite the harsh and confrontational language around liberation, the subtlety with which 
Iran conducted its revolutionary aspirations in the years after the revolution makes such 
statements appear bombastic and simply rhetorically confrontational. Furthermore, 
Khamenei warns that Iran’s position “does not mean that we intend to export [revolution] 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid, 58.  
139 Ibid. 
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 by the baynet. We want to call [dawat] everyone to Islam [and to] send our calling 
everywhere.”  140
It is under this context and critical analysis that leads Arshin Adib-Moghaddam to 
conclude that in the initial years of the Islamic Republic, portraying the country as a 
beacon of  hope for the toppling of an unjust world order was more central to its mission 
that any military support it may have provided. Adib-Moghaddam states:  
Although convert backing for liberation movements in Afghanistan, Iraq,         
Lebanon, Latin America, Africa and Palestine was sometimes justified         
openly, exporting the idea of the Islamic Republic without military          
aggrandisement was rather more central. Reliance on dawat (calling) and          
tabligh (propagation, advertisement, dissemination) was hence substituted       
for the militaristic coercion periodically characteristic of the Shah’s reign.          
In accordance with that attitude, the Islamic Republic cancelled the Shah’s           
multi-billion dollars defence contracts with the United States and Western          
Europe and abandoned Iranian military installations in Oman.  141
 
In theory, the revolutionary era assumed a position, then, where Iran’s radical 
independence from both superpowers would catalyse a process that would liberate the 
oppressed from an unjust world order. Essentially, what Iran and, by extension, the 
Revolution stood for would ― by itself ― have the power to export the revolutionary 
spirit abroad. Iran intended for the liberation movements throughout the world to look to 
Iran as example of a nation breaking from the shackles of foreign powers.  
During the time of the revolution, a particular phrase rose in prominence: neither 
Eastern nor Western, only the Islamic Republic. The revolutionary generation was 
willing to accept this knew identity, even if it meant that Iran was to be casted as a rogue 
140 Ibid, 58. 
141 Ibid. 
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 state or an outlaw. A number of immediate foreign policy decisions can be explained 
with the narrative so far provided. Iran abdicated its membership to a number of Cold 
War institutions. It fought an attritional war with Iraq, drawing its motivation, in part, 
from the belief that the war was a global effort to subdue the revolutionary spirit of the 
nation. The country immediately supported the PLO and offered solidarity for leftist 
movements throughout the world. With the severance of ties with Apartheid South 
Africa, and bellicose language and posture to the United States, a foreign policy culture 
emerged where the ideals of the revolution were perfectly aligned with the states national 
interest. 
Yet, societies and cultures, after all, are not static, but dynamic. Hitherto, I have 
laid out a narrative that portrays Iran, in its initial years, as a nation that was in part 
founded on the precept of indignance ― directed towards the hierarchical world order, its 
absence of equity, and imperial manipulation. This dissension to the international system 
persists, but a competing posture has arisen in the foreign policy establishment that seeks 
different means to what are essentially the same goals. Since the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, positions, practices, and stances have been incorporated into the culture of the 
regime that deviate quite drastically than those preached by the first supreme leader (i.e. 
nonintervention, weariness around the development of nuclear weaponry, and 
anti-militarism). Today, regime practices in the region are more emblematic of security 
concerns and sphere of influence than the direct fulfillment of an ideological agenda 
based on the principles of the revolutions. Nevertheless, the leitmotif of opposition and 
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 challengement to international system ― particularly the United States and its role in 
sustaining the system ― persist.  
The modifications of the perspective that defined the Iranian state throughout the 
first 15 or so years after the revolution emerged and developed throughout the end of the 
20th century and the 21st century. At the moment, it is quite robust and contends for the 
highest positions of government. Internally, the counter thrust “has manifested itself in a 
multi-dimensional movement for a pluralistic democracy” and, this thrust, “has already 
had an impact on the country’s foreign policies.”  The dialogue among civilizations, 142
detenté with Europe, engagement with Saudi Arabia, its pressure on Hezbollah for the 
release of American hostages, dialogue with the U.S. on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
Nuclear Deal are prime examples.  
Author Arshin Adib-Moghaddam warns his reader, however, not to perceive the 
aforementioned policies solely through the lense of a power struggle between reformists 
and conservatives, calling such a mistake reductionist. He attests that “Iranian foreign 
policy elites have remained committed to certain core strategic principles of the state.”  143
He finds it helpful to think of the Iranian foreign policy establishment as coherent around 
“grand strategic preferences that transcend the faultlines of day-to-day politics.”  Those 144
who do take on a reformist approach remain pro-palestinian, anti-zionist, 
anti-imperialism, and demand cultural and political independence ― all of which were 
integral dictums of the revolution. For the reformist, more so than the conservative, there 
142 Ibid, 69. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid. 
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 is no contradiction between detenté and engagement and the spirit of the revolution. The 
reformist takes on a less aggressive approach to their grand strategic goals. Moreover, 
Adib-Moghaddam asserts that the reformists in Iranian society generally conceive of the 
millinearian aspect of the regime’s theological disposition in relation to foreign policy as 
evolutionary rather than immediate. He offers yet another point of distinction: 
progressive versus fundamentalist Islam. Despite these differences, both camps prioritize 
the preservation of the revolutionary cause, all the while projecting Iranian power both 
regionally and globally. Finally, the reformist forces are most prominent within civil 
society. High officials often oscillate between both camps, depending on the issue at hand 
and the center of power (i.e presidency or IRGC). With all that said, Arshin suggests 
Iran’s moments of “seemingly eclectic pragmatism” should be seen within the 
aforementioned context. He states:  
Iran’s seemingly eclectic’ pragmatism during times of crisis with the arms           
deals United States and Israel (the Iran-Contra affair), the diplomatic          
backing of the US invasion of Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, relative           
silence about Russian war crimes in Muslim Chechnya and Chinese          
suppression of Muslim primarily in the Western provinces of the country,           
mute support for the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003, and efforts to             
engage with the US diplomatically should be seen within that context.  145
 
Such foreign policy decisions should be interpreted as times when Iran took advantage of 
world politics, outside of their control, to further their grand strategic preferences; they 
are not an abandonment of the foreign policy agenda of the post-revolutionary era. They 
are acts of ​realpolitik.  
145 Ibid, 74. 
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 In summary, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 ushered in a set of precepts that were 
institutionalized in the years after the revolution. Markedly, the regime consolidated a 
strategic doctrine around political and cultural independence, ant-imperialism, 
anti-zionism, the persistent challenge of Western expansionism and the established world 
order, and anti-americanism. Having been institutionalized into the DNA of the state, 
these ideals are not easily disregarded. A counter-hegemonic force has emerged, 
generally signified through the term reformist — though it would be reductionist to 
consider the reformist bloc as uniformly opinionated. It is best to frame the counter forces 
as residual convictions of the revolution, not as an effort to diverge from the original 
tenets of the Islamic Republic ― a posture that seeks their gradual, evolutionary 
achievement rather than its immediate imposition. 
When the U.S. formulates policy directed towards Iran, it would do well to 
recognize this reality and not perceive Iran’s actions as irrational or completely 
unpredictable. While the culture behind the foreign policy establishment cannot explain 
all that is occurring in the world regarding Iran’s foreign policy decisions, it is an 
important, overarching leitmotif that the U.S. would do well to consider as it formulates 
policies that protect vital U.S. interests as they relate to confronting and cooperating with 
Iran. It is the reformist position that is perhaps most likely to give way to an opportunity 
for the gradual improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. In fact, it was the rather 
un-raucous presidency of Hassan Rouhani during which a deal was struck to temporarily 
curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the deal was also secured by the absence of hawkish 
undertones to Iran-U.S. relations.  
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 CHAPTER V:  PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION AND BALANCE OF 
POWER 
 
From Kissinger’s thinking, one can isolate a number of valuable diplomatic 
insights that are relevant to an international system defined by multiple centers of power. 
His perspicacity, I argue, is of great utility to the prospect of diplomatic reconciliation 
between the United States and Iran. The components of Kissinger’s thinking that could 
potentially help usher in an age of conciliation are  numerasized below. 
One, Kissinger’s thinking posits the avoidance of war through the balance of 
power. For Kissinger, this is the highest moral attainment that can be pursued at the level 
of the international state-system. Two, pluralistic and liberal internationalism is the ideal 
scaffolding on which to construct a stable state-system. It respects nonlinear conceptions 
of historical development, thereby appreciating differences in international historical 
sociologies. Three, power is not a static phenomenon; therefore, balance of power 
necessitates adjustments on behalf of the participants of the balancing act. The inability 
of one or more states to adjust to a new power reality, precipitated by a rising power, 
results in the eventual recalibration of the balance through force. Four, multipolarity 
demands not the proliferation of domestic precepts, but the establishment and 
safeguarding of the balance of power. Hence, America should be cautious when 
formulating diplomacy on the basis of its ‘universal’ ideals. Instead, ideals can be 
self-perpetuated through the construction of overlapping economic and political 
structures and domestic civil societies. Five, Kissinger asserts that a nuclear Iran is 
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 unacceptable due to the proliferation consequences it would have across the region. 
Accordingly, the nuclear question is a starting point when determining criteria that would 
necessitate a military response.  Six, efficacious diplomacy is conditional on timing and 
other external conditions. In other words, in order for a political deadlock to be 
surmounted through diplomacy, timing is particularly crucial. The final point is used as 
the point of departure for the next section. 
 
5.1 Timing and Posture 
The direction of Iranian-American relations is in limbo. The new source of 
uncertainty stems from the Presidency of Donald Trump and his antagonism towards the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). His bombastic and confrontational 
language is jeopardizing the possibility of a serious period of detenté ushered in by 
President Obama. Hence, the current political environment does not appear well suited 
for the continuation of engagement, let alone detenté. Regardless of recent events and 
American politics, Iran, domestically, is within a period of suspense and it is anticipating 
a period of transformation (i.e. the selection of a new Supreme Leader). Ultimately, the 
transition of power will represent a sound adjudication on the direction of Iranian politics 
and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. The JCPOA represented a victory for 
Iranian moderates (i.e. those not necessarily opposed to engagement with the West). The 
fact that Iran agreed to the treaty on the grounds of sanction relief conveys the 
importance the regime, and particularly Ayatollah Khamenei, places on economic 
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 development and growth. It recognizes that the health of the regime is partly contingent 
on its socio-economic conditions. Yet, nearly three years since the completion of the deal, 
Iran has still to benefit to the degree it thought it would. It is now clear that economic 
development necessitates engagement with the United States and other economic centers 
of the world. This gives the United States a high degree of leverage and a clear set of next 
steps in the general pursuit of detenté, but the opposite directions is being pursued by the 
Trump administration.  
To raise and answer the question in the previous section ​Kissinger On Iran​: can 
one isolate a change in posture from the Iranian regime and, if so, what brought about 
these changes in its national interests? Yes, we can identify a change in Iran’s posture: its 
willingness to engage the West, and particularly, the United States, on the matter of 
Iran’s nuclear program. What brought about this change in posture? In part and overtime, 
the counter-hegemonic voices in the country established political power through the 
electoral system. For some time, the majority of civil society was willing to endure the 
consequences of political and economic independence in the name of revolutionary 
ideals. No doubt, to this day, portions of the population are still willing to endure the 
negative externalities of such a position. Political and economic independence, in the case 
of Iran, has resulted primarily in a lack of political freedoms and insufficient economic 
opportunity. Devotees come in two general types.  There are those who are willing to pay 
the price because they are largely politically and economically secure, to the point where 
autarky is not overwhelming. On the other hand, enthusiasts of the Islamic Republic’s 
isolation, despite its overwhelming impact on socio-economic conditions, persists due to 
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 their unwithering devotion to a set of ideals. Those of the latter, particularly, are 
increasingly far and few, as the revolutionary generations is reaching the end of its 
life-cycle.  
The revolutionary generation is subsiding and the costs to the precepts of the 
revolution are rising. The Green Revolution and the December 2017 and January 2018 
protests portray a frustrated populace, economically and politically. The latter protests are 
particularly noteworthy due to the fact that their participants included the rural population 
― not just the liberal, educated elite of Tehran. In the future, the discontent of the Iranian 
people could potentially encourage the government to assume a stance that is favorable to 
reconciling relations with the United States because of the socio-economic opportunity it 
would catalyze. In return, the counter-thrust to the regime would potentially subside. The 
fact of the matter is that the Iranian government needs the passive and agreeable language 
of the U.S. government in order for U.S. and international capital to flow handsomely 
into the country. The confrontational language of the United States ― “no option is off 
the table” ― will not provide the reassurance and stability capitalists require in order to 
lend large sums of capital. Hence, if the regime feels uneasy about the  implications of 
civil society’s discontent on the longevity of the Islamic Republic, the regime could be 
encouraged to further reconsider its posture towards the United States if the proper 
incentives are provided by the former. Such a prospect is not guaranteed ― the U.S. and 
the reformist positions in Iran would be going up against Iranian fundamentalists and the 
hawks and warmongers of the United States. 
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 The JCPOA should not be interpreted as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
abandonment of the spirit it was founded on, despite Tehran’s slight pivot away from 
isolating itself from the West to its reluctant engagement with it. The Iranian regime 
remains committed to its founding precepts whether one is a reformist or conservative, as 
chapter four argued. The reformist and fundamentalist divide is emblematic of a larger 
divide between a set of contested means for a shared set of goals. The “pivot” I suggest 
above is driven by the rise of the reformist bloc. To be clear: they remain devoted to the 
revolutionary zest the regime hopes to cast into perpetuity.  
The impending end of Khamenei’s reign will potentially further shift Iran into the 
international orbit if a centrist or a moderate is chosen as successor. There are 
unconfirmed reports that Khamenei has been battling cancer for a number of years.  At 146
his age, there is no doubt he is laying the groundwork for his successor’s smooth 
transition, despite the fact the next Supreme Leader is chosen by the Guardian Council. 
Moreover, Khamenei will most likely seek a successor who simultaneously embodies his 
conservative views and his calculated willingness to sparingly indulge the reformist 
agenda. The forthcoming transition of power will inevitably pose a shock to the Republic 
of Iran; this will by only the second time the country has gone through a transition of 
power and it will mark the first time in nearly thirty years. Khamenei should know that 
any transition that seeks to block out the reformist stance will most likely anger a large 
block of the Iranian people. However, the bellicose language of the United States helps 
reinforce anti-american voices in the regime, thereby limiting the prospects of detenté in 
146 Vakil 2017. 
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 the future by positioning hardline voices as attractive. Consequently, the United States 
should assume a foreign policy that does not increase the desirability of Iran’s hardlined 
positions, as these are the voices that  make rapprochement next to impossible. 
Concerning the transition of power, America’s antagonistic rhetoric could possibly help 
Khamenei and the Guardian Council feel politically secure to a point where the Council 
feels secure sidelining moderate positions. 
If cooler heads prevail in the future, the policy prescriptions detailed below might 
be able to build on the JCPOA and the general and gradual ― yet not guaranteed ― 
repositioning of Iran, thereby instituting a long-term shift to detenté and ultimately 
reconciliation. Hopefully, when more moderate or attuned leadership prevails, it will not 
be too late to make use of detenté in order to help overcome the impasse between the 
United States and Iran.  
Now that it has been conveyed that the spirit of the age is different than in the 
previous era, it will be argued that detenté is the best way to take advantage of the 
anomalies in Iranian posture. After, specific policy recommendations are laid out that will 
allow for a successful manifestation of detenté.  
 
5.2 The Case for Detenté 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is remarkable considering it is the first 
instance of a substantive pivot toward faithful compromise and engagement between the 
United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. The JCPOA is by no means 
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 perfect, but it marks a triumph of diplomacy. The deal secured, at the very least, a 
postponement of Iran’s nuclear weapon program without resorting to force. At its best, it 
will lay the necessary foundation for the continuation of nonproliferation to Iran and the 
Middle East once the deal expires in the next ten to fifteen years. The deal is 
extraordinary considering two foes ― Iran and the U.S. ― were able to compromise on 
their national precepts and overcome the hardlined voices trumpeting against the deal 
within each countries political scene. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action does not amount to an overcoming of 
the deadlock between Iran and the U.S., but it gave way to a substantive break in their 
relationship that has nearly always been confrontational. Iran has largely complied with 
the requirements of the deal ― minus a few minor slips that were quickly corrected. 
Since the change in administrations in the United States, the U.S. cannot say the same. 
The trump Administration is threatening to pull out of the deal due to his general distaste 
for the deal and because of Iran’s support of “terrorism” and its ballistic missile program. 
Trump’s rhetoric is jeopardizing the true value of the deal: the opportunity to rebuild trust 
and lines of communication and engagement with Iran. Remaining committed to the 
JCPOA is in the best interest of the United States. The other options ― regime change 
and aggressive containment ― are bleak and, ultimately, they would not lead to regional 
stability nor would they help establish a sustainable balance of power with the least 
amount of carnage. 
The United States has three general options when it comes to dealing with Iran, 
now and in the future: containment, regime change, and detenté. I argue that all but the 
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 third option will result in a degeneration of relations and regional destabilization. The 
first ― containment ― is contingent on a successful sanctions regime and a stable and 
all-embracing coalition. The heart of the United States containment policy, then, rests on 
economic sanctions and support for a coalition of Arab states that will address fears of 
Iranian hegemony. The coalition needs a regional leader, and while it has one in Saudi 
Arabia, it does not appear up to the task. It is bogged down in domestic strife and reform 
and it is stuck in the Yemeni Civil War, which has no clear end in sight. As a result, 
Saudi Arabia does not appear to be in a position to efficaciously lead. Moreover, a 
coalition of Arab states would require a solid sense of cohesion and commitment between 
its members. The Saudi-Qatari upheaval shows the limitations of Arab unity and Egypt’s 
domestic problems make it disinterested. Finally, the absence of serious Turkish fears of 
Iranian hegemony in the region make its participation in a coalition doubtful. Also, at the 
moment, it seems that Turkish and Iranian interests align, as they both possess sizeable 
Kurdish populations and they are economically interdependent.  Without Turkey’s 147
involvement, a coalition would lack credibility and military muscle.  
The second major component of a containment policy is sanctions. While they 
proved vital in getting Iran to the table to negotiate its nuclear program, sanctions would 
not enjoy the success they did in the years before the JCPOA. In order to be successful, 
sanctions need to be multilateral. With Iran complying with the nuclear deal, the U.S. will 
have a hard time convincing the E.U., Russia, and China to support an international 
sanctions regime similar to the one in place before 2015. Moreover, a renewed sanctions 
147 Biglari 2017.  
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 regime would undermine Iran’s reformists and boost its hardliners political positions. 
Considering the latter is the backbone to Iran’s outright opposition to the United States, 
the re- imposition of sanctions would come at the detriment of the United States. 
Regime change is the second plausible, but mistaken, option for the United States. 
It could pursue such a measure by the means of covert action or a full scale military 
operation. The former would necessitate dissident factions or popular support . The only 
functioning opposition group is the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). This organization, 
however, is minuscule in size and most of its adherents reside outside of the country. 
Furthermore, the group is not supported by the public, as the MEK sided with Saddam 
Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. The MEK lack the political and social power necessary to 
overthrow the regime. Even if this were not the case, it would not be wise to repeat the 
history of the 1953 Coup d'etat, sponsored by the CIA. In addition, it does not seem that 
the U.S. could ferment popular opposition to the State; U.S. interference in 20th century 
Iranian history looms too large. As long as the regime does not brutally subdue the 
reform movement, change by force is unlikely. The brutal civil wars in the region cast too 
strong of an aversion to popular uprising for the youth of the country to stir dissent.  
Finally, if the United States invaded Iran with a full scale military operation ― 
similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq ― the U.S. would repeat the ills of the past. Iran does 
not possess weapons of mass destruction and, under the JCPOA, they will not for the 
foreseeable future. In addition, an invasion would require a long term military presence in 
Iran and U.S. military forces would not only face a good fight from Iran’s military, but 
also extreme hostility from the Iranian people. An invasion could also precipitate wider, 
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 regional instability. The situation in Iran and throughout the region does not necessitate a 
U.S. military invasion of Iran. 
That leaves us with detenté ― a politically unpopular option, but best aligned 
with America’s long term strategic interests. Detenté is a two sided project; hence, both 
parties would have to agree that the easing of hostilities is in both of their interests. 
Fortunately, this is the case. With Iran’s nuclear program on pause for the next ten years, 
the U.S. has the comfort of knowing that a policy of engagement is not a gamble aiming 
to suspend Iran’s nuclear development. Moreover, the current limbo in U.S. foreign 
policy ― that is, its combination of containment, hostile rhetoric, and cold war tactics ― 
taxes U.S. resources. Detenté raises the possibility of long term stability in region, 
thereby constraining the environments that breed militant extremism ― the main interest 
of the United States in the region, outside the geopolitical game of power politics. 
Together, these conditions and prospects make detenté in the interest of the United States.  
Iran, on the other hand, is well suited for a phase of detenté. Its support for proxy 
groups throughout the Middle East divert funds from domestic priorities. Long-term 
overextension is a fear of the Iranian regime. The fate of the Soviet Union has to play a 
psychological toll on the Iranian regime. Yet, Iran will likely not riscend support for its 
military proxies unless it receives a reliable alternative to its current security structure. 
The stability of the regime relies on a delicate balance between economic health and 
security. The United States can assist on these fronts in exchange for a regional posture 
that is more accommodating to American interests and regional stability. Hence, detenté 
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 is in the interests of the Iranian regime if it leads to an alternative security arrangement 
and enhanced economic health.  
 While I argue detenté is directly in line with each country’s national interest, 
there is no guarantee that it will prevail. Detenté is contingent on a few additional 
preconditions. First, it will depend on how Iran approaches statecraft in the coming years 
and maybe even decades. If Iran does not adhere to the Westphalian conceptions of 
statecraft and, therefore, acts as a cause and not as a country, the United States and Iran 
will be approaching foreign policy from two different ontological positions that will 
render detenté irrelevant. In the case of Iran, the approach it takes might, in the end, 
depend on the strength of the reformist or progressive position. In the United States, 
dententé is contingent on un-maximalist and compromising dispositions. The Trump 
administration seems to be pursuing the opposite trajectory.  
Assuming Iran, in the future, practices statecraft in a manner that is aligned with 
the Westphalian tradition, I contend the U.S. needs to assume a new and updated position 
in the Middle East that will allow for the gradual improvement of relations between the 
United States and Iran, as well as prepare it for a less tumultuous journey throughout the 
21st century. Before relations can become cordial, hostilities will need to cool. Detenté is 
the aim, but what are the means? 
The United States, I argue, should base detenté on six prescriptions. In other 
words, the U.S. needs to do the following in order to usher in age of conciliation. One, 
the United States needs to recognize the substantive role it played in the 1953 Coup d'etat 
and offer an official apology. Second, the United States should accommodate or tolerate 
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 Iranian influence in the region. Third, the U.S. should work to wean Iran from its reliance 
on instability as a means to regional influence and, instead, work with it to establish 
alternative levers of sway. A first step to the aforementioned is the tolerating Iranian 
regional influence. This will help Iran come to the calculation that stability is in its 
interest and it will allow for Iran to establish and ultimately yield non-military 
mechanisms of power. Four, the United States must accept Islamism as heterogeneous 
and not necessarily at odds with Westphalian traditions of statecraft. Five, American 
foreign policy should be constructed in a manner that does not seek to manipulate 
foreign, domestic situations to align with the domestic precepts of the United States. This 
means overlooking the internal conditions of non-democratic states when the balance of 
power is in disarray. By doing so, the United States will assume a less imperial role and 
abstain from heavy handed policies that prevent the United States to take on a facilitating 
roles in the region. Six, the U.S. should accept a neutral role in the Middle East for the 
coming decades. Hence, it should abdicate its favoritism for Israel and Saudi Arabia.  
 
5.3 American Policy Prescriptions 
 
1. Apology for the Coup d'etat of 1953. 
The original divide between the United States and Iran is the former’s 
participation in the Coup d’etat of 1953, its subsequent assistance in reinstituting the 
Shah as the head of state, and the police state that it help construct to keep the Shah in 
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 power for over 20 years. Hence, the first step in reconciliation between the two countries 
must begin with the United States offering an official, congressional resolution 
apologizing to the Iranian people for violating its sovereignty. By doing so, the United 
States would send a strong signal to the people and the government of Iran that it 
sincerely aspires to shift away from the paradigm that has left the two countries in 
deadlock for nearly four decades. As shown in Chapter four, the deficit of trust between 
the two countries is inhibiting engagement. An official apology, however, would be a 
sincere step towards rebuilding trust, particularly due to the fact that the gesture would 
not be transactional. The JCPOA was a concrete step that allows for trust to be built up 
over time, but it is rather transactional: the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the 
temporary abolition of Iran’s militaristic nuclear program. An apology is rather apolitical, 
and, perhaps, it would appeal to the deep generosity and maturity of the Iranian people. 
Such an act will also reassert American leadership and welcome its presence in the 
region. 
 
   2.    Tolerating Iranian Influence 
America’s status quo position is poorly attuned to the realities of the power             
dynamics in the region. The reality of the matter is that Iranian regional power status is                
stubbornly being denied ― this comes as the expense of regional stability. Accordingly, a              
serious push for detenté will require the United States to recognize Iran as a regional               
power, which means, by extension, accommodating Iranian influence in the region.           
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 Hence, American-Iranian detenté and the future of the regional balance of power are not              
at odds.  
Regional powers extend influence into smaller states; it is a reality of the             
international state system. Tolerating Iranian influence throughout the Middle East,          
however, is typically against conventional wisdom in the United States. This type of             
thinking is predicated on the assumption that Iran’s heightened influence is equivalent to             
expansionism or it is treated as a prodrome of a ​tour de force​. Influence and               
expansionism, then, are often treated as synonymous. I contend that trying to subvert             
Iranian influence is out of touch with the reconfiguration of the contemporary Middle             
East Order and, therefore, harmful to future Iran-U.S. relations. Now that Iran has             
solidified its reach into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon ― through its “Axis of Resistance” ―               148
it should be tolerated to maintain these partnerships at a political and social level, and,               
perhaps, a limited military extent as well. It is not within the ability of the United States                 
to fully undercut these ties without military force ― even then there is no guarantee such                
a maneuver would help foster stability in the long run.  
Henry Kissinger’s strategic thinking reminds us that power is never fixed in the             
international arena. As a result, balance of power is never static or perpetual; it is               
reconfigured through challenges to the status quo. Heretofore, Iran was a secondary state             
in Eurasia; today, it is making its weight felt. It is putting up a fight to be accepted                  
amongst the ranks of the major powers. Hence, it is regularly pressing for modifications              
in order to receive compensation for hitherto low levels of respect. It is insisting that the                
148  The Axis is composed of Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas in Palestine, and, of course, 
Iran.  
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 regional order adjust. Iran will not accept a balance of power where it perceives the               
arrangements to be humiliating, unjust and tilted against it. It is within this context that               
the growth of Iranian influence should be understood. The world powers would do well              
to listen unless they can stomach a constant, but draining military response.  
American foreign policy, therefore, needs to clearly differentiate between Iranian 
influence and Iranian expansionism. The former does not necessarily jeopardize 
American interests,  while the latter ― as a possible maneuver to regional hegemony ― 
does threaten American interests, as the establishment of any regional hegemon would. 
Of the states where the Axis of Resistance is present, not one organ of the resistance has 
absolute control of the state in which they are based. In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization 
Front and Shia politicians and clerics are checked by the Sunni minority, Iraqi Kurds, and 
U.S.-Iraq relations. In Syria, while Iran’s ally ― Bashar al-Assad ― remains in power, 
the resources of the state are exhausted and are consumed with domestic concerns, not 
external ambitions. Moreover, the United States, Turkey, and the Syrian Kurds ― all 
with their own respective interests ―  check the Syrian government. If Bashar al-Assad 
remains in power or if a head of state sympathetic to Iran takes his place, the U.S. would 
not lose a historic or regional ally. Historically, Syria’s orientation has been directed to 
Iran and Russia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah remains militarily dormant and politically active. 
They too are checked, by Israel. Hence, the Axis of resistance ― and in particular Iran ― 
do not look fit to launch military campaigns aimed at territorial acquisition nor do they 
appear to be in a position to consolidate political power. On these grounds, the United 
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 States overestimates the military capabilities of Iran, particularly with the temporary 
pause on their nuclear weapons program. 
Iran’s new position in the region could have positive implications on a future 
balance of power. If Iran’s influence across the region is accepted as status quo by 
regional players, Iran could potentially make the calculation that stability and 
engagement is within its interest. A leading component of Kissinger’s strategic thinking 
is developing ways to incorporate ill behaved states into a balance of power that restrains 
expansionist behavior. In order for this to occur, Iran must feel power is fairly distributed 
throughout the region. In other words, establishing Iran as a status quo power might very 
well be contingent on accepting the Axis of resistance as legitimate. Otherwise, Iran will 
not be content with its position in the region, making a balance unattainable. Moreover, 
one should question the efficacy, in terms of stability, of having Iran withdraw its support 
for its proxies in the long run. If Iran were to relinquish support for its dependent state 
and non-state actors, they would not necessarily become irrelevant. Iran’s relationship 
with actors such as Hezbollah and the leverage it enjoys over them could be an important 
component to preventing further escalations and to establishing a strong balance of 
power. For example, it was the leverage Iran held over Hezbollah that resulted in the 
release of the remaining U.S. hostages that Hezbollah held captive in 1991.  
Given this environment, cautiously tolerating Iranian influence in the region is not 
a direct threat to America’s immediate or long term interests. Nor is accepting a degree of 
Iranian influence in the region improper for a country of its magnitude and importance. 
After all, it has the deepest collective history in the region and, thus, it posses a strong 
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 national pride. Accordingly, the United States should not predicate engagement and 
detenté with Iran on the grounds that is must first cease its support for regional proxies. 
Serious talks or negotiations over the nature of Iran’s relationship with these entities will 
occur only after hostilities mitigate. By accepting Iranian influence in the region and 
forgoing constant efforts to contain it, U.S.-Iran relations will begin to improve.  
On similar grounds, the United States should not predicate engagement with Iran 
on the grounds that it abandon its ballistic missile program. In the region, Yemen, United 
Arab Emirates, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Israel, Iraq, Egypt, and 
Afghanistan are all known to possess some form of ballistic missile systems.  During 149
the Iran-Iraq war, Iran did not possess ballistic missiles while Iraq did; Iran struggled to 
get their hands on them due to American sanctions. Eventually, Iran received ballistic 
missiles through an arms deal with North Korea and Libya. Given the environment of 
who possess ballistic missiles in the region and the historical memory of their lack of 
ability during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s development of Ballistic Missiles should not be 
viewed as irrational or improper.  
 
   3.    Source of Iranian Influence and New Prospects 
For the United States, a serious and a continues push towards Detenté will depend 
on its ability to ease Iran’s military support of non-state actors throughout the Middle 
East. Yet, the United States will have to offer substitute security arrangements before Iran 
abdicates support for these groups.  
149 Arms Control Association 2017.  
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 The preliminary source of Iranian influence in the Middle East was the instability 
precipitated by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Ever since these military 
campaigns, Iranian influence has gradually expanded. Today, Iran yields influences 
unlike anytime in the modern era. Instability remains Iran’s primary source of influence 
and, thus, security; it is skilled at manipulating and injecting resources into conflicts 
beyond its own borders. It is ironic that Iran’s influence is directly correlated, if not 
caused, in part, by American foreign policy.  
Stability in the Middle East and a sustainable balance of power will be impossible 
to establish as long as conflict remains Iran’s primary source of regional sway. Similarly, 
any regional agreement or treaty that excludes Iran will not be sustainable in the 
long-run. Iranian participation is integral to regional stability given the leverage it has at 
its disposal. In other words, regional stability is currently not in Iran’s national interest 
because it would minimize the country’s influence and, thus security.  
The challenge for American foreign policy ― and truly the international liberal 
community ― is to find a way to divorce Iranian influence from instability and 
militarism. Iran will not retract its military support for its proxy forces throughout the 
Middle East unless if its feels it has other avenues of influence to resort to. Besides 
military power, what other forms of power could Iran resort to? Ideological, economic, 
and political power are the only options. Its founding ideology is certainly attractive to 
factions throughout the globe, but it would be a form of soft power and, thus, not well 
suited for the replacement of hard, military power. The nation’s soft power does little in 
terms of national security and it would not hold up well against the ideologies of the 
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 United States and Saudi Arabia that are typically backed with military power and large 
treasuries (e.g. from 2013-2016, Saudi Arabia spent $300 billion on its military while 
Iran spent $45 billion). Finally, it is hard to imagine an American foreign policy capable 
of convincing Iran that relying on its soft power will sufficiently protect Iran’s interests in 
the region.  
Economic power, on the hand, is more promising. It would hold substantial sway 
across the region, but Iran currently lacks the economic muscle to act as a financial, 
economic, and innovative hub with the ability to drive investment and reconstruction 
throughout the war torn region. This is not to say Iran’s economic power could not be 
enhanced. Iran has a relatively robust middle class, a solid education system, and an 
extremely large youth population; hence, Iran has a solid set of inputs that will help it 
become an economic powerhouse in the region. Such a project would take years and 
require international support, thereby giving the international community a degree of 
leverage. More specifically, in order to experience meaningful and holistic economic 
growth across all classes, Iran needs tremendous international financing that largely only 
the United States can provide. Yes, Iran could access finance from other countries, but 
such sources would still be contingent on the nature of American-Iranian relations. At the 
end of the day, financial institutions will not make large scale investments in Iran if they 
believe there is even a slight possibility of the U.S. invading Iran or the possibility of Iran 
sliding into a regional war. Large scale investment necessitates stability.  
The United States and Iran should take advantage of this reality. The medium to 
long term security of the regime rests on the state of the Iranian economy. It realizes this. 
 
155 
 Moreover, as Iran progresses economically, it will translate its growth into regional 
influence by building economic structures in the region, instead of bilateral military 
corridors and enterprises. It is in the absolute Interest of the United States to help Iran 
economically as long as such help is tied directly to a reduction in its support for proxies. 
China and its one belt one road initiative, however, could pose a threat to the U.S.’s 
prospect of using economic support as a gateway to reconciliation. The longer the West 
waits to help Iran beef up its economy, the more likely any leverage it might have would 
fall into the hands of China and other countries with large financial industries.  
Helping Iran economically is directly connected to integrating it into the 
international system, so as to create a situation where Iran will seek to participate in the 
system and not exacerbate from the sidelines. Henry Kissinger is adamant on the 
necessity to not humiliate, punish, and belittle nations who are reinventing themselves for 
the new order. For example, Kissinger criticizes the treaty of Versailles so heavily due to 
the fact that it neither pacified nor weakened Germany after the end of the first world 
war. He attributes this to the fact that Germany was treated too harshly throughout the 
treaty, particularly in the section of what is now known as the War Guilt Clause ― the 
need to pay reparations for all damages done.  Similarly, after the end of the Cold War, 
Kissinger stressed the importance of integrating Russia into the international system 
through a series of economic and political measures. He thought it was necessary not to 
reprimand and scold Russia and Germany for their past actions because it would not help 
establish stability in the future. 
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 Of course, Iran is not recovering from collapse, like the soviet union was, or 
recovering from a  brutal world war, like germany. Yet, the general sentiment of 
Kissinger’s tenet of reintegration holds. One can conceive the JCPOA as a diplomatic 
solution or postponement to an issue that could have been dealt with militarily. The 
nature of the beast is that the international community needs to ingrain Iran into a system 
that, as of now, it has one foot in and one foot out. The JCPOA needs an economic plan 
of support in order to help overcome the deadlock.  
Political influence is more precarious, yet crucial to the needed divorce. It 
threatens the Westphalian principle of nonintervention and is likely to perpetuate the fear 
of expansionism throughout the region. Yet, such fears will need to be suppressed and 
endured ― and addressed when legitimately threatened ― in the short to medium term in 
order to allow for the cultivation of the long-term project of economic development. 
Political support for factions within the axis of resistance will need to be tolerated, as 
verbal and limited resource support is a better alternative than military support. It is 
perhaps best to consider the Axis of resistance as an alliance that contains and suppresses 
the fears of individual factions within the axis by the sense of security it provides through 
the conception of alliedship and strength through numbers.  
Demanding that Iran outrightly abdicate military support for its proxies is naive 
and inevitably fruitless. As a main lever of influence and power, Iran will rely on these 
groups for its national security as long as the policy’s negativities clearly do not outway 
its benefits. In order for Iran to consider rescinding support, the U.S. will first have to 
engage Iran through an overarching period of detenté and offer it alternative security 
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 measures. The nuclear deal is a once in a generation chance, if not a one time prospect, to 
rebuild a degree of trust that will allow for fruitful engagement between the two 
countries. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy should refrain from outrightly suffocating 
Iranian influence in the region and, instead,  gradually set up an incentive structure that 
divorces Iran’s influence from the exploitation of conflict and reconnects it to political 
allyship and economic influence.  
At the end of the day, the enhancement of Iran economic power will not 
completely satisfy Iranian security concerns, despite its plausibility as a substitute for the 
military support of proxies. As the ultimate factor in inter-state relations, hard power 
must be replaced with a close or comparable alternative. ​When​ and ​if​ Iran retires its 
support for its paramilitaries, its relative degree of hard power will diminish. ​If​ Iran 
relinquishes sponsorship, it will do so in anticipation of ― or having already realized ― 
replacement channels of auxiliary national security. ​When​ is dependent on how quick 
regional players are willing to seriously offer and engage Iran on issues of regional and 
national security. Hence, Iran will need to be offered a seat at the table ― a sign and 
respect of its regional power status. Hamid Biglari offers a step in the direction of 
respecting, but addressing regional conflict and security. He states:  
One possible diplomatic arrangement could be a regional security summit,          
attended by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and sponsored by the P5+1,            
building on that groups success in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal.           
Regional ballistic missile reduction as well as a ban on nuclear weapons            
development would be on the agenda. Respect for territorial integrity,          
mutual non-interference in each other’s affairs, safe shipping passage in          
the Persian Gulf, and the eradication of terrorism and religious extremism           
would also need to be negotiated.  150
150 Biglari 2017. 
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As the three supreme states in the region, the summit would be balanced, fair, and 
complete. The 2017 Riyadh Summit that took place in May is the antithesis the summit 
offered by Biglari. The attendees were the statesman of 55 muslim and Arab countries; 
Iran was barred from attending. During the Summit, Saudi Arabia and the United States 
signed an arms treaty amounting to $350 billion dollars over the next ten years. Such 
maneuvers cast hope for regional stability and action into a perpetual state of 
misalignment and, even, perhaps, render a summit suggested by Biglari impossible, let 
alone a sustainable balance of power in the region.  
  
   4.    Accepting Islamism as Heterogeneous  
Kissinger stresses the need for states to capitulate domestic ideals in order to form 
a pluralistic national order to flourish. That is, states need to restrain their urge to treat 
their guiding principles and systems of governance as universal and supreme. Iran and the 
United States both hold their founding principles and historical experiences with high 
regard. The latter is based on liberal democracy, with an emphasis on freedom and 
democracy. The former is founded on Islamic, political institutions and gives heavy 
weight to political independence and antagonism towards the un-equitable international 
order. The institutions of each country are quite dissimilar. 
 The west is particularly frightened by the political concept of Islamism. It is often 
framed as incompatible with Western political traditions. International strategic thinking 
based on pluralism should, in theory, be able to accomodate institutional differences 
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 within the international system. The aforementioned is precisely what occurred 
throughout the 1970s when the United States and China went through a period of 
reconciliation, despite their economic, political, and ideological differences. Throughout 
the first three decades of the Cold War, the United States was accustomed to treating 
communism in monolithic terms.  
Today, any non-secular regime is treated with suspicion, particularly those that 
combine politics and Islam. When Nixon came into power, and thus, Kissinger, a new 
mindset emerged that started to treat communism less monolithically. Conceiving 
communist regimes as not constituting one cohesive threat,  the United States loosened 
up to the idea of engaging the People’s Republic of China. Today, I argue, it would be 
wise to begin to treat Islamism in, similarly, less unitary terms.  
With a specific rendition of Islamism institutionalized into the Iranian state, the 
international community is able to engage and negotiate with the Islamic, theocratic 
government. In the case of militant Islamism ― such as ISIL and al-qaeda and other 
groups ― it lacks the centrality of the state, which makes it hard, if not impossible, to 
engage and negotiate with it. Liberal democracies should seek a way to accommodate 
states that incorporate Islamism into their political structure in a manner similar to how 
the liberal states came to terms with the People's Republic of China and its take on 
communism. It is possible that the international zeal of Islamism will pass as the region 
embraces alternative forms of organization, similar to the fate of communism as the 
Soviet Union collapsed. 
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 The point of the matter is that treating Islamism in a less stringent and hostile 
manner will potentially assist in the attempt to integrate Iran into the international system. 
Iran’s conception of international affairs is often painted as being diametrically opposed 
to the Westphalian framework of order ― that it poses a direct challenge to its guiding 
principles. There is some validity in this appraisal ― as Kissinger displayed in the earlier 
section ― but it is reductionist to treat the entirety of the Iranian political milieu as 
emblematic of rejecting national interest in favor of universal religious principles ― as 
the ideas of Adib-Moghaddam in chapter four displayed. In order to overcome the 
deadlock, the U.S. needs to address the conditions of the international order that cause 
Iran to challenge it ― primarily that it perceives it as unjust. The United States inability 
to entertain the idea that there are other forms of political and economic organization 
other than the renditions of the liberal, democratic form practiced in the global north 
exacerbate Iranian challenges to the international system. Indeed, Iran confronts the 
current order, but it has yet to show to show total rejection of the contemporary tradition 
of the state.  
 
      5.   A Smaller, but Enhanced Role: Balance of Power and American Neutrality  
America’s ultimate goal in the region should be to strike a settlement where all 
significant parties―Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran―are in support of the status 
quo’s distribution of power and where minority parties feel protected and supported by 
the balance. Within the balance, the United States, China, and Russia can pose as outside 
facilitators and additional sources of structural support for the balance. In order for this to 
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 occur, the U.S. needs to construct close relationships with all parties, including Iran. 
These bilateral relationships will need to be closer and more influential than most 
bilateral relationships within the region. Such a task will take years, if not decades, and it 
will be extremely difficult to execute. Such a balance is emblematic of Bismarck's 
diplomatic achievements while in power. In such a position, the U.S. could wield its sway 
with regional powers in a manner that accommodates and reconciles conflicting interests 
and grievances. For such a balance of power structure to exist, the U.S. would have to 
assume a position of neutrality it hasn’t displayed in the region for decades and all 
associated parties would have to hold trusts in the U.S. Moreover, such a strategy 
assumes that at some point in the future, conflicting interests in the region will be reduced 
to a level where a balance would be possible to maintain. Hence, before the balance could 
be cultivated, internal stability in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria will need to transpire. Finally, 
the deadlock between Iran and the U.S. will need to be overcame.  
In order for the United States to help construct a sustainable balance of power, it 
needs to pivot its foreign policy orientation in a number of ways. Besides sticking to the 
guidelines of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it must transform its unconditional 
support for Israel. Israel and its representation in America ― the Israeli Lobby ― enjoy 
an unwarranted amount of influence over U.S. foreign policy. In fact, the policies of the 
lobby and Israel are often counterintuitive to the national interests of the United States. 
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue the aforementioned persuasively in their book 
The Israeli Lobby​. By distancing itself from Israel, the U.S. will take its first step in 
assuming a more neutral role in the region. By no means should the United States 
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 abdicate its position that Israel is to be a secure state, but the U.S. must recognize the 
Palestinian cause with explicit language that condemns Israel’s occupation of Palestinian 
lands in the West Bank and it needs to reinvigorate its support for a two state solution 
(though it should support a one-state solution should that transpire).  The United States 
possess quite a bit of leverage over the foreign policy of Israel, considering it relies 
heavily on the United States ― leverage that is poorly exercised. The U.S. will do well to 
exercises its hold vis-a-vis Israel in a manner that situates America into a centrist position 
that more accurately protects its interests in the region, as pointed argued by Walt and 
Mearsheimer. This pivot would deprive Iran and Islamist causes throughout the Middle 
East the sources of their anti-american rhetoric, as it is largely, but partly, founded on the 
United State’s absolute support for Israel and its reluctance to embrace the palestinian 
cause. 
On a similar note, the United states needs to reconsider its heavy-handed support 
of Saudi Arabia. It can and should start with the abdication of its support for Saudi 
Arabia’s war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United States have a complicated 
relationship, dating back to the Quincy Agreement of 1945, when the President Roosevelt 
promised U.S. military security to Saudi Arabia in exchange for secure access to oil 
supplies. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia bred and exported its wahhabi doctrine across the 
Muslim world, thereby permeating the very ideology the United States spends billions of 
dollars fighting through military confrontation each year. Moreover, portions of the 
monarchy helped fun and facilitate the September 11th attacks. Nevertheless, the 
relationship persists. By distancing itself from the monarchy ― simply by the means of 
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 relinquishing unabiding support ― the U.S. will enhance its regional neutrality twofold. 
The costs will be minimal and are outweighed by the long term prospects in the region 
presented by doing so. 
Renouncing absolute support for Israel and Saudi Arabia will allow the United 
States to pursue a more flexible foreign policy in the region. Primarily, the U.S. will be in 
a position where it can more likely make amends with Iran and loosen its reliance on 
force and rhetoric as the primary means of dealing with a resurgent Iran. In fact, if the 
relationship between Iran and the United States improved, it would likely benefit Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, as the U.S. would have a diplomatic channel with which it could 
mitigate the tensions between the three countries. All of this is in line with a wider 
regional ambition: shaping a smaller physical presence in the Middle East region for the 
United States. The U.S. should not be so necessarily intent on seeing Bashar al-Assad 
removed from power or feel the need to prolong the Syrian Civil War in order to counter 
Russian and Iranian expansionism. Since decolonization, Syria has been within Russian 
and Iranian spheres of influence. If the War were to end with the reestablishment of the 
status quo, it would not definitely harm U.S. interests in the region (albeit tragic). The 
U.S. should maintain its presence in Iraq and Syria on the grounds of expelling and 
cementing the exodus of I.S. as a territorial organization ― no more. By limiting its quest 
in the region to stability and balance of power, the United States will assume a role for 
the 21st century that I and ultimately Henry Kissinger, vehemently argue is in its long 
term interest.  
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5.4 Iranian Recalibration 
Iran, too, must undertake a series of policy pivots if the deadlock is to be 
overcome. One, if the United States releases an official apology for its role in the 1953 
coup d’etat, the Iranian government must welcome it and express forgiveness. Two, Iran 
needs to limit its nuclear program to civil purposes. Three, Iran needs to forgo its support 
for violent extremism, regardless of the breed or the agenda it seeks to push through its 
use. Four, Iran must abdicate its expansionist temptations.  
 
1. Forgiveness 
A firm Iranian expression of forgiveness towards the United States’ role in 
orchestrating the 1953 Coup d’etat and its interference in its politics will be 
commensurate and set the basis for a new time. For the United States, an apology would 
be emblematic of introspection and of the desire for reconciliation. For Iran, forgiveness 
would signal a distinct break from the anti-American fervor that the Islamic Revolution 
was partly based upon. 
Yet, forgiveness might very well be an unrealistic expectation. The regime’s 
legitimacy is partly derived from its anti-American rhetoric. Therefore, should the 
Islamic Republic of Iran accept the apology of the United States, it could mean 
renouncing anti-Americanism as a source of legitimacy. The regime’s primary concern 
― the continued existence of the theocratic regime ― could very well stand between the 
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 acceptance and rejection of an apology. How an apology will be received is ultimately 
contingent on timing and the internal calculations of the regime. Accordingly, the United 
States should be mindful of these contingencies when it considers offering an apology. 
Accepting an apology from the United States is in the interest of the regime. 
Perpetual animosity towards a foreign power is not a sustainable or desirable form of 
legitimacy. The regime would do well to repurpose its authority away from American 
antipathy and towards a domestic project of rejuvenation. By expressing forgiveness, Iran 
will be distancing itself from its antediluvian past, which could provide a gateway to a 
future predicated on regional integration and prosperity rather than manipulation and 
exploitation of warring factions. The point being: forgiveness will create a space for 
reinvention that will allow Iran to calibrate its place in world politics. 
 
    2.  Non-Proliferation 
Iran’s nuclear ambition―with the exception of Israel―sets it apart in the Middle 
East region and it is the chief source of tension between Iran and the United States. The 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the culmination of a series of none continuous 
negotiations that began 12 years before the treaty was ratified in 2015. Essentially, for the 
next ten years Iran will never be more than a year away from nuclear weapon capability 
and after that initial decade, its capabilities will improve and it will be able to assemble a 
weapon if it chooses within a shorter time frame. The temporary and tolerant nature of 
the treaty and the inability of the Obama administration to link nuclear restraint to 
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 regional military and political restraint are the mainstay of the criticism directed at the 
deal. 
Henry Kissinger critiques the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on three fronts. 
First, Kissinger asserts inspection and enforcement of the deal will be a perpetual and 
perhaps insurmountable challenge to the deals efficacy. Second, the framework of the 
agreement is predicated on the acceptance of Iranian enrichment and the logic of 
multilateral nuclear deterrence, leaving Iran within close reach of a weapon and the 
region still in nuclear limbo. Third, the JCPOA will not improve regional order, but 
“reinforce, not resolve the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling 
American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to 
necessitate deepening involvement there ― on complex new terms.” Indeed, nearly three 
years since the frameworks ratification, instability in the region has remained consistent 
if not exasperated. Moreover, the United States has a heavier presence in the region than 
it did in 2015. 
Nevertheless, now that the deal is established, it is foolish to strip it of its 
credence or ignore its obligations. Hence, Iran should continue to abide by it and the 
United States should remain faithful to its word. If the United States abdicated from the 
deal, it would tarnish its ability in the future to construct and realize nuanced, multilateral 
negotiations on which the international order is increasingly predicated. Second, an 
attempt to reimpose sanctions risks isolating America, as it would be difficult to restore 
the international sanctions regime when Iran is abiding by the deal. Accordingly, even if 
the United States fails to meet its obligations under JCPOA, Iran should continue to 
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 adhere to the deal, considering the p5+1 have expressed a commitment to the deal despite 
the United States’ hesitancy under a new administration. 
If Tehran remains faithful to the framework despite the precarious behavior of 
Washington, the simple shock of a change in a Presidential administration might be 
sufficiently and politically weighty to recast relations between Iran and the United States 
in the direction of detenté. If Iran backs away from the deal, the United States and Iran 
will no longer have common ground and will need to start from scratch. The 
consequences of this are unforeseen. At worst, inter-state conflict in the region will 
emerge and perhaps an outright war, as there will be no pact to mitigate nuclear agitation 
and America will not be able provide the Arab states with  the security they depend 
heavily on. Ultimately, Iran and the United States need to remain faithful to the nuclear 
framework and focus attention on their counterparts heavy hand in the region.  
  
    3.   Iranian Backed Militias and Expansionism 
Currently, the major threat emanating from Iran is its militant foreign policy and 
expansionist behavior ― not its nuclear program which is temporarily placated. Iran has 
bolstered its position in the region at the expense of prolonging and aggravating the civil 
wars that have stricken the Middle East. It relies on insurgencies, milias, political 
opposition movements, and terrorist groups in order to execute its foreign policy agenda 
in nearly every country in the Middle East. This dependency is due to its own resource 
limitations and a lack of willingness to use its own national military. These tactics have 
largely been effective and have helped challenge the status quo in the region. 
Unfortunately, Iran’s success in the region is dependent on unrest. Accordingly, Iran’s 
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 bolstered position is predicated on the Middle East’s instability. In addition, Iran is a 
sufficient power to the point where steadiness in the region will require its cooperation.  
A challenge presents itself: Iran depends on unrest for its influence and, 
simultaneously, stability in the region depends on Iranian temperance. A roadblock to the 
reconciliation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran is that the fact 
that the latter benefits from the disarray at the former’s expense. The U.S. will not 
continuously and positively engage Iran when it is directly supporting the forces that 
challenge the interests of the United States. The reverse also holds true: Iran will not 
warm up to the United States while it forces are stationed in its backyard. The 
dichotomous nature of relations makes reconciliation particularly hard.  
On Iran’s part, it must treat its support for regional militias as a temporary and 
ultimately negotiable. This does not mean abdicating its support in order to comply with 
the preconditions of negotiations laid out by the United States. It does mean coming to 
terms with the fact that it eventually needs to pivot the source of its influence from 
Iranian-backed militias to other political and economic avenues (these avenues were 
described in an earlier section). The issue of Iranian-backed militias will perhaps be 
solved by connecting it to issues of American military presence in the region. If solved in 
tandem and in contingency to the other, Iran and the United States will be on a path to 
surmount the deadlock. 
Finally, Iran must heavily curtail the expansionist tendencies that arise from a 
belief that the nation ought to dominate the Middle East due to its historical experiences 
of consolidating the wider region into a single empire. This paper has painted 
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 expansionism as a redline. Hence, if the Islamic Republic of Iran leads a military effort to 
annex or occupy a neighboring country, an international military response will be 
necessary in order to preserve the multipolar power structure of the region. An imperial 
Iran would certainly suspend the possibility of reconciliation between it and the United 
States until deep into the 21st century. On this note, Iran will do well to abstain from 
inter-state military aggression or invasion. 
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